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ABSTRACT 
Samuel Finesurrey: Cuba’s Anglo-American Colony in Times of Revolution (1952-1961) 
(Under the direction of Louis A. Pérez Jr.) 
 “Cuba’s Anglo-American Colony in Times of Revolution, 1952-1961” explores how, in 
the context of revolution, contact between Cubans and U.S. nationals--as well as a smaller 
number of British and Canadian residents--reproduced existing hierarchies, while simultaneously 
creating new empathies. Cuba’s Anglo-American residents managed informal empire by 
developing and cultivating economic, political and cultural authority on the island. These 
privileged outsiders were able to exert dominance through socio-economic partnerships with 
Cuban powerbrokers. However, Anglo-American educators, journalists, missionaries, politicians, 
executives, mobsters and philanthropists crafted a diverse, and often contradictory set of 
alliances with Cubans. Through archival research and oral histories conducted with former 
residents of the self-titled Anglo-American colony, this dissertation argues that proximity to 
Cuban suffering, most powerfully experienced by U.S. educators and missionaries, forged 
conditions that challenged existing class-and-nationality-based structures on the island. In the 
context of revolution, where their Cuban colleagues, classmates, students, parishioners, friends 
and family risked their lives and their privilege for a “new” Cuba, a significant segment of 
Anglo-American residents entered into cross-cultural solidarities with revolutionary actors. 
Based on the personal commitments they developed with Cubans, many U.S., British and 
Canadian nationals residing in Cuba struggled for a socio-economic and political transformation 
of Cuban society, both before the revolution ousted the Batista government and after the 
revolutionary government had consolidated power. The influence, presence, and actions of 
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Anglo-American residents profoundly impacted the direction of events in Cuba and the United 
States. This research centers a new set of actors, institutions, and relationships in the narrative of 
the Cuban Revolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the Spring of 2011, I spent five months teaching English in Leon, Nicaragua, and 
became fast friends with Alexis, another foreigner. Originally from Honduras, Alexis arrived in 
Nicaragua as a teenager. He would move again a few years later in search of employment to 
Costa Rica. Working in a cellphone repair shop, Alexis faced limited financial security. Still, he 
proved a tremendous aid in helping me secure a place to stay at his uncle’s and directing me to 
cheap dining options normally hidden to foreigners. We would go out with the tourists and 
expats living nearby most nights, or the students at the Norwegian language school a few blocks 
away, but we rarely had more than one or two Central Americans with us. With just a bit of 
English, Alexis entered into a social world designed for the comfort of privileged outsiders. Both 
of us were outsiders to Nicaragua, but my socio-economic background and nationality garnered 
me obvious advantages. 
 In a moment of beer-induced clarity, Alexis spoke of his frustration with the advantages 
denied to him, but enjoyed by Anglo-Americans. He recognized that for foreign tourists, ex-pats, 
English teachers, entrepreneurs and students, Nicaragua represented a carefree retreat from our 
lives. Despite the revolutionary Sandinista government, the privilege of Anglo-Americans in 
Nicaragua, in comparison to “Nicas” and other Central Americans, was clear. Alexis’ daily 
struggle for subsistence would continue long after we left, long after our individual “generosity” 
was delivered to the residents of the town of Léon, long after we journeyed elsewhere. Our 
friendship developed on an always uncomfortable platform of transnational inequity. Nicaragua 
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was fully accessible to Anglo-American residents and travelers, while experiences and 
opportunities within his adopted home were severely constrained for Alexis.  
 In this dissertation I define privileged outsiders as individuals visiting, working, studying 
or volunteering in economically marginalized nations, who benefit from their nationality and 
access to foreign capital. They can enjoy foreign cultures without the burdens of living like the 
“locals.” In Nicaragua, Anglo-American tourists and ex-pats were not experiencing life as a 
Central American, but rather dipping their toes into a Central American reality on their terms; 
absorbing what they desired, distancing themselves from what proved too unfamiliar and staying 
only as long as they chose. Many would eventually catalogue “travel abroad” or “international 
service work” on resumes, as they paved professional paths far from our Central American rest 
stops. Yet in most instances, their positions as privileged outsiders made it difficult to identify 
with the sustained struggles and ambitions of those most marginalized in their host society. 
 When visiting or residing in economically disadvantaged parts of the world, privileged 
outsiders are typically white, relatively wealthy, North Americans or Europeans. Anglo-
Americans enjoy the long reach of geopolitical influence of their governments when traveling to 
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. U.S. nationals in particular get peppered with 
questions about the U.S. political landscape, as the policies of the United States reverberate with 
tremendous implications throughout the globe. Privileged outsiders generally live in elite 
neighborhoods and dine out more often than could be afforded at home as their money goes 
further in these settings. With the concept of doubly privileged, Albert Memmi argues that the 
presence of an underprivileged local group enables privileged outsiders to operate with 
substantial advantages, even more than those available in their nations of origin.1 Those from the 
                                                 
1 Much of what Albert Memmi experienced under the formal colonization of French Tunisia remains true in settings 
of informal empire, and notably for the privileged outsiders of pre-revolutionary Cuba. Memmi explains, the 
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United States generally do not have to fear local law enforcement, as most authority figures will 
protect U.S. citizens, even when that protection impinges on the freedoms of the local 
community.  
 By examining the Anglo-American colony of 1950s Cuba, in this dissertation I am 
studying the long history of North American and European outsiders enjoying privilege in 
historically disadvantaged nations, as corporate representatives, students, educators, journalists, 
missionaries, government officials, military personnel, explorers, men and women on adventure, 
workers in NGOs, philanthropists, researchers and volunteers. I too am implicated in these 
dynamics. From a high school program in Spain, to a gap year in Costa Rica, a study abroad 
program in Egypt, volunteer work in Nicaragua after college, and life as a graduate student in 
Cuba and Chile, I have spent years benefiting from the global influence of the United States 
while living abroad. As an English teacher in Léon and Cairo, I taught the language of political 
and economic dominance, supporting individuals eager to achieve social mobility by cultivating 
skills desirable to Anglo-American employers. My position as a U.S. national abroad allowed me 
to seek refuge in Starbucks and Burger King, attend classes and read road signs in English; I 
could depend on the assistance of the police, afford the tourist bus, the train sleeping car, auto-
rentals and a flight home. These half-in half-out experiences allow privileged outsiders to shape 
                                                 
privileges of imperial forces do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they come at the expense of the subordinated. 
Memmi argues that imperialism naturally causes dialectical inequities between colonized and colonizer, “If [the 
colonizer’s] living standards are high, it is because those of the colonized are low; if he can benefit from plentiful 
and undemanding labor and servants, it is because the colonized can be exploited at will and are not protected by the 
laws of the colony…” The Tunisian scholar continued to explain what it means to be a privileged outsider with 
regards to legal accountability, “If [the colonizer] is in trouble with the law, the police and even justice will be more 
lenient toward him. If he needs assistance from the government, it will not be difficult; red tape will be cut…”  
Memmi further details the economic and educational value of the privileged outsider’s identity, “Jobs and positions 
will be reserved for him in advance; the tests will be given in his language.” The hierarchies that framed Memmi’s 
life in French Tunisia, from which he derived these theories, reflect dynamics parallel to, but distinct from the 
experience that privileged outsiders encountered in pre-revolutionary Cuba. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and The 
Colonized (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991), 8, 12, 64. 
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transnational contact on their/our own terms, in ways familiar yet remote, intimate while separate 
and always secure in the reality that they/we can leave at any time. While not a colonist in the 
traditional sense, in today’s world, as they did in 1950s Cuba, privileged outsiders benefit 
enormously from the political, economic, social and religious tentacles of informal empire, with 
tremendous implications for both privileged outsiders and their respective host societies.  
 Drawing from archival research, a collection of seventy-seven original oral histories and 
nine email exchanges (see Appendix A for sample), this dissertation argues that in Cuba, as 
elsewhere in the world, hierarchies of ethnicity, nation and class are typically reproduced and 
solidified through inter-group economic and social relations. Yet, as will be revealed later in the 
text, in moments of shared struggle and proximity to suffering, locals and privileged outsiders 
can forge transnational solidarities in contexts of informal empire. These relationships have the 
potential to move history, as this dissertation will argue was the case in Cuba during a decade of 
revolutionary upheaval between 1952-1961. 
… 
 Primarily comprised of U.S. nationals and a smaller number of British and Canadian 
residents, the self-titled “Anglo-American colony” formed among white English-speaking 
privileged outsiders living, working and studying in Cuba before the revolution. While the 
population of the colony fluctuated dramatically between 1898 and 1961, by the mid-1950s 
approximately 15,000 Anglo-American colony members spread throughout the island, managing 
influential cultural, political and economic institutions.2 With a commitment to excavating both 
                                                 
2 By 1899, during the first U.S. occupation, 6,444 U.S. citizens resided on the island along with 588 British nationals 
and 56 Canadians. The Anglo-American population grew by around 1,000 people in the 1907 census taken during 
the second U.S. occupation with 6,713 U.S. residents and 1,252 British nationals. U.S. nationals in Cuba alone 
comprised a population of 9,555 in 1919. Total U.S. citizens numbered 13,005 including Puerto Ricans who gained 
their citizenship from the Jones Act in 1917. Seven-thousand-one-hundred-and-ninety-five U.S. residents, excluding 
Puerto Ricans, remained in 1931. The withdrawal of U.S. capital combined with the entry of the United States into 
World War II left just 3,800 U.S. residents in Cuba in 1943, as the number of British residents fell from 3,095 in 
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the enormous collective power of, as well as the rich heterogeneity within, the Anglo-American 
community, this dissertation explores the various commitments, relationships and identities 
formed in the inter-cultural contact zones of Cuba’s foreign-directed schools, households, 
churches, businesses, sugar mills, casinos, brothels, military bases, and social clubs from 1952-
1961. “Contact zones” are defined by Mary Louise Pratt as “Social spaces where cultures meet, 
clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of 
power....”3 In Cuba, these spaces varied wildly, fostering myriad inter-group experiences and 
relationships between Cubans of diverse backgrounds and members of the self-titled Anglo-
American colony. 
Cuba offers a valuable case study in the history of transnational contact given the 
significant influence of Anglo-Americans in Cuba before 1959, and their general absence from 
the island after 1961. While this dissertation combines archival materials and original oral 
histories to chronicle the well-established presence and reproduction of foreign influence through 
Cuba’s Anglo-American-controlled edifices, it draws attention to important counter narratives, 
revealing how some privileged outsiders on the island evolved into advocates for Cubans 
disenfranchised by the existing order. These Anglo-American residents both reproduced and also 
helped to destabilize their own exalted status in Cuba. This research peels back how cross-
                                                 
1931 to 1,887 in 1943. The 1953 Census reports 6,503 U.S. citizens, 272 Canadians and nearly 15,000 members of 
the British Commonwealth living in Cuba. Census data is further analyzed in Chapters One and Two. U.S. War 
Department, Office Director Census of Cuba, Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1900), 98, 220-221; Oficiná del censo de los Estados Unidos, Censo de la República de Cuba, 1907 
(Montpelier, VT: The Capital City Press, 1908), 340; Junta Nacional del Censo, Censo de la República de Cuba, 
1919 (La Habana, Cuba: Maza, Arroyo y Caso, S en C., 1919), 431; Junta Nacional del Censo, República de Cuba, 
Informe general del censo de 1943 (La Habana, Cuba: P. Fernández y CIA., S. en C., 1943); Oficina Nacional de los 
Censos Demográfico y Electoral, Censos de población, viviendas y electoral (La Habana, Cuba: Tribunal Superior 
Electoral, 1953), 81; “12,168 Americans Reported Living Here,” Times of Havana, September 16, 1957, 1. 
3 Mary Louise Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” Ways of Reading, 5th edition, eds. David Bartholomae and Anthony 
Petroksky (NY: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), 2. 
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cultural relationships between Cubans and privileged outsiders were mobilized, by Cubans and 
Anglo-Americans, to challenge the Batista government, welcome the revolution and then contest 
the island’s new authorities once the revolutionary government threatened their collective 
influence and status. This is a study of many, often conflicting stories about the bonds of 
informal empire, strategic resistance, and the emergence of cross-cultural solidarities, tracing the 
island’s Anglo-American colony from its emergence to its eventual exile. 
The Birth of Informal Empire in Cuba  
 In their 1953 article “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” John Gallagher and Ronald 
Robinson challenged historians who explored imperialism, specifically British Imperialism, in 
strictly colonial contexts. By highlighting the ways trade and economic influence allowed an 
expansion of British authority during the Victorian Era, Gallagher and Robinson complicated the 
notion of empire by popularizing the concept of informal empire.4 Poppy Fry defines informal 
empire as “the exercise of controlling influence by one group or polity over another, without an 
associated claim to political sovereignty or ‘ownership.’”5 Matthew Brown expands this notion 
to argue that informal empire results from the dominance of foreign “commerce, capital, and 
culture.”6 Distinct from formal colonization, in informal empire powerful nations exert authority 
over a subordinated state without directly managing their affairs. In many ways Cuba was a 
strategic site for informal empire by the United States, after Cubans gained independence in 
1902. 
                                                 
4 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review 6, no. 1 
(1953): 1-15. 
5 Poppy Fry, “Informal Empire,” Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World, ed. Peter N. Stearns (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008): 167-172. 
6 Matthew Brown, Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce, and Capital (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 21. 
7 
 No longer primarily motivated by land acquisition, as had been the case in the West, 
Mexico and Hawaii in the nineteenth century, by the twentieth century the U.S. government and 
its corporations would extract capital without the formal colonization of foreign peoples. In close 
consultation with the U.S. government and foreign executives, Cuban policymakers prioritized 
North American and European economic, political and cultural interests, severely constraining 
the effectiveness of Cuban strategies to address poverty, health care, infrastructure and 
education. Anglo-American residents, largely from the United States, managed powerful 
corporate, diplomatic and social institutions that collectively pressured, convinced, cajoled 
and/or bribed Cuban leaders to advance Anglo-American aims. Jules Benjamin explains the 
implications of this informal structure in Cuba: “While the extensive U.S. economic presence 
benefited those [Cubans] who integrated themselves into it or who learned to manipulate it, the 
larger effect was to exacerbate class and sectorial tensions. At the same time, the ability of 
Cuban leaders to contain or resolve such conflicts was undermined by their need to adhere to 
U.S. advice.”7 Domination by foreign capital and the threat of U.S. intervention fueled 
systematic corruption within the Cuban government, and the valuing of Anglo-American, and 
particularly U.S. interests, over the needs of Cubans. After numerous military and diplomatic 
incursions in the first decades of the twentieth century, Cuban leaders understood that their 
continued power was precariously contingent on the support of, and compliance to the United 
States government, as well as U.S. corporate interests.  
 Through the deployment of “development” discourses, Anglo-Americans in Cuba 
circulated and institutionalized a logic that legitimized their influence in the economic, political 
                                                 
7 Jules R. Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of 
National Liberation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 5.  
8 
and cultural spheres, while often denigrating the capacity and undermining the structures of 
Cuban society.8 Economic development materialized as large foreign-owned sugar plantations, 
mining operations, cattle ranches and industrial factories hired tens of thousands of Cuban and 
other Caribbean workers. These efforts spawned by Anglo-American companies were justified 
by claims of spurring the Cuban economy, as well as providing jobs. Yet, widespread investment 
by foreign corporations across Cuba, but in rural Cuba most particularly, offered little material 
opportunity for social advancement among the vast majority of their non-Anglo-American 
workforce.9  
 In an effort to protect large-scale investments by Anglo-American firms, the United 
States government undertook multiple military and diplomatic interventions into Cuba in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. The interruption of governmental functions destabilized Cuban 
political structures, just as the co-option of Cuban officials by Anglo-American capital 
undermined the integrity of the Cuban government. It did not take long for the island’s priorities 
to become aligned with the ambitions of foreign corporations. For many Anglo-American 
residents, the resulting instability of the Cuban state reinforced their sense of superiority and fed 
a logic that prescribed foreign investment and Anglo-American leadership to ameliorate Cuban 
                                                 
8 In supplementing formal colonial structures with those of informal empire, Arturo Escobar argues that seeking 
justification for the continued subjugation of foreign societies, the United States and Europe developed a discourse 
of development that justified the dominance of Western authority. Using the tools of science, technology, planning 
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illiteracy and disease, as if the existence of these were unrelated to early and continued manifestations of empire. 
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failed to solve the basic problems of underdevelopment, it can be said—perhaps with greater pertinence—that it has 
succeeded well in creating a type of underdevelopment that has been, for the most part, politically and technically 
manageable.” Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 47. 
9 Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García, Sugar and Railroads: A Cuban History, 1837-1959 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 211. 
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underdevelopment.10 Anglo-American schools and churches were founded on the ideology that 
they would improve the Cuban condition even as most Anglo-Americans on the island doggedly 
viewed Cubans as unable to achieve economic or cultural parity, and in constant need of tutelage 
from foreigners.  
 In the context of informal empire, the Anglo-American “development” of Cuba spread 
through economic, political, educational and religious capillaries, and thus was presumably 
outside state control. Cuba’s Anglo-American colony shared the aim of formal colonial and 
settler colonial projects to extract wealth and restructure Cuban identities. However, Anglo-
Americans managing economic and cultural institutions in Cuba largely did not fit neatly into a 
storied tradition of colonialism. Their practical function was to limit Cuban sovereignty by 
streamlining the island’s political and economic priorities to appease and accommodate 
privileged outsiders and foreign capital. By cultivating Cuban partners dexterous in Anglo-
American culture and at the top of Cuba’s professional, industrial and political classes, 
privileged outsiders successfully exerted their influence through socio-economic alliances while 
generally avoiding direct management of Cuban political affairs. 
 Knowledge production often worked to normalize hierarchies in Cuba and proved crucial 
to cementing the structures of informal empire. Many Anglo-American educators and 
missionaries arrived on the island dedicated to improving the lives of Cubans. Most, at least 
initially, were not aware of the ways in which their presence sustained a stratified society 
dominated by foreigners. By equipping their students and parishioners with English and Anglo-
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supposed to explain his penury, serves at the same time as a contrast to the luxury of the colonist…. This place, the 
people here, the customs of this country are always inferior—by virtue of an inevitable and pre-established order.” 
Memmi, The Colonizer and The Colonized, 67-68. 
10 
American customs, they trained individual Cubans to advance socially and financially. With an 
Anglo-American education and Anglo-American contacts, these Cubans were better able to gain 
employment and/or forge business ties with foreign corporations.  
 Though many Cubans were able to secure stable employment at foreign corporations and 
enter into the Anglo-American social orbit, after six decades of informal empire, the dominance 
of Anglo-Americans in Cuba largely remained stable.11 In his work, The Location of Culture 
Homi Bhabha explains that attempts at mimicry of the colonizer by locals do not create parity 
between colonized and colonizing groups, but instead, solidify colonial hierarchies. Bhabha 
argues that colonial forms of knowledge legitimate ethnic and/or national stratification, even as 
they seduce marginalized groups to imagine achieving parity with the colonizer.12  
 While reproductions of ethnic, national and class hierarchies remained an important 
effect of Cuba’s Anglo-American colony, it is also true that at the membranes where cultures 
come into contact, hybrid identities, transnational relationships and shared political ambitions for 
the island’s future emerged between select Cubans and Anglo-Americans. While most Anglo-
Americans lived in luxury unimaginable in their home countries, in Havana they lived among, 
not above, wealthy Cuban professionals. While Anglo-American executives and diplomats often 
worked in tandem influencing events in Cuba, they did so with the cooperation of Cuban allies. 
The distinction between direct colonial administration and the everyday seepage of foreign 
political, cultural and economic influence in informal empire is important for understanding the 
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varied and shifting subjectivities of privileged outsiders and Cubans, in Cuba before and after 
1959.  
Understandably, Cubans educated by Anglo-Americans became personally invested in 
elevating Anglo-American knowledge and cultural forms. Eager to participate in the 
development of their nation through acquisition of foreign skills-sets that would enhance their 
financial and social prospects, many Cubans enthusiastically entered (or sent their children to) 
institutions managed by Anglo-Americans. Over time, these Cubans would become the most 
vocal advocates for Anglo-American ideologies. Before the revolution, foreign-educated Cubans 
profited from their ability to communicate with Anglo-Americans as their training enabled them 
to garner employment at foreign companies or cultivate business relationships with members of 
the Anglo-American colony. After 1959, Cubans who benefited from their ties to foreigners 
generally defended Anglo-American influence; the value of their transnational skill-set directly 
depended on the ascendancy of foreign capital and non-Cuban cultural forms.13 
 In this arrangement of informal empire, Anglo-Americans in Cuba enjoyed a political 
flexibility absent in many sites of formal colonialism, enabling them to see themselves, and to be 
seen by some Cubans as politically “neutral” during the revolution. Unlike the French colonists 
in Africa and Indochina or the British in Africa and South Asia, the Anglo-Americans in Cuba 
were not explicitly entangled in Cuban political affairs. That is, the governing authority in Cuba 
before 1959 was sovereign from the United States, although highly dependent on and thus 
generally aligned with Washington. This significant distinction between informal empire and 
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formal empire enabled Anglo-American residents to disavow the governing authority, even as 
they personally reaped the benefits of foreign influence. When the revolution triumphed, many 
celebrated because, as Anglo-American colony member Adele Fuchsberg remembered, “We 
needed a change from the criminal Batista.”14 Anglo-Americans were able to distance 
themselves from the political conflict of the late 1950s, as ostensibly outside observers, above 
the tumult of their adopted home. Cuban friends and neighbors had worked hard and effectively 
to convince them that the Batista government needed to be overthrown and that Cuba needed to 
transition from dictatorship. However, by the end of 1959, as Anglo-American interests came 
under attack by the revolution, many of these foreign-trained members of the Cuban professional 
class resisted what they considered the radical and nationalist turn of their government. These 
Cubans would eventually join their Anglo-American friends in exile at a significantly higher rate 
than those Cubans who did not participate in Anglo-American knowledge-producing institutions.  
 In similar fashion, most of the Anglo-American colony grew disillusioned with the 
revolution only after their economic and social status was challenged.15 Determined to exorcise 
U.S. influence after 1959, leaders of the revolution did not fear Washington’s retaliation as had 
the previous Cuban governments. No longer protected by their national identity, Anglo-
Americans increasingly faced the consequences of their political activities.16 The Cuban 
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Revolution shattered the protective armor of informal empire that previously enveloped those 
Cubans and foreigners fluent in Anglo-American ways. Anglo-Americans and their Cuban allies 
found themselves privileged outsiders and privileged insiders no longer. They became highly 
critical of, as many mobilized to contest, the revolution most had once supported. 
Forms of Contact in Informal Empire 
 As a theoretical and historic exploration of informal empire, this project documents the 
combined imprint and also the great heterogeneity within the Anglo-American colony. It unveils 
the contradictory forms of contact between Anglo-Americans and Cubans, and the resultant 
commitments, tensions and solidarities that evolved during the tumultuous decade that began 
with the Batista coup of March 1952 and concluded with the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961.  
The notion of “contact” has long been studied as a set of relations between dominants and 
subordinates. In 1954, in the wake of the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision, 
Psychologist Gordon Allport elaborated the conditions under which contact in desegregated 
schools could usher in more positive cross-racial relations and educational equity. Allport 
articulated four key conditions necessary for positive effects of contact: equal group status; 
common goals; intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities, laws or customs.17 Over 
the past sixty-four years, many scholars, including indigenous theorist Eve Tuck, as well as post-
colonial South African scholars Kevin Durrheim, Nicola Jacobs and John Dixon have challenged 
Allport’s positive vision of integration, arguing instead that contact between dominant and 
marginalized groups has typically, and historically, sustained exploitation. These scholars 
contend that assimilation for select members of marginalized communities essentially reproduces 
hierarchies by normalizing subordination and allowing those with power to define the terms of 
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contact and inclusion.18  However other theorists, including Mary Louise Pratt, María Elena 
Torre and Gloria Anzaldúa argue that in the spaces of “borderlands” or “contact zones” shared 
between dominant and subordinated cultures, hierarchies can be at once reproduced and 
contested, reshaping identities and creating new forms of political knowledge.19 This dissertation 
interrogates contact in a variety of settings, and explores the resultant exploitation, hybridities, 
and solidarities that emerged between Anglo-Americans and Cubans. The research focuses on 
stratified contact between Cuban and Caribbean labor and foreign management, transcultural 
socio-economic contact among members of the Anglo-American and Cuban professional class, 
and contact forged in struggle among Protestant missionaries and parishioners, particularly in 
rural Cuba.  
 Stratified contact pursued by Anglo-American corporate executives enforced rigid 
hierarchies between privileged outsiders and Cuban, as well as Caribbean laborers. Unlike 
Allport’s template, these groups interacted across large and unchallenged chasms of power, 
class, race and nationality, with neither shared goals nor equal status.  In the sugar mills, mines 
and factories dotting the island, these highly stratified forms of management-labor contact, laced 
with unrealized expectations of parity, would ultimately lead to the building of resentment 
against foreign management. Depictions of the U.S.-owned sugar mill would serve as part of the 
justification for challenging U.S. influence and advocating a radical socio-economic 
restructuring of Cuban society. Corporate executives committed to sustaining the status quo, 
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soured early on the revolution and mobilized their substantial power and political influence to 
undermine the new Cuban government.  
At the same time, transcultural socio-economic alliances also formed during this 
decade between relatively wealthy Cuban professionals and foreign educators, students, 
journalists, urban missionaries, as well as select business-oriented long-term Anglo-American 
residents. Cuban professionals cultivated near-equal status by accessing and acquiring Western 
skill-sets and networks garnered at foreign-run schools, social clubs, churches and business 
associations. Transnational relations between these groups resulted in hybrid identities and cross-
cultural alliances in support of democratic reforms with a shared commitment to sustained 
Anglo-American influence. While these transnational networks initially worked to defend the 
revolutionary Cuban government, after 1959 a substantial percentage of these professional class 
Cubans and their Anglo-Americans allies left the island and many participated in counter-
revolutionary efforts.  
Solidarity through struggle developed between rural missionaries and their Cuban, and 
to a lesser degree Haitian and West Indian parishioners, patients and students, as they 
collectively bore witness to some of the more brutal manifestations of desperation and violence 
during the late-1950s. Those involved in this dynamic viewed the Batista government, as well as 
foreign corporations, as obstacles to change. Though often still subordinated to Anglo-American 
missionaries, by the 1950s rural Cuban Protestants had increasingly attained leadership 
responsibilities in Cuba’s Protestant churches. Shared experiences of hardship enabled rural 
Anglo-American missionaries to ally with empowered Cuban Protestants striving for both a 
democratic and socio-economic transformation of Cuban society.  
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These three forms of contact evolved on the same island, in distinct geographic and 
socio-economic contexts. They developed as competing, yet intersecting elements of the vibrant 
Anglo-American colony.  
Dissertation Outline  
 Organized into four sections and divided into ten chapters, this dissertation explores the 
diverse political, professional, religious and educational contexts of varied segments of the 
Anglo-American colony and their Cuban, as well as their Caribbean contacts, across ethnicity, 
gender and class, to explain how this expatriate enclave deployed, internalized and negotiated 
their privileged roles as managers of informal empire in Cuba. Many U.S., British and Canadian 
nationals came to Cuba to provide spiritual or educational training to Cubans. Some sought to 
reorient Cuban values. Most, however, arrived with the purpose of extracting influence and 
capital. Within the Anglo-American colony, the differing ambitions and relationships cultivated 
by educators, journalists, missionaries, diplomats, sailors, corporate executives, mobsters, 
farmers and philanthropists led to the formation of uneven alliances with Cubans in the anti-
Batista movement, and later the development of strategic partnerships with Cubans and foreign 
governments waging counter-revolution. The individual and collective influence, presence and 
actions of privileged outsiders held profound implications for the direction of events in Cuba 
between 1898 and 1961. Indeed, the implications of this community continue to impact U.S.-
Cuban relations to this day. Focusing on the final decade of this period 1952-1961, this 
dissertation unveils how exploitation, but also solidarities were nurtured in informal empire in 
times of conflict, while introducing a significant set of actors, institutions and relationships into 
the narrative of the Cuban Revolution. 
Section One, “Constructing and Maintaining Informal Empire” establishes the 
significance and enactments of informal empire before the revolution. Chapter One develops a 
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framework to understand how Anglo-Americans cultivated their influence over Cuba through 
military might, capital, and alliances with Cubans. It explores how formal, as well as informal 
empire accommodated privileged outsiders, while disrupting communities of Cubans, West 
Indians and Haitians, and spiking tensions across the Caribbean. Chapter Two examines how the 
relationship between Fulgencio Batista, U.S. officials and foreign capital consolidated Batista’s 
control on the island, secured Anglo-American influence and extracted capital from Cuba. 
Chapter Three explores Anglo-American farming villages, dotted throughout eastern Cuba and 
the Isle of Pines, where North Americans and Europeans sought to create idyllic Anglo-
American replica communities, before being forced to leave or integrate into Cuban society due 
to natural disasters and the shifting priorities of Cuban and U.S. power brokers. These three 
chapters detail how privileged outsiders and their Cuban allies forged socio-economic alliances, 
exercising power in Cuba in ways that codified the structures of informal empire at the expense 
of both Caribbean workers and independent Anglo-American farming communities. 
 Section Two, “Cultivating Privilege and Partners in the Cuban Capital” chronicles how 
contact between Cuban professionals and Anglo-Americans functioned to both reinforce and 
challenge national hierarchies in the Cuban capital. Chapter Four traces the development of inter-
cultural alliances in Havana, within Anglo-American-managed institutions, where educators and 
other knowledge producers advanced Western skill-sets to the benefit of foreign corporations, 
while promoting political democracy on the island. Chapter Five explores how transnational 
contact within foreign-managed institutions in Havana forged solid working, and then political 
and social relationships between relatively wealthy Cuban professionals and Anglo-Americans, 
transforming both groups culturally and politically. Through an extensive collection of oral 
histories and archival documents, as well as secondary materials, Chapters Four and Five detail 
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how inter-group socio-economic alliances yielded new and hybrid Cuban and Anglo-American 
identities, solidarities and commitments crucial to understanding the transnational support for 
revolution, and then counter-revolution.  
 Section Three, “Solidarity Through Struggle” narrates the conflicted position of rural 
missionaries in Cuba. Though they reproduced Anglo-American knowledge and values, often in 
the service of U.S. corporations, and worked to reshape Cuban spiritual and religious life, these 
missionaries also sought to break the cyclical nature of Cuban poverty after being exposed to 
Cuban suffering. Chapter Six examines the fraught motives and dynamics of Anglo-American 
corporations and political institutions intent upon recruiting foreign missionaries to manage 
schools, churches and clinics. While missionaries provided basic services to rural workers, they 
soon discovered that the suffering they encountered developed in large part as a consequence of 
the structures of informal empire. Chapter Seven is grounded in rural Cuba. Informed by 
interviews, diaries, memoirs and letters provided by some of these missionaries, this chapter 
uncovers the ethical commitments and empathies that developed between missionaries and 
impoverished Cubans living in company towns, who suffered due to neglect from the Cuban 
state, as well as their Anglo-American employers. These narratives offer a relatively unknown 
story, as they reveal the profound ambivalence missionaries embodied, concerning both their 
corporate benefactors and the over-sized imprint of Anglo-American influence on the island.  
Section Four “Contact and Conflict” charts the consequences and shifts in political 
identities and consciousnesses of Anglo-Americans and their Cuban allies, born through contact 
in times of conflict. This analysis relies heavily on archival documents and oral histories, along 
with secondary literature to argue that the revolutionary atmosphere, with rising demands for 
economic and political structural change, catalyzed a diverse assortment of powerful cross-
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cultural alliances. Those Cubans who were working, socializing, praying and studying in close 
proximity to Anglo-Americans functioned as interpreters of revolution to their friends, 
colleagues and neighbors from England, Canada and the United States. These Cubans worked to 
alter how power brokers in Cuba and abroad imagined and approached the upheaval, both before 
and after 1959. Chapter Eight examines how contact with Cuban and Caribbean cane-cutters, 
mill workers, parishioners, students and farmers struggling in a contested war-zone conditioned 
rural missionaries to act in solidarity with those seeking to transform the political and socio-
economic structures that governed the island. Chapter Nine documents the strategic relationships 
developed in Havana between Cubans and their Anglo-American friends, colleagues, classmates, 
lovers and neighbors, orchestrated to access the space, networks and cultural capital necessary to 
help overthrow the Batista government and pursue a revolutionary agenda. Chapter Ten explores 
how Anglo-Americans and Cuban professionals recalibrated their political and personal 
solidarities to support and then resist the new Cuban government, once it was clear that their 
shared cultural status and financial security were under siege. In these three chapters, we see the 
profound influence of Cubans on Anglo-American identities, their commitments and their 
willingness to sacrifice for what they considered justice. 
Anglo-American Identities in Flux 
 Informed by Fernando Ortiz’ concept of transculturation, this project wades into 
conversations about the messy spaces where intergroup exchange unfolds across power 
structures. Doing so reveals how interactions between privileged outsiders, Cubans, West Indians 
and Haitians evolved culture and individuals by catalyzing solidarities and empathies, while 
simultaneously reproducing exploitation and apathy.20 This project also relies on standpoint 
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theory forward by Sandra Harding who argues that “Only through…struggles can we begin to 
see beneath the appearances created by an unjust social order to the reality of how this social 
order is in fact constructed and maintained. This need for struggle emphasizes the fact that a 
feminist standpoint is not something that anyone can have simply by claiming it. It is an 
achievement. A standpoint differs in this respect from a perspective, which anyone can have 
simply by ‘opening one’s eyes.’”21 In the context of revolution, shared struggle proved 
transformative for many within the Anglo-American colony who became imbued with 
aspirations for a political, and/or socio-economic restructuring of Cuban society. 
 The struggles encountered by the diverse sub-communities and individuals who belonged 
to the Anglo-American colony shaped contradictory empathies, ambitions and actions as the 
structures of Cuba were challenged and then reorganized by the revolutionary movement. This 
analysis of transnational contact builds upon Louis A. Pérez’ scholarship theorizing “National 
identity not as a fixed and immutable construct but rather as cultural artifact, as contested—and 
contesting—representations often filled with contradictions and incoherences, almost always in 
flux…. This is identity as historically contingent as both national expression and individual 
construction, processing multiple forms, often simultaneously, sometimes successively; it is 
always changing with changing times: open not fixed, more a process than a product.”22 While 
this work investigates the varied standpoints developed from the distinct sub-communities on the 
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island, the text also tracks the ways in which respective identities and perspectives proved fluid, 
contingent and relational.  
Mapping Sub-Communities Within and Surrounding Cuba’s Anglo-American Colony  
 Official Representatives of Foreign Governments: Direct representatives of the United 
States government arrived in Cuba after 1898. Between the periodic occupations and their 
permanent naval base at Guantánamo Bay, a large U.S. military and diplomatic presence 
remained in Cuba until the end of diplomatic relations in 1961. The presence of the U.S. armed 
forces effectively influenced Cuban policies from their centers of operation in Havana and 
Oriente on behalf of U.S. interests.23 Scholarship on the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in the 
1940s and 1950s sheds light on how North Americans systematically designed and sustained 
social, ethnic, economic and national hierarchies in Cuba.24 Utilizing collections found in 
missionary archives, the U.S. National Archives, as well as secondary materials, this dissertation 
discusses how the conduct of U.S. sailors and marines in Caimanera and Guantánamo, 
exacerbated by the inaction of the Batista government, helped transform these cities that 
surrounded the naval base into centers of revolutionary and anti-U.S. sentiment by the end of the 
1950s.25   
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 Archival work at the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Library of Congress, the U.S. 
National Archives, and British National Archives informs this dissertation through an 
understanding of Anglo-American cultural and political initiatives in Cuba delivered by foreign 
governments, both before and after the triumph of the revolution. This work traces how British 
and U.S. diplomats worked to restructure Cubans’, Haitians’ and West Indians’ opportunities and 
identities in ways that suited Anglo-American interests, while simultaneously pressuring Cuban 
leaders to prioritize foreign capital and its geopolitical ambitions. The threat of diplomatic or 
military coercion had profound implications in Cuba.26  
 Rural Corporate Executives: Cultivating large tracts of land for mining, rail, tobacco, 
ranching and especially sugar operations, corporate executives of U.S. companies typically lived 
in segregated barrios americanos in rural Cuba while managing huge enterprises and collectively 
employing hundreds of thousands of Cuban and Caribbean workers. This sub-community of the 
Anglo-American colony will be explored through oral histories with Cubans and foreign 
nationals who lived at North American sugar mills, ranching and mining operations. Further, an 
examination of these rigidly hierarchical relationships established and sustained between 
privileged outsiders and their Cuban, Haitian and Jamaican workers relies on research conducted 
at Bowdoin College Library, The Maryland Room at the University of Maryland, the Hershey 
Community Archive, Archivo Nacional de la República de Cuba, Butler Library at Columbia 
University, the New York Public Library, The Cuban Heritage Collection at the University of 
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Miami, Bowdoin College Library, as well as an extensive literature on U.S. corporations in rural 
Cuba.27 Unsurprisingly, the province of Oriente, where most of these large-scale operations were 
centered, became a hotbed for revolutionary activity in the late-1950s.  
 Caribbean Labor: Using the networks of formal and informal empire, U.S. sugar 
executives imported seasonal and more permanent workers from Haiti and the British Caribbean 
altering the demographic, politics and culture of Cuba and the Caribbean. Haiti’s proximity to 
eastern Cuba, and the influence of the United States during its occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) 
made Haitian workers accessible and vulnerable to the exploitative tactics of U.S. employers. 
Often hired as cane-cutters, over 100,000 Haitians arrived in Cuba as agricultural laborers during 
the 1910s and 1920s. The 100,000s of British Caribbean workers who arrived in Cuba during the 
republican era were familiar with Anglo-American customs, fluent in English, and held legal 
status as British subjects. For these reasons, British West Indians found a social mobility 
inaccessible to Haitians and many Cubans. Often accused of stealing Cuban jobs, both Haitians 
and West Indians faced reprisals from the Cuban government in the 1930s and 1940s when tens 
of thousands were deported back to their respective homelands. Through archival research at the 
U.S. National Archives and the British National Archives, as well as the incorporation of studies 
by Oscar Zanetti, Alejandro García, Robert Whitney, Graciela Chailloux Laffita, Matthew Casey 
and Jeffrey W. Sommers, this dissertation traces how the transnational financial and labor 
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networks of the Anglo-American colony in Cuba dramatically shifted Cuban demographics, 
while exacerbating tensions between Caribbean nationalities.28 
 Independent Farmers: Small communities of Anglo-American farmers developed largely 
in the eastern-most province of Oriente, as well as on the Isle of Pines in the 1890s, 1900s and 
1910s. Offering an escape from the trends of urbanization, industrialization, and wealth inequity 
that challenged Anglo-Americans at home during the turn of the twentieth century, land-
speculator companies sold tracts to settlers who planted predominantly citrus fruits in and around 
Anglo-American enclaves. Michael E. Neagle’s study on the Isle of Pines documents how these 
communities flourished with thousands of farmers and entrepreneurs, for two to three decades, 
sending their children to English language schools, attending Protestant churches and living lives 
that resembled life in the small towns and villages of the United States. Following World War I, 
the Anglo-American population on the isle declined steeply, due to a series of devastating 
hurricanes and as the U.S. government increasingly prioritized corporate interests over the needs 
and desires of Anglo-American settlers.29 The dynamics of informal empire in Cuba proved 
disastrous for these farming communities. Largely through oral histories and collections of 
primary sources by Boyd Leuenberger and Jane McManus, this dissertation explores how the 
few hundred Anglo-American farmers who remained in Cuba into the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 
1960s became increasingly dependent on their Cuban neighbors as they cultivated deep ties to 
the island. This transformation from settler colonists to integrated outsiders led a small number 
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of these farmers to remain years and decades after 1959, long after the vast majority of Anglo-
Americans had left to their respective nations of origin.30 
 Anglo-American Executives in Havana: While much of the major investments of foreign 
corporations led to the development of sugar mills, mining operations, cattle ranches and 
transportation networks in the Cuban countryside, the epi-center of the Anglo-American colony, 
generally home to more than half the Anglo-American residents on the island, emerged in 
Havana. Through oral histories, institutional studies and archival work at the Cuban Heritage 
Collection, the University of North Carolina, the Archivo Nacional de la República de Cuba, and 
the Instituto de Historia de Cuba this dissertation unearths the stories of Anglo-American 
executives in foreign banking, electrical, oil, agricultural, pharmaceutical, textile, 
communications, and transportation corporations who secured assignments in the Cuban capital. 
Their narratives chronicle not only the formation of lucrative business partnerships, but also the 
emergence of significant social relationships between Anglo-American businessmen, Cuban 
professionals and Cuban politicians. These relationships proved pivotal to an early embrace of 
the revolution by most Anglo-Americans in Cuba, and, shortly thereafter, to the joint action 
initiated by many Anglo-Americans and their Cuban allies to undermine the new government.31 
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Habana, Cuba: Editorial José Martí, 2012). 
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 Havana’s Anglo-American Cultural Institutions and Knowledge Producers: To support 
Anglo-American executives and foreign diplomats, a well-funded network of social, educational, 
religious and business institutions was established by North Americans and British nationals in 
Havana. Foreign schools were operated by foreign educators. Anglo-American-run Protestant 
churches held English-language services for this community of privileged outsiders. An Anglo-
American hospital was staffed by Anglo-American nurses. Anglo-American-owned restaurants 
and shops, as well as English language newspapers serviced the needs of foreign diplomats and 
executives. Anglo-American businesses and social clubs provided refuge to those seeking the 
familiar comforts of home. José Vega Suñol details the processes by which Anglo-Americans in 
Cuba accumulated economic and social advantages, while avoiding full integration into Cuban 
society. Although these institutions were designed largely to recreate the comforts of home, and 
often strove to remain segregated from their Cuban hosts, many of these establishments 
developed, eventually, into transnational knowledge-producing institutions; settings in which the 
children of largely professional Cubans were educated and socialized alongside Anglo-
Americans.32  By conducting dozens of oral histories, as well as combing through Anglo-
American periodicals and a collection of memoirs, this dissertation enters into the cultural 
institutions that protected Anglo-American identities in Havana, trained Cubans in Anglo-
American customs and skill-sets, while also creating spaces where new knowledges, identities, 
relationships and political imaginations would flourish.33 
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 Through daily interactions with Cubans, Anglo-American educators, missionaries and 
journalists became social bridges between the Anglo-American colony and Cuban society. They 
often developed significant friendships with Cubans, learning about and taking seriously Cuban 
demands for democracy during the Batista government. In the early days of the revolution, they 
appreciated the appointment of men they knew, liked and trusted to the first revolutionary 
cabinet. It did not take long, however, until the new government began to challenge the 
structures that enabled them to continue their work in Cuba, and undermine the value their 
knowledge production offered Cubans. At that point, these foreign knowledge producers in 
Havana changed political course and worked to support Cubans seeking to leave the island. 
 Relatively Wealthy Cuban Professionals: Through relationships developed in matrimony, 
social clubs, churches, boardrooms, backrooms, and educational institutions, some relatively 
wealthy Cuban professionals penetrated the social networks of the Anglo-American colony. 
Through a large collection of oral histories, archival material, and published memoirs this 
dissertation will examine how in Havana's contact zones, Cubans and Anglo-Americans 
developed socio-economic alliances based on common financial, as well as geopolitical interests. 
The continued influence of Anglo-Americans augmented the value of the skills these Cuban 
professionals had acquired in foreign schools, churches, social clubs and business association. 
Transnational socio-economic bonds strengthened through intimate cross-cultural educational, 
occupational or social relationships, as foreign-trained Cuban professionals exerted a subtle sway 
over the political consciousness of Anglo-American residents. Prior to 1959, Cuban 
professionals expressed to Anglo-Americans their collective frustration with the anachronistic 
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and authoritarian political institutions on the island. Early on, these cross-cultural relationships 
helped to fuel and support the anti-Batista movement and then the first phase of the revolutionary 
government. However, soon after 1959, many Anglo-Americans residents and their Cuban allies 
soured on the revolution and reoriented their vast transnational networks toward counter-
revolutionary activities. 
 Rural Protestant Missionaries: Rural executives funded U.S.-based missionaries to 
provide educational, health and social functions for Cuban and Caribbean employees. Building 
upon the scholarship of Kurt Urbanek, Marcos Ramos, Margaret Crahan and Jason Yaremko, 
through oral histories, diaries, memories and letters of a number of Cuban pastors and Protestant 
missionaries, this project reveals the significant empathies and solidarities forged by foreign 
evangelizers with Cubans in revolt during the 1950s.34 This work is supported by research at 
United Methodist Archives and Historical Center, the Southern Baptist Historical Library and 
Archives, the Friends’ Historical Collection, and the American Baptist Historical Society. This 
dissertation considers how, despite their tangled relationship with Anglo-American capital and 
their home mission boards, these missionaries became invested in projects that contested Cuban 
hierarchies, even as this collaboration would eventually undermine their own standing in Cuban 
society. Rural missionaries, and especially women missionaries, lived and worked in close 
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proximity to Cuban suffering, enabling the politically, economically and socially disenfranchised 
to become what Judith Butler has called grievable subjects.35 Bearing witness to state-sponsored 
brutality and the rising pressure of revolution cemented transnational solidarities between foreign 
missionaries and Cubans through the development of a shared goal to restructure Cuba’s political 
and socio-economic hierarchies.  
 Cuban Protestants: Families living in rural Cuba often suffered neglect from the Catholic 
Church, the Cuban government and large corporations – both foreign and domestic. In these 
contexts, Protestant missionaries frequently offered the most comprehensive, if still inadequate, 
social services in the region. From the Spanish colonial period forward, Protestantism emerged 
as a symbolic and material trope for social change, resistance against Spain and the Catholic 
Church. Still, the Protestant community represented only a small percentage of the population, 
with an estimated 10,000 active members and a community perhaps twice that, in a population of 
just over two million in 1908.36 By the mid-1950s Protestantism had grown significantly, with 
close to six percent of the Cuban population identifying with a range of denominations. The 
religion attracted Cubans who sought to both thrive in and transform Cuban society.37 The 
Catholic Church consistently undermined its own credibility in the eyes of many Cubans leading 
to just 24 percent of the population identifying as practicing Catholics in 1954.38 The rising 
practice of revolutionary Protestantism continued into the 1950s as Protestants disproportionately 
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joined the cause against Batista, often attaining leadership positions in the revolutionary effort. 
Through oral histories and archival research, this dissertation offers compelling narratives about 
Protestant revolutionaries who conveyed the need for a structural reorganization of Cuban 
society to the Anglo-American missionaries they learned from and prayed with. 
… 
This dissertation explores the complexities of informal empire, illuminating the 
conditions under which privileged outsiders developed empathy, sympathy and/or apathy for 
Cuban suffering. The spaces that Anglo-Americans occupied within Cuban society, and 
experiences they endured, evoked a range of reactions to the development of revolutionary 
events. In particular, their proximity to suffering influenced how Anglo-Americans viewed their 
role on the island, the rising revolutionary sentiment and their respective political commitments 
to radical change. At different times throughout the course of this decade, nearly all residents of 
Cuba considered themselves victims--of authoritarianism, communism and/or informal empire. 
The cross-cultural revolutionary and counter-revolutionary empathies emerging within the 
Anglo-American colony in the 1950s and early 1960s developed in dialectic relation with the 
experiences and observations of suffering, both before and after January, 1959, altering the 
course of history for both Cuba and the United States.  
Summary 
 This multi-layered analysis of Cuba’s Anglo-American colony, situated in 1950s Cuba, 
complicates narratives of identity and political commitments during the Cuban revolution. This 
research aims to contribute to the growing literature on informal empire by exposing how the 
rhetoric of “development” was exploited to legitimize institutions, policies, relationships and 
practices that largely reproduced existing socio-economic hierarchies. Most fundamentally this 
dissertation addresses the uneven terms of contact Anglo-American colony members pursued by 
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examining the ways in which Anglo-Americans both depended on one another and mobilized for 
varied visions of change with their respective Cuban allies. While much of the research focuses 
on Anglo-Americans in Cuba, this project uncovers substantial evidence that Cubans, and to a 
more limited degree Haitians and West Indians, strategically accessed the Anglo-American 
colony, exerting significant influence in the struggle against the Batista government, and later 
against the revolution. From this work we come to appreciate the malleable terms of 
transnational contact, unique within sites of informal empire. Benefitting from the generosity and 
eloquence of men and women who sat for oral histories to supplement the scholarly and archival 
record, this is a study in informal empire, strategic resistance, loss and the emergence of inter-
group solidarities that offers a significant intervention in the long-studied narrative of the Cuban 
Revolution. 
 Informed by oral histories and email exchanges conducted with missionaries, students, 
journalists, educators, small business owners, secretaries, embassy officials, corporate 
employees, ranchers, mill workers, peddlers, fortune seekers and/or their children, who resided 
in locations as diverse as Preston, Chaparra, Hershey, La Gloria, Mayarí, Báguanos, Playa 
Manteca, Las Ciegas, Macareño, Camagüey and Havana, this work has been nourished by the 
diversity of voices, relations and political commitments present within the Anglo-American 
colony. The imperial gaze of privileged outsiders formed as an assemblage of their original 
motives, their professional commitments, geographic locations, their families, their gender, race, 
class, social habits, religion, education, friends, heritages, and experiences. After the loss of what 
many referred to as a “paradise,” brothers and sisters, friends and lovers, classmates and 
colleagues often – to this day - disagree with one another about what occurred and who is to 
32 
blame. Oral histories and extensive archival research reveal complex, compelling and often 
contradictory versions of what happened and why.  
 There is no doubt that the genuine fondness I developed for many of the individuals 
interviewed for this project will seep into the pages that follow. Still, these relationships pushed 
me – and the resulting interviews enabled me – to uncover not only the crass reproduction of 
social hierarchies in these transnational contact zones, but also the fragile cross-cultural 
solidarities that cemented under the pressure of revolution and, as I hope to show, transcended 
typical imperial narratives. In Anglo-American-managed workplaces, social clubs, cultural 
institutions, schools, and churches, Cubans and Anglo-Americans together mapped dreams for a 
brighter future in a Cuba they could all call home. 
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CHAPTER ONE: FORGING INFORMAL EMPIRE  
Introduction 
 After Spain had been defeated in the Cuban Wars of Independence, Cuban General 
Enrique Collazo wrote, “The appreciation demonstrated by the Americans to the French ought to 
serve as the model with which the Cubans should demonstrate to the American people….We are 
free and independent as a result of the Liberation Army of Cuba and the assistance given by the 
American government.”39 Collazo seems disturbed that even before the United States entered the 
conflict with Spain, Anglo-Americans had constructed a narrative that would feature prominently 
the U.S. role in the independence of Cuba. The rhetoric of U.S. power brokers surrounding the 
Spanish-American War, even in its title, eclipsed the role of Cubans in their struggle for 
sovereignty that started in 1868, and ended thirty years later, shortly after the U.S. intervention. 
With the United States positioned as the source of Cuban liberation, the logic of U.S. domination 
in Cuba gained validity after 1898. Many U.S. nationals moved to Cuba assuming a debt owed 
by the people of Cuba, justifying foreign influence, privilege and control.  
As the dynamics of this “origin” story would suggest, influential Anglo-American colony 
members granted little legitimacy to Cuban political structures or Cuban sovereignty. In the first 
decades of the twentieth century many U.S. executives and diplomats, as well as some British 
and Canadian residents, worked to undermine Cuban democracy when it benefited their interests. 
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Foreign capital in Cuba typically supported foreign investments rather than improving conditions 
for poor and rural Cubans.40 Anglo-Americans coerced Cuban officials with military actions, 
diplomatic maneuvering, bribes and threats to promote foreign interests, exacerbating political 
instability and economic struggle on the island. This dynamic soon garnered Cuban politicians a 
well-earned reputation for corruption. While many privileged outsiders who arrived at the start of 
the twentieth century worked on “improving” and “developing” Cuban lives and opportunities, 
they did so within the structure of informal empire and often advanced a narrative that framed 
the Anglo-American presence as benevolent. This chapter sketches the establishment and 
sedimentation of informal empire, arguing that socio-economic alliances between Anglo-
Americans and Cuban power brokers who benefited from foreign influence undermined Cuban 
stability, reproduced Anglo-American privilege, and elevated Cubans who were sympathetic to 
the ambitions of foreigners.41  
Socio-Economic Partnerships in Pursuit of Transnational Dominance 
 Beginning with the Spanish abdication of Cuba to U.S. authorities on January 1, 1899, 
until the triumph of the Cuban Revolution exactly sixty years later, executives, military officials 
                                                 
40 As economist Thomas Piketty notes in his work Capital in the 21st Century, foreign investment from wealthier 
countries to poorer countries generally does not increase local income; accumulated capital tends to migrate abroad. 
Thomas Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
41 Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García’s studies on the United Fruit and Sugar Company and the Cuba’s Sugar and 
Railroad industries, respectively, trace the utilization of economic dominance to attain political influence, and 
conversely deploy political pressure in garnering favorable economic policies from the Cuban government. Zanetti 
United Fruit Company; Zanetti, Sugar and Railroads; Louis A. Pérez goes further explaining corporate patronage of 
U.S. knowledge-producing institutions such as schools and churches developed as North American corporate and 
embassy officials sought to frame the collective presence of the Anglo-American colony as benevolent. Pérez argues 
in Cuba, “The power of U.S. hegemony was embedded in cultural forms that served as the principal means by which 
the North American presence was legitimized.” As managers of knowledge-producing institutions, the Anglo-
American colony played a significant role in exporting values that legitimized power relationships, which garnered 
political and economic influence for foreign capital. Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba and The United States, Ties of 
Singular Intimacy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 13; Scholars including Jason M. Yaremko and 
Marcos A. Ramos developed a framework to trace the economic, social and personal connections between corporate 
donors, Protestant missionaries, Cubans and the dissemination of Anglo-American values between 1898-1958. 
Yaremko, U.S. Protestant Missions in Cuba; Ramos, Protestantism and Revolution in Cuba. 
35 
and diplomats from the United States subordinated Cuban political structures and insured 
influential Cubans would remain beholden to the overwhelming economic, political and cultural 
influence of Anglo-Americans. Before U.S. governing authorities left Cuba on May 20, 1902, 
Cuban leaders were forced to insert the Platt Amendment into their constitution, guaranteeing the 
United States government the right to intervene in Cuba at any time. The United States agreed to 
leave the island only if control over the Isle of Pines was left ambiguous and U.S. ownership of a 
naval station was affirmed by Cuban authorities.42 As U.S. Military Governor of Cuba Leonard 
Wood wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in October 1901, a month after President McKinley’s 
assassination, "There is, of course, little or no independence left Cuba under the Platt 
Amendment."43  
 New to overseas empire in the 1890s, U.S. authorities did not want to be cast as self-
interested colonizers. The United States Congress passed the Teller Amendment in 1898 which 
“disclaim[ed] any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over 
[Cuba, and]…to leave the government and control of the island to its people.”44 The Foraker 
Amendment forbade the U.S. military government from granting concessions or special contracts 
to U.S. investors on the island. General Wood, who opposed the Foraker Amendment, chose to 
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interpret the restrictions loosely, benefitting U.S. corporations including the Cuba Company, as 
well as the United Fruit and Sugar Company (UFSC). 45  
Occupations by the United States government in the first decade following Spanish 
colonialism convinced already bullish foreign capital that investments into a devastated Cuban 
economy would be protected by U.S. authorities. Referencing 1899 when Spain abdicated the 
island to the United States, Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García observed, “Those [Cuban] 
businesses that hadn’t already gone bankrupt were on the brink; land was being sold for a song; 
and the people, famished and jobless, constituted a cheap source of labor.”46 U.S. corporations 
and diplomats collaborated to insure their collective influence. Before handing over control of 
the country in 1902, the U.S. military government allowed what became the United Fruit and 
Sugar Company to acquire vast tracts of land in eastern Cuba.47 By 1905, the United States alone 
controlled 21 percent of sugar production. This number would rise to 63 percent within a couple 
of decades.48   
The arrival of U.S. capital in the eastern provinces devastated the lives and communities 
of the largely independent Cuban peasantry. According to Louis A. Pérez, the formerly self-
sufficient people of rural eastern Cuba found themselves rapidly absorbed into the large-scale 
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sugar plantation economy developing around them.49 Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García 
explain, “The conditions in which Cuba had emerged from the War of Independence were 
particularly favorable to imperialist penetration. Exhausted and ruined, the island was not able to 
exploit its resources.”50 The final War of Independence against Spain (1895-98) decimated the 
Cuban countryside and left the island extremely vulnerable to economic penetration of foreign 
interests. Matanzas and Santa Clara, which had produced 80 percent of the Cuba’s sugar, were 
home to 267 sugar mills in 1894 and just 83 in 1899. One and a half million heads of cattle 
before the war were reduced to 60,000 by its end.51 Devastated by the damage to properties in 
the eastern provinces during the 30 years of intermittent revolution (1868-1898), compounded by 
the destruction or misplacement of Cuban land deeds, campesinos throughout eastern Cuba were 
compelled to adopt new forms of labor, community, family and dignity within the foreign-
dominated economy developing around them.52 Cuban priorities were orienting toward the needs 
of Anglo-American executives and policy makers; campesinos were forced to bend to the new 
order.  
Cuba’s political leaders understood the sway North Americans and British nationals held 
over the Cuban landscape. Most aligned their policies with Anglo-American geopolitical and 
corporate goals. To garner military, financial and diplomatic support from abroad meant an 
immediate increase in prestige and authority for Cuban power brokers. When a revolt by Cuban 
liberals broke out after the election of 1905, the Moderate President Tomás Estrada Palma 
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requested a U.S. intervention. By calling on the United States, the Estrada Palma government 
conceded that Cuba served as a protectorate of the United States. Estrada Palma sought to 
prevent a takeover by the Liberal Party and aligned with Anglo-American priorities to protect 
foreign properties threatened by the rebellion. British-owned rail companies had their engines 
and a rail bridge destroyed by rebel forces. Reports and rumors of the incineration of Anglo-
American-owned sugar cane fields and the destruction of U.S.-owned communications wires 
caused a stir in North American, as well as British embassies and boardrooms. Unable to crush 
the revolt himself, and unwilling to further negotiate with his Cuban enemies in September 1906, 
Estrada Palma turned to President Theodore Roosevelt for assistance. Havana’s Anglo-American 
publication the Havana Post welcomed the intervention as an opportunity for Cubans to grow, 
progress and develop under the tutelage of U.S. rule. Other more conservative elements of the 
Anglo-American colony, like the publication the Havana Daily Telegraph responded to the 
second occupation by advocating for Cuba to be formally annexed by the United States.53   
While annexation did not occur, the U.S. occupation was managed by close to 6,000 U.S. 
soldiers, under the leadership of Governor Charles Magoon, and would last until 1909. Justified 
as an effort to prevent Cuban graft, Magoon emptied the Cuban treasury, exploiting the Cuban 
surplus by spending money far more freely than the Estrada Palma government. Magoon would 
leave Cuba six and a half million dollars in debt, despite inheriting a surplus. Throughout the 
country, Magoon advocated for and advanced infrastructure projects that aided Anglo-American 
capital. He was accused of favoring bids from Anglo-American companies, for example, when 
he selected the Oliver & Company of Knoxville for a road contract over the objections of Cuban 
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capital and even the Havana Post. Proposals by foreign corporations to expand U.S. and British 
owned rail projects were approved. Canals made transportation of goods easier in areas 
dominated by Anglo-American residents including the Isle of Pines and ports heavily trafficked 
by Anglo-American trade. Magoon’s biographer David Lockmiller contends that U.S.-owned 
mining companies, including the Jurangua Iron Company, the Spanish-American Iron Company 
and the Holguín-Santiago Mine Company were all stimulated by the Magoon program of public 
works and profited tremendously during his leadership by shipping metals to North American 
and European factories. The Governor himself financially benefited from his time in Cuba by 
investing in the Havana Electric Railway Company, managed by former U.S. Consul General in 
Havana Frank Steinhart. The Havana Electric Railway Company achieved a monopoly on gas 
and electricity in the city.54 In defense of Magoon’s record, Lockmiller wrote, “As provisional 
governor it should be remembered that he was placed in the difficult and at times impossible 
position of administering a civil government satisfactory to both Cubans and officials in 
Washington.”55 The same could be written about every leader of Cuba between 1899 and 1959. 
 As Cuban rebels throughout its history would articulate time and again, being forced to 
prioritize the geopolitical and economic interests of foreigners generally proved incompatible 
with delivering equity, sovereignty and stability for the Cuban nation. In 1912 a rebellion of 
Afro-Cubans overwhelmed the eastern part of the island, threatening the extensive Anglo-
American interests in the region. 56 After Cuban authorities declared the Partido Independiente 
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de Color (PIC) illegal because they organized on the basis of race, Afro-Cuban members of PIC 
rebelled, primarily in Oriente. One contemporary U.S. naval officer explained the rebellion in 
economic terms, “Whatever may have been the immediate object of the threatened uprising of 
the blacks, it’s real cause was due to the existing economic condition of the blacks.”57 The arrival 
of U.S. capital into eastern Cuba dramatically altered the lives, families, traditions, communities 
and labor power of poor Afro-Cubans who became dependent on foreign corporations. Yet 
Cuban authorities, pressured by U.S. policy makers, demanded passive submission to these new 
realities. Threats to Anglo-Americans and their investments would not be tolerated.  
 The U.S. Consul in Santiago, Ross E. Holaday found that foreigners were being 
intimidated with “letters demanding money, and threatening to burn their property, or take their 
lives, or that of some member of their family, if they refused to comply with the demands of the 
unknown writer.”58 The Vice President of the Cuban Railroad Company lobbied the State 
Department to force Cuban President José Miguel Gómez to end the upheaval. The railroad 
executive lamented, “We have been practically at the tender mercy of the negro bands.”59  An 
Anglo-American manager for the same company added, “Nothing short of a reign of terror 
would end the revolt in Oriente.”60 Anglo-American investors watched in horror as their 
company stores, mining operations, coffee plantations, livestock, rail bridges, railroad stations, 
telegraph and telephone wires all succumbed to rebel attacks against property. In 1912 President 
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Howard Taft landed U.S. Marines on the island and mobilized the U.S. Navy. The threat to 
Anglo-American sugar, mining, telecommunication and rail operations inspired U.S. maneuvers 
at the highest levels of government. 
 In addition to the external pressure applied by the United States, President Gómez faced 
internal pressure from the Conservative Party leader Mario García Menocal who well understood 
the influence of the United States and looked to protect foreign investments. Like many wealthy 
Cubans who sought to oust the Spanish in the nineteenth century, Menocal was educated at a 
U.S. boarding school before attending Cornell University. After the Cuban Wars of 
Independence in which Menocal served, the Conservative leader oversaw the construction of the 
Cuban American Sugar Company mill in Chaparra, the largest in the world at the time.61 Like 
Estrada Palma only a few years earlier, Menocal saw the United States as a potential ally in 
destabilizing the efforts of his political enemies while securing an industry in which he was 
personally invested.    
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Figure 1. Avenida Menocal, Cuban American Sugar Company, Chaparra 62 
 Cuban and U.S. leaders successfully pressured the reluctant President Gómez to send his 
army and brutally crush the rebellion that was endangering significant domestic and foreign 
investments. In 1912 The Cuba News, among the eight English language newspapers printed in 
Cuba at the time, explained Gómez’ precarious position. They wrote the Cuban President had 
made his “political capital out of his patriotic, anti-American attitude…”63 Yet still he felt 
compelled to act on behalf of U.S. interests. Alejandro de la Fuente argues that Gómez was 
motivated, at least in part, by the knowledge that a U.S. intervention in the election year of 1912 
would have spelled disaster for his Liberal Party. Instead of giving the United States a chance to 
intercede, North American power brokers and influential Cuban allies persuaded Gómez to 
suspend constitutional guarantees and send the army to butcher 3,000 Afro-Cubans in eastern 
Cuba. Contemporaries lamented “many innocent and defenseless Negros” among the dead.64 
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Tearing at the multi-racial fabric of Cuban society while mobilizing the massacre of Afro-
Cubans, Gómez secured the investments of Anglo-American capital. 
Due to U.S. influence, interventions and occupations, Anglo-Americans residents in Cuba 
operated with levels of protection unavailable to most Cubans, facilitating a substantial 
expansion of the Anglo-American population in Cuba during the U.S. occupations. In the middle 
of the nineteenth century, only 1,256 U.S. citizens resided in Cuba.65  By 1899, during the first 
U.S. occupation, this number increased fivefold: 6,444 U.S. citizens resided on the island along 
with 588 British nationals and 56 Canadians.66 The Anglo-American population grew over time. 
The 1907 census, administered during the second U.S. occupation, recorded 6,713 U.S. nationals 
and 1,252 British citizens.67   
Near the end of the second occupation in December 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt 
further reassured Anglo-American residents when he spoke to Cubans to “warn them to 
remember the great truth that the only way a people can permanently avoid being governed from 
without is to show that they both can and will govern themselves from within.”68 With 
assurances from U.S. politicians, the Anglo-American business community quickly expanded in 
Cuba with large investments from firms like Bethlehem Steel, National City Bank of New York, 
the Cuban Company, the American and Foreign Power Company, the First National Bank, and 
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Chase National Bank all arriving in the first decades of the Cuban Republic.69 British and 
Canadian capital invested heavily in the transportation and banking industries during the same 
period. Large international companies including United Railways of Havana, the Royal Bank of 
Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia gained significant influence on the island.70 By 1915, an 
estimated 20,000 North American, English and German citizens lived in Cuba.71 Due to the 
increased opportunity for Anglo-American investments over the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, U.S. nationals in Cuba alone comprised a population of 9,555 in 1919.72 
The fall of global sugar prices between 1920 and 1921 occurred while U.S. marines were 
stationed on the island, as they had been since 1917. In just a few months, the global sugar 
market collapsed from 22.5 cents to 4 cents per pound, destabilizing Cuban corporations. Entire 
industries would collapse. The devastation of the Cuban economy led to a buying bonanza of 
bankrupted Cuban properties by North American and British banks.73 Cuban-owned mills began 
to fall into the hands of Anglo-Americans who could extract capital from abroad.74 National City 
Bank benefited from free-falling sugar prices by taking control of more than fifty sugar mills in 
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the summer of 1921.75 Loans to the desperate Cuban state by institutions including J.P. Morgan 
heavily indebted the Cuban government to U.S. financial firms.76 Anglo-American, and 
specifically U.S. economic control, increased substantially, leading to expanded political 
influence. President Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso was forced to name U.S. General Enoch Crowder 
as his “financial adviser.” Remaining in Cuba until 1923, Crowder controlled appointments to 
key government posts in the Zayas administration.77 By this time British capital had consolidated 
all railroad interests on the western part of the island, while earlier the U.S.-owned Cuban 
Company transgressed Cuban law to provide emerging sugar interests the only rail-line that 
would connect eastern Cuba to Havana.78 By the 1920s, Anglo-American executives controlled 
Cuba’s communication, electrical and transportation networks, while dominating both the sugar 
and banking industries as well. During this period Cuban sugar sales became more dependent on 
the U.S. market, which made Cubans extremely vulnerable to the whims of U.S. policymakers. 
By 1926 U.S. mills processed 63 percent of Cuban sugar. 79 Yet this trend would break as the 
collapse of the global economy in 1929 shifted the attention of many Anglo-Americans away 
from Cuba.  
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Networks of Empire Reshape Rural Cuba 
 
Figure 2. The Networks and Outposts of United Fruit’s Empire, 1929 80 
 Networks of formal and informal empire in the wider Caribbean worked to support 
Anglo-American investments and consolidate foreign influence in Cuba. Anglo-American 
institutions encouraged the immigration of Haitian and West Indian workers to provide labor and 
advance the corporate and geopolitical ambitions of North Americans and British nationals on 
the island. West Indians from the English colonies of Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia and Trinidad, 
fluent in English and familiar with Anglo-American customs, were more attractive to potential 
employers than were Haitians or Cubans. British colonialism augmented the desirability and 
availability of West Indian laborers for Anglo-American employers. By contrast, the U.S. 
occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) provided largely uneducated laborers to foreign and domestic 
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sugar corporations in Cuba.81 Without the tools garnered through imperial contact due to their 
successful expulsion of Napoleon’s forces in 1804, likely no group of imported labor during this 
period proved more vulnerable to exploitation than the Haitian cane-cutter. These networks of 
empire altered demographics and tensions across the Caribbean, as well as in Cuba. 
 Often at the bottom rung of rural Cuban society, the Haitian bracero arrived in Cuba with 
neither the biographies of contact that would appeal to Anglo-American employers, nor the 
protection of the Cuban or British government. Haitians largely became locked in their roles as 
cane-cutters and were denied paths toward social mobility.82 Cuban and U.S. sugar mills 
successfully pressured the Estrada Palma government to allow the importation of these workers 
in 1906. With the U.S. occupation in Haiti beginning in 1915, U.S. contracting agents quickly 
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began collecting Haitian labor for work in the cane-fields of Cuba.83 By the 1920s, a decade in 
which close to 100,000 Haitians immigrated to Cuba, these systems of formal and informal 
empire provoked a labor shortage in Haiti.84 
 The experience of British West Indians is better documented than their Haitian 
counterparts’ due to their status as British subjects - until 1962 for Jamaicans and Trinidadians, 
1966 for Barbadians, and 1967 for St. Lucians. While many Afro-Caribbean workers from the 
British Empire also worked as cane-cutters for Anglo-American executives, their contact with 
English and Anglo-American customs and education often provided them greater opportunities 
than immigrants from Haiti or poor Cubans. It was not uncommon for West Indians to secure 
positions as domestic servants, interpreters, nurses, mill workers, or ministers. These positions 
proved slightly more lucrative and less physically demanding than cane-cutting.85  
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Figure 3. Cuban American Sugar Company, Chaparra Mill 86 
 Charles Ray of St. Lucia found some mobility and protection due to his ability to 
communicate with Anglo-American management. Ray began work as a cart driver in the mill 
earning $1.25 a day at the Cuban American Sugar Company in Chaparra, Oriente. After his 
father spoke to the mill manager, presumably in English, Ray was placed in the lab. Ray 
remembers his own promotion from the lab when he encountered a U.S. chemist, “who did not 
speak Spanish.” Ray explains, “He chose me to work with them there, as an interpreter.” This 
relationship with Anglo-American management protected Ray during the Cuban nationalist, anti-
immigrant drives of the 1930s. This very same North American chemist helped Ray change his 
birth certificate from English to Cuban so that he could continue being employed at the mill.87 
 Those West Indians who arrived through public ports were technically secured a 
protected status from the British Crown unavailable to other immigrant workers.88 Though 
protections nominally existed, when in need, West Indians often found the British authorities 
unresponsive to their plight. The experience of West Indians in Europe during the World Wars 
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altered expectations among veterans of the conflict. Many no longer placed their faith in a 
continued relationship with England, and warned Britain that things must change for continued 
loyalty. Decrying the condition of British West Indian workers in Cuba, in 1938 WWI veteran 
Theophilus Samms from Central Victoria in Santa Clara wrote to the Colonial Secretary in 
London,  
We have always been obedient to you and at any time of your distress. Many of our boys 
had been to your rescue in the world’s war. Some of whom were slain in that battle. 
Others have returned to us and among them many are here [in Cuba] suffering the 
inconstitutional laws of the land. Why should our Emperor which is mighty not only in 
army and navy but a government that has billions of Pounds allow us to be here under 
these ferocious [illegible]. Why should you continue to purchase such a vast amount of 
Cuban Product? 89  
 
Frustrated with English inaction, Samms warned, “Remember Russia in the World War.”90 West 
Indians in Cuba began questioning the value of their continued ties with England.  
 In August 1941, a concerned North American lawyer, John Sawyer wrote the British 
Foreign Office about the desperate situation of West Indians at the Cuban American Sugar 
Company mill town of Delicias. With considerable diplomacy, Sawyer wrote, “the Mother 
country is probably not aware of the horrible conditions.” He explained that when he attempted 
to contact the local British representative, his petitions were ignored. Desperately trying to draw 
attention to the crisis for those in the Foreign Office, Sawyer wrote, “England has hundreds of 
Subjects housed in Central Delicias [SIC] in an old fallen down Barracks in a very poor 
condition with very bad sanitary conditions, a great many on the verge of starvation, and many 
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others just slowly starving to death.”91 Looking into the matter H.A. Hobson of the British 
Colonial Office admitted the situation was “deplorable,” but with World War II demanding 
English resources and geopolitical capital, Hobson determined nothing could be done.92 Despite 
hundreds of years of colonization, and over a century after the abolition of slavery, in the eyes of 
their British colonizers, West Indians remained expendable. Protections for West Indians as 
British Subjects often went unrecognized while this community faced harassment from Cubans 
and Haitians who accused them of ‘British arrogance.’93 
 Eventually British officials responded to the conditions exposed by advocates like 
Sawyer and Samms. In a 1943 report issued by Sir Frank Stockdale, the British government laid 
out plans to relieve the West Indians in Cuba. Implemented over the course of two decades, 
10,000 pounds annually would finance agricultural projects, as well as subsidize welfare for the 
elderly and those without work.94 By the 1950s some of this money would be funneled through 
the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation of Havana to support a burial center for “colored 
nationals.” 95 White U.S., British and Canadian residents who were unaffiliated with the British 
Embassy became the legitimate, entrusted authorities who could allocate funds for the West 
Indian community. 
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 The status of West Indians and Haitians in Cuba was precarious both legally and 
economically.96 In response, British Caribbean and Haitian workers in Cuba sought to organize 
themselves. In the late 1920s as many as fifty-two branches of Marcus Garvey’s United Negro 
Improvement Associations (UNIA) were started in Cuba, with one of the world’s largest and 
longest lasting chapter established in Banes, Oriente on United Fruit and Sugar Company 
property.97 The pan-Africanist movement developed through UNIA cultivated support networks 
by pooling the resources of the Afro-Caribbean community to provide limited comfort for 
colonized subjects away from home. Matthew Casey documents the networks through which 
Haitians exchanged information within their communities in Cuba. Though hired by particular 
companies to gather Haitian cane-cutters, Haitian recruiters at times informed these laborers 
about opportunities for higher pay scales and better working conditions on other plantations.98 
Still, segregation by sugar companies strategically separated workers by ethnicity and country of 
origin, in terms of where they lived and worked, making it difficult for workers to unite in cross-
cultural opposition to the policies of respective corporations.99 Yet despite difficulties resisting 
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the networks of formal and informal empire, Caribbean immigrants carved out a space for 
themselves in pre-revolutionary Cuba, altering the island and the Caribbean basin in the process. 
Socio-Economic Alliances for Power and Profit Prime Conditions for Systemic Poverty 
 Unlike most poor Cuban and Caribbean workers for Anglo-American corporations, a 
segment of Cuban professionals found opportunities for mobility within the structures of 
informal empire, and emerged as advocates of Anglo-American influence. In his memoir, Mario 
Lazo, the U.S. educated Cuban lawyer who represented Anglo-American firms and government 
projects, defended the much-maligned Platt Amendment arguing that the Amendment, “proved 
to be of inestimable value to the young republic. It induced the flow of American capital to 
Cuba, contributing enormously to its economic development. It was the sole reason why Cuban 
bonds sold in the market at a better price than those of such countries as France, Brazil, 
Argentina and Chile.”100 Lazo came from a class of Cubans who personally profited from the 
investments of Anglo-American capital.  
 Learning English and adopting Anglo-American values aided these Cuban professionals 
and their families. Many Cubans trained in Anglo-American institutions secured well-
compensated jobs working at foreign companies. Those who sought to conduct business on their 
own were able to transact with Anglo-Americans, retain foreign clients, and access North 
American and European transportation networks for their products and services, both on the 
island and to foreign ports. Cubans with deep ties to the Anglo-American colony positioned 
themselves to attain some of the same benefits privileged outsiders inherited from their 
nationality.  
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 Benefits of these transnational collaborations flowed in multiple directions. Cubans in top 
corporate, political and social positions offered Anglo-American residents a variety of 
advantages including advice concerning the Cuban market, connections to Cuban businesses, 
cosmopolitan cultural experiences, legal protections, as well as a stable workforce. Cuban 
politicians, capitalists and enterprising professionals gained access to foreign capital by 
participating in business organizations with Anglo-Americans including Rotary International, the 
Lions Club, and the American Club. They sent their children to Anglo-American-run schools 
like Ruston or Merici Academies. They golfed, swam, rowed, sailed, drank, danced, played 
bridge and canasta, with foreign executives, diplomats, housewives and their children at places 
like Hershey, the Havana Yacht Club, the Rovers Club, the American Club or the Biltmore 
Yacht and Country Club. Cuban politicians offered low tax rates and an army of enforcers on 
behalf of foreign capital. Some Cubans could help executives resolve a potential punishment for 
illegal fiscal or labor practices. These Cubans emerged as social bridges, local advocates and 
professional cultural interpreters for Anglo-American businessmen who often lacked fluency in 
Cuban ways and words. This transnational community of Anglo-Americans and relatively 
wealthy Cuban professionals cemented as a mutually beneficial socio-economic alliance.   
 According to José Vega Suñol, those Cubans who encouraged and advanced U.S. capital, 
expertise and values would solidify social and financial hierarchies within Cuba, consolidating 
and stabilizing their own authority.101 Between 1899 and 1958 Anglo-Americans and select 
Cubans worked together in making tremendous profits, especially in the sugar industry, as they 
ensured Cuba would largely remain a mono-crop economy.102 Exposing the utility of socio-
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economic alliances between Cuban power brokers and Anglo-American capital, Imilcy Balboa 
Navarro explains that many Cuban political leaders encouraged the consolidation of a sugar 
economy, thereby ensuring their nation’s dependency on imported goods for sugar profits. Cuban 
Presidents José Miguel Gómez (1909-1913), Mario García Menocal (1913-1921), Gerardo 
Machado (1925-1933), and Carlos Mendieta (1934-35) all worked as owners or high-ranking 
employees of Cuban or U.S. sugar mills. Out of self-interest, they generally aligned their policies 
with foreign capital and created conditions favorable to foreign investment in sugar and sugar 
related industries like the railroads.103  
The Mill 
 Growing up in Preston’s barrio norteamericano in the 1930s and 1940s, David E. Brewer 
reflected on the sentiments of conservative Anglo-Americans throughout the island who lived 
lives quite separate from poor and working-class Cubans. Living amongst vast inequity, due to 
racial and cultural hierarchies, Anglo-American sugar executives and non-white laborers 
remained in wholly separate worlds. Still, opportunities arose for a segment of Cubans trained in 
Anglo-American schools and universities. Over the course of the 1930s and 40s, an estimated 
200 U.S. citizens living in Preston fell to a few dozen. As pro-Cuban labor laws began to take 
effect, Cubans who developed Anglo-American skill-sets were increasingly hired as 
professionals, executives and engineers at foreign-owned sugar mills. According to Brewer, the 
majority of Cubans he encountered in and around Preston continued to “look at the United States 
as big, fat, wealthy Americans.” He recalls, “occasionally when I was riding on one of the trains, 
                                                 
103 Imilcy Balboa Navarro, “Steeds, Cocks, and Guayaberas: The Social Impact of Agrarian Reorganization in the 
Republic,” in State of Ambiguity, Civil Life and Culture in Cuba's First Republic 
 ed. Steven Palmer, José Antonio Piqueras, and Amparo Sánchez Cobos (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2015): 216-223. 
56 
it’s warm and I’ve got the windows up and my arm out the window and kids would look at me 
with freckles and say, ‘Americano give me some money.’ And they’d pester you. And I’d finally 
tell them to get lost in Spanish and they’d look at me funny and leave.”104  
 
Figure 4. Swimming Pool on la avenida in Preston 105 
 Barrios americanos physically segregated Anglo-American sugar executives from the 
people who worked for them and lived in their vicinity. The material inequity between the 
barrios americanos and the shacks of Cuban, West Indian, and Haitian cane-cutters, as well as 
the company-built homes in other neighborhoods in the mill town, created a significant gulf 
between, and resentment across these communities. In Preston, Anglo-Americans, and eventually 
a few Cubans in managerial positions working for UFSC, lived on la avenida with magnificent 
porches wrapping around North American styled homes. English-speaking servants filled the 
public and private spaces, while corporate executives enjoyed exclusive access to a swimming 
pool at the end of the street, as well as a nine-hole golf course nearby.106 Jorge Segura 
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remembers the United Fruit and Sugar Company of Banes: “There were two sides to [Banes], 
one for the Americans, one for the Cubans. There was a central, shared part also, but the 
Americans had their own Colony. There were differences. That sat badly with people.” 107 Many 
Anglo-Americans simply ignored the Cubans around them. “…I saw a lot of Americans in the 
streets, on the weekends. Many came. Sometimes they passed me in the street, but they never 
said anything.”108 In Hershey, Anglo-Americans lived with a very few Cuban professionals and 
executives, in beautiful chalets made of stone, with live-in domestic servants. Meanwhile Cuban 
and Caribbean mill workers lived in smaller wooden town houses further from the Hershey train 
station.109 Foreign sugar executives largely kept their distance from their non-Anglo-American 
employees.  
   
Figure 5. A Chalet and the Homes of Mill Workers in Hershey 110 
 Throughout Cuba, sugar mill towns employed most of the surrounding community, 
provided minimal services, and subsidized housing contingent on employment status. Missionary 
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Edgar Nesman, who worked outside of Preston, remembers, “Those living in the mill towns 
often had access to housing, sanitary facilities, education, and health care as part of their 
employment. For those who worked on the plantations, however, life was not as easy. The sugar 
harvest usually started in December or January with the onset of cooler weather that raised the 
sugar content in the cane plants. The harvest (“zafra”) lasted six or sometimes seven months.  
There was little work available for the cane-cutters after that.”111 Paul Wirth, whose Louisianan 
father was the doctor at the Hershey Mill, recalls, “The housing for the [Cuban and West Indian] 
workers was wooden houses very close together, and…they could never build more houses 
because then it would become a municipality and the government would get involved. So that’s 
why they kept it that small.” 112 By keeping the town under 200 homes, Hershey ensured that the 
company could mitigate interference from Cuban authorities.113  
 Sugar executives consolidated power by keeping workers dependent. In the early years of 
the Cuban republic, Frances Peace Sullivan explains, company policy strategically installed 
systems of care, whereby exploited labor became reliant on the “generosity” of their exploiters 
for basic survival. Sullivan writes “In the late 1910s and 1920s, sugar companies systematically 
underpaid employees, requiring workers to rely on private acts of charity (or seemingly 
magnanimous patronage from mill owners and managers) to help them through times of 
individual or collective economic distress.”114 The relationship positioned Anglo-Americans as 
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the benefactors of Cuban and Caribbean labor, while creating a class of workers utterly 
dependent on their Anglo-American employers.  
Having constructed mini-fiefdoms isolated from Cuban metropolitan centers, both Cuban 
and Anglo-American sugar mills sought to exert as much control as possible within their domain. 
Enrique Levy was the son of a Jewish peddler who grew up outside of the U.S.-owned Central 
Macareño. Levy remembers that at Central Macareño, the reliance on the Anglo-American 
executives was total: “All of our lives were dependent on these people.”115 As Levy recalls, “The 
[Cuban] government was not involved at all. For example, the electric plant belonged to the 
sugar mill company. The water supply belonged to the sugar mill company. The streets, not that 
they maintained them, but whatever they had to do, it was the sugar mill company. All the homes 
were ownership of the sugar mill company, which was given to employees.” As was the case 
with sugar mills throughout Cuba, suspension of contract meant that a worker lost not only a job, 
but also a home. Central Macareño “was a company town. The store was the company’s, the 
houses were painted the same way, everything. That’s the way it was in Macareño.”116 This 
dynamic typified foreign-owned sugar mills.117  
Methodist missionary Betty Campbell Whitehurst lived in the small mill town of 
Báguanos. Her mission was subsidized by the foreign-owned sugar company, a subsidiary of the 
Royal Bank of Canada. “Almost all of the men worked for the sugar mill. They earned good 
wages during the sugar harvest, three to five months a year, when the mill was operating. The 
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rest of the year they bought things on credit at the company store and by the time the mill started 
up again, they had already spent most of their future earnings. It reminded me of Tennessee 
Ernie Ford’s song, ‘Sixteen Tons,’ which says ‘I owe my soul to the company store.”118 If the 
zafra was not long enough for them to earn enough to pay off their past bills, they went deeper 
and deeper into debt.119 Cycles of dependence were built into the fabric of mill town life. When 
mills became insolvent, as occurred at Central Almeida in the 1930s, calamity struck. The mill 
was unable to pay its laborers, and as a result, “many workers…died of hunger.”120  
While collectively U.S. sugar mills leveraged their economic influence to maintain 
Cuban dependency on sugar and foreign capital, Hershey presents a significant outlier case-
study, given its unique development and outsized influence in framing perceptions of Cuba’s 
dominant industry. Hershey employees could go to the company store, but they didn’t have to. 
Their proximity to Havana, just twenty-eight miles away, made the shops of the Cuban capital an 
option as well. Thus, the employees of the mill were less dependent on the company store, and, it 
follows that Hershey operated less like a mini-fiefdom than more rural sugar enterprises.121 The 
Hershey sugar mill in Cuba pursued greater integration into Cuban society than other U.S. sugar 
corporations established prior to the Cuban Revolution.  
During, and immediately after the first U.S. military occupation of Cuba (1899-1902), 
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U.S. companies, including the United Fruit and Sugar Company, acquired cheap land devalued 
by thirty years of intermittent revolutions in rural eastern Cuba.122 Far from any major city, 
Richard Smith who grew up in Preston remembered, “There was rarely a need for the company 
employees to venture much beyond the confines of the plantation…. There was very little 
interaction between the Havana American community and the Americans on the plantation other 
than an occasional visit by the Senior Vice President of the Company and his family and some 
friends. We rarely saw any one else from Havana.”123  
Hershey was established more than a decade after UFSC in 1916, and in less isolated 
conditions, receiving concessions from the Cuban government to construct a railroad that 
connected Havana to Matanzas.124
 
Havana’s constantly evolving cosmopolitanism influenced 
Hershey’s multi-national development during the first half of the twentieth century, and the mill 
would become Cuban-owned in 1958.125 Anglo-American executives at Hershey often enjoyed 
close relationships with a number of Cubans, both at the mill and through Havana’s transnational 
networks.126 Meanwhile, the remotely located mills of the United Fruit and Sugar Company 
maintained a layer of Anglo-American managers in top positions, residing in largely isolated  
barrios americanos. UFSC was nationalized by the revolutionary government in 1960.127 
Built in a region with a long sugarcane-growing tradition, unlike some other sugar mills, 
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Hershey adopted many of the pre-existing Cuban labor practices, including the purchasing of 
sugarcane from local growers. The United Fruit and Sugar Company, by contrast, sought to 
control its entire operation, harvesting almost 90 percent of the sugarcane its mills processed. 
Further, Hershey seems to have paid its workers in cash, as opposed to company vouchers used 
to limit the mobility of workers and increase their dependence on respective employers.128 
Although the Cuban government attempted to end the voucher system in 1909, many 
corporations, including the United Fruit and Sugar Company, continued to compensate workers 
with vouchers, despite legal restrictions against doing so.129 The most serious excesses of the 
Anglo-American sugar industry went largely unknown to the Anglo-American colony familiar 
with Hershey, but not UFSC. To be clear, Hershey underpaid much of its labor, and valued mill 
workers more than those who labored in the fields. However, this too escaped the imagined 
reality for Anglo-American residents who knew little about the conditions of cane-cutters. 
 While most of Cuba’s Anglo-American tourists and residents found the distant United 
Fruit and Sugar Company properties of Banes or Preston to be inaccessible, Havana’s Anglo-
American schools often took their students to Hershey on field trips. Their parents rode 70 
minutes on the train for golf outings on the nine-hole company course, or for a family picnic at 
the famed Hershey Gardens. 130
 
A travel book from the 1950s explained, “The trip is enjoyed by 
tourists because they are greeted in English and made to feel thoroughly at home. A good chance 
is afforded to see how sugar is manufactured from the cane and afterward refined.”131 The 
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company brochure went further in detailing what awaited Anglo-Americans at the mill:  
Everything is modern in ‘the sugar town’, just as in ‘the chocolate and cocoa town’, and 
the convenience of employees is just as carefully considered. The avenues are wide and 
macadamized, with cement pavements and rows of tropical trees. All homes are 
attractive, each with its lawn and garden. There is a beautiful two-story hotel for the 
executives and tourists. The town is supplied with the purest of water from the famous 
spring ‘Ojo de Agua del Horne de Cal’, which is located on the property. There is a park, 
with a baseball diamond, race track and other amusement features.132 
 
For foreigners in Cuba between 1916 and 1958, the idyllic town of Hershey emerged as the 
relatively benevolent face of U.S. sugar corporations on the island.  
For many Anglo-Americans, excursions to Hershey fashioned their view of life and labor 
at the sugar mill, masking the harsh reality of the sugar economy for the rural poor. By 1945, 52 
percent of agricultural workers were employed fewer than four months per year, a consequence 
of the seasonal nature of sugar production. Most rural households were without running water. 
Three-quarters of children living in rural regions did not attend school and 95 percent of them 
suffered from parasites.133 Geographic isolation facilitated Anglo-American ignorance. Despite 
these realities, in a 1950 documentary called Cuba: The Land and the People, 1950, Coronet, the 
lives of campesinos are described as “easy and pleasant.”134  The film ignored the suffering, 
especially during the tiempo muerto between harvests. Most in the Anglo-American colony 
never saw the unskilled Cuban or Caribbean worker who earned as little as a dollar a day cutting 
cane.135 
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 Conditions for labor further deteriorated as time spent working decreased. According to 
Claes Brundenius, due to the automation of the sugar industry, the length of the zafra shrank 
considerably between Cuban independence and the revolution. Brundenius estimates that 
technological improvements reduced the average harvest from 300 days at the beginning of the 
century, to 210 days in the 1920s, to 104 days in the 1930s, to just 95 days after 1945.136 The rest 
of the year most sugar workers were left without a steady income. 
 During times of political upheaval, these contentious visions of U.S.-owned mills 
surfaced in the popular Cuban discourse, challenging Anglo-American, as well as Cuban myths 
about the Cuban sugar industry drawn from short visits to the Hershey mill. Armando Gil, the 
child of a Hershey mill worker, lamented, “the saddest thing, was as good as Hershey had been 
and as much as the communists tried to picture the concept of the ugly American, in my town, 
even if they tried, they couldn’t do it. They couldn’t do it because the people that have known 
and have worked, their experience was the total opposite.”137 While Hershey proved exceptional, 
in many ways, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, the suffering of campesinos in eastern Cuba 
moved out of the shadows and became evidence of the need for a radical socio-economic 
restructuring of Cuban society. 
Conclusions 
 The United States ensured a prioritization of its interests between 1899 and 1958 through 
the capillaries of informal empire, including military incursions, economic influence, political 
intervention and the cultivation of select Cuban leaders. Relationships with Cuban power brokers 
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insured that special attention be paid to the shared interests of Anglo-Americans and their Cuban 
allies. This chapter traced the construction of mutually dependent Anglo-American influences in 
the economic and diplomatic spheres that worked to transform Cuban society and Caribbean 
labor in ways that benefitted foreign interests and accommodated privileged outsiders. The long 
reach of empire proved paramount for Anglo-Americans seeking a work force best suited to 
accommodate their needs. While individual Cubans profited from the extensive influence of 
privileged outsiders, many Cubans and Caribbean workers were denied financial security and 
educational opportunities. This system destabilized Cuban structures and limited sovereignty for 
the island, before serving as evidence to justify the implementation of radical socio-economic 
and political changes after 1959.
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CHAPTER TWO: FULGENCIO BATISTA: A CUBAN PARTNER “GOOD FOR THE 
COMPANY”   
“We can serve Yanqui imperialism or serve the people, the interests of the two are not 
compatible.” Antonio Guiteras, 1933138 
Introduction 
In September 1933, Ramón Grau San Martín, the popular physiology professor at the 
University of Havana, was chosen as acting president of Cuba by the student directory of the 
rebelling forces after the ousting of Cuban President Gerardo Machado.139 Unacceptable to U.S. 
policy makers, due to his nationalist agenda, Grau’s government would go unrecognized by the 
United States. By the end of September 1933, U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles was already 
conspiring with another leader in the anti-Machado revolution, a young sergeant named 
Fulgencio Batista.140 More than anyone else, Batista would define Cuban politics for the next 
quarter century, largely through a multipronged alliance with U.S. interests. Understanding his 
continued leadership depended largely on the support of U.S. officials, over time Batista torqued 
his political, economic and cultural priorities toward the interests of Anglo-American residents 
and institutions and away from the needs and desires of the Cuban people.   
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Batista and Roosevelt (1933-1944) 
 
Figure 6. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Fulgencio Batista Shake Hands in Washington, 1942141 
 
 Fearing radical change, Washington acted quickly in 1933 to prevent President Grau 
from consolidating power. The Roosevelt administration ordered warships to Cuba and Key 
West, alerted U.S. bombers and marines, all the while refusing to recognize the new Cuban 
government. Yet Grau continued to push forward with a number of nationalist reforms to aid 
impoverished Cubans. Between September 10, 1933, and January 15, 1934, the Grau 
government implemented an eight-hour workday and a minimum wage. Grau deported Haitians 
and West Indians in great numbers as they competed for work at Cuban and foreign corporations 
with the rural and urban Cuban poor. Grau and his political allies invested in a breakfast program 
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for children in the nation’s schools. He held companies accountable by declaring a ban on 
voucher pay systems throughout the island.142 Further, he cut electric rates and temporarily took 
control of the U.S.-owned Cuban Electric Company.143 These challenges to foreign capital and 
the structures of informal empire would not be tolerated by the Roosevelt administration. 
 Ambassador Welles described the Grau government as a “lunatic asylum,” having 
“communistic” ideas.144 In late 1933 and early 1934, Welles and Batista partnered to map out 
Cuba’s future. Batista’s biographer Frank Argote-Freyre explains, “Batista, to maintain his own 
power, broke with the students and installed a government more to the liking of the United States 
and its internal political allies.”145 The Cuban strongman worked to prevent collateral damage in 
the removal of Grau, and rejected ideas for a U.S. invasion proposed by Welles. Batista 
recognized the potential anger that could be unleashed against the United States if they invaded 
Cuba.146 U.S. policy makers rewarded the coup orchestrated by Batista in January 1934 by 
quickly affirming Batista’s selection for Cuban president, Carlos Mendieta y Montefur. With a 
friendly government installed by their ally Batista, on May 29, 1934, the Treaty on Relations 
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between Cuba and the United States abrogated the Platt Amendment, one of the central demands 
of the deposed Grau government.147 
 Growing up poor in Banes, Oriente, a United Fruit and Sugar Company mill town, 
Batista saw an allegiance with Anglo-Americans as a way to improve his personal fortunes and 
perhaps also the fortunes of the Cuban people. Batista attended the Banes Friends School run by 
Quaker missionaries and he graduated fourth-grade at the age of twelve in 1913.148 As a youth, 
he cut cane for the UFSC and understood in body and mind, the company’s power, and the 
influence of the United States in Cuba more generally.149 Argote-Freyre writes that in 1933 
“Batista touted himself as the man who established order. As he viewed it, an accommodation 
with the United States was part of the political equation.”150 Rather than rebel against the 
influence of the United States, Batista embraced U.S. support as fundamental to Cuban stability. 
In 1933 Batista skyrocketed from an unknown Cuban sergeant to the most significant figure in 
Cuban politics for a quarter of a century, in large part due to his early recognition of, and 
subservience to, U.S. authority on the island. 
 While allied with Anglo-American executives and diplomats in Cuba, Batista was 
particularly vexed by Cuban elites, whom he viewed as an obstacle to his leadership due to the 
scorn they held for his ethnicity--Batista was believed to be of Spanish, African, Taíno and/or 
Chinese descent--and his class background. His first major confrontation with the Cuban elite 
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came in 1933. As a sergeant in the Cuban Military, Batista organized enlisted men to overthrow 
their officers after the military brass failed to meet a number of their demands. Cuban officers, 
for decades, had treated the enlisted men harshly and without respect, as little more than 
servants. The officers, under attack, sought intervention from the United States. The Roosevelt 
administration refused. With the collapse of the Machado government and conflict in the air, 
Washington understood that power now lay with Batista. Ambassador Welles wrote in October 
1933, “[T]here does not exist at the present time in Cuba any authority whatever except [Batista] 
and that in the event of further disturbances which may endanger the lives and properties of 
Americans or foreigners in the Republic, it seems to be essential that this relationship be 
maintained.”151  
 His successful overthrow of the military order did not garner Batista acceptance with 
high-society Cubans. An incident at the Sans Souci nightclub on New Year’s Eve, 1933, proved 
particularly stinging for the Cuban strongman eager to be embraced by the nation’s elite. Upon 
the arrival of Batista and his entourage, the upper-class patrons of the club, almost in unison, got 
up from their seats and walked out of the establishment.152 Though he continued to desire 
admittance into the circles of Cuba’s aristocracy, Batista found it prudent to cultivate ties with 
Anglo-Americans. He purchased a home in Daytona Beach, sent his children to Anglo-American 
schools, joined social clubs frequented by Anglo-Americans and wielded authority to strengthen 
Anglo-American business partnerships with the Cuban government.153  
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 Batista’s efforts at forging alliances with Anglo-Americans proved fruitful. Welles’ 
successor, Special Representative Jefferson Caffrey, took his predecessor’s advice and cultivated 
a close personal friendship with Batista. They cemented ties to preserve the influence of the 
Roosevelt administration and secure the authority of Batista in Cuba.154 In 1936, in the midst of a 
confrontation between Batista and the elected President Miguel Mariano Gómez over funding 
priorities, the United States remained silent as Batista orchestrated Gómez’ removal.155 Batista 
stabilized U.S. interests in Cuba, and Washington reciprocated with continued support for 
Batista’s leadership.  
 By the mid-1930s, with Batista in charge, Anglo-American power brokers could 
influence Cuban affairs without the need for a display of military might.  When workers took 
over the Preston mill in the 1930s, United Fruit executive Walter Schuyler and UFSC lawyer 
Mario Lazo met with then Army Chief-of-Staff, Fulgencio Batista. Lazo recalls, “Brief and to 
the point…” Batista asked, “How many soldiers did Schuyler believe were needed?” The 50-60 
requested would be ordered through a “trusted sergeant [who] proceed[ed] with an army detail 
from Santiago to Preston that same day.” Lazo remembers: “Within seventy-hours, order was 
restored in both Preston and Banes without bloodshed or violence. During the following weeks, 
this experience was repeated over and over throughout the country. As a consequence, the 
conservative elements of Cuban society rallied behind Batista.”156  
 By the time the Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934, Anglo-American capital 
controlled more than half of Cuban sugar production, along with Cuban rail, electrical and 
                                                 
154 Argote-Freyre, Fulgencio Batista, 123. 
155 Ibid., 228. 
156 Lazo, Dagger in the Heart, 67. 
72 
telephone lines. Batista understood well the importance of remaining in step with U.S. 
geopolitical and economic priorities. Mario Lazo and his Anglo-American clients found Batista 
an eager ally on “war projects for the U.S. government, including the fifteen-million-dollar San 
Antonio de los Baños Air Base twenty-five miles south of Havana, with its mile-long concrete 
runways….” Batista approved “a multi-million-dollar nickel plant, financed and owned by the 
United States government” at Moa Bay and granted millions of dollars in tax exemptions for 
these U.S. projects. Lazo obviously appreciated the partnership: “In every instance my firm 
received from the President immediate and cordial cooperation.”157   
 Batista’s deal-making with Anglo-American capital led him into direct conflict with 
those progressive Cuban leaders who sought autonomy from the United States. Antonio Guiteras, 
a rival leader who emerged following the revolution of 1933, became disgruntled with Batista’s 
cozy relationship with U.S. officials. Guiteras explained, “We can serve Yanqui imperialism or 
serve the people, the interests of the two are not compatible.”158 Guiteras advocated nationalizing 
all corporations that did not provide a living wage to their workers. Pushing for confrontation 
with U.S. capital, Guiteras raised the ire of State Department officials who nicknamed him 
“Cuba’s Public Enemy No. 1” for his challenges to Anglo-American interests and his budding 
rivalry with Batista. Guiteras, later celebrated as a hero by the Cuban Revolution, would be 
eliminated by Batista’s forces in May 1935, at the age of twenty-nine.159 
 Batista is remembered as a brutal dictator who prioritized U.S. capital for his time in 
power between 1952 and 1958. And yet in the 1930s and 1940s, Sergeant--then Colonel, 
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General, and later President--Batista sought to initiate progressive social change to improve the 
lives of poor and rural Cubans. Impoverished by the sugar economy as a child, Batista was 
moved to initiate a number of social reforms to address the suffering of the campesinos. In 1936 
he mobilized the army to bring education to rural communities by developing a plan to hire 
“sergeant-teachers” who established escuelas rurales cívico-militares. He launched health 
initiatives leading to the creation of the Technical Public Health Service and the National 
Tuberculosis Council, and directed the Civic Military Institute to construct orphanages 
throughout the island to serve the orphaned children of state workers. Batista pursued rights for 
colonos who leased or owned land to grow sugar cane that they sold to large mill operations.160 
Many Anglo-Americans recognized in Batista’s policies a spirit of the New Deal programs 
advocated by the Roosevelt Administration in the United States. Through his expansion of a 
social safety net, Batista gained a solid reputation throughout the diverse subsets of the Anglo-
American colony. In 1938, Methodist missionary Sallie Lou MacKinnon admitted, “Col. 
Fulgenicio Batista…appears to be a beneficent dictator sincerely interested in the welfare of the 
common people.”161  
 Though he rose in large part through the support of U.S. interests, in his 1939 campaign 
for the presidency Batista could be heard criticizing U.S. excesses. A rising populist to the Cuban 
electorate, he advocated “absorbing monopolies” and argued for the dignity of small nations. 
Nevertheless, Anglo-Americans remained unconcerned, confident that a Batista presidency 
would protect their interests. Batista continued to solicit and receive contributions from leading 
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Anglo-American colony members and Anglo-American corporations. Elected in 1940 to serve as 
the first president under the 1940 Constitution, Batista’s term ended with a peaceful transition of 
power to President Ramón Grau after Batista’s preferred candidate Carlos Saladrigas Zayas lost 
the election of 1944. A champion of progressive ideas and greater equity for Cubans, between 
1933 and 1944, Batista attempted to advance the welfare of his people even as he refused to 
question the role of the United States in Cuban affairs. Following his term in office, Batista 
moved to his home in Daytona Beach, Florida.162 
Batista Returns to Power (1952-1959) 
 
Figure 7. Time Magazine Covers Batista’s Coup with the Headline, “He Got Past Democracy’s Sentries,” April 
1952 163 
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From the late 1920s until the reemergence of Batista in the 1950s, the size of the Anglo-
American population decreased. While 7,195 U.S. residents remained in 1931, this represented a 
substantial decrease from the 9,555 U.S. nationals who lived in Cuba in 1917.164 The number of 
U.S. residents would drop further still through the 1930s and into the early 1940s. For a number 
of reasons, Cuba grew less attractive to foreign investment and for Anglo-Americans seeking to 
establish new lives abroad.165 The “Ley del 50%” adopted by Grau, and the Constitution of 1940 
codified protections for Cuban workers, making labor more expensive for Anglo-American 
corporations, while requiring them to hire a greater number of Cubans and fewer foreigners.166 
The Global Depression of the 1930s further encouraged Anglo-Americans to return to their home 
societies. The Cuban share of sugar production rose from 22.4 percent in 1939 to 58.7 percent in 
1955. Cubans would control 60.2 percent of bank deposits in 1950, a sharp rise from 16.8 
percent in 1939.167 The withdrawal of U.S. capital combined with the entry of the United States 
into World War II left just 3,800 U.S. residents in Cuba in 1943, as the number of British 
residents fell to 1,887, from 3,095 twelve years earlier in 1931.168 However, in coordination with 
Fulgencio Batista, the reach of foreign capital was significantly reinvigorated after 1952. 
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 Anticipating defeat in the 1952 presidential campaign, on March 10 Fulgencio Batista, 
with the support of the Cuban military, staged a coup to overthrow the democracy he helped 
create twelve years earlier. Without the legitimacy garnered by the democratic process, the new 
Batista government was deeply dependent on U.S. support for its survival. While some Anglo-
American residents expressed distress over Batista’s overthrow of Cuban democracy in 1952, 
others applauded the move. As a community, they were comforted by Cuba’s new leadership. 
The coup empowered Fulgencio Batista, whom they were confident would lead an overtly pro-
U.S. administration.  
 On United Fruit and Sugar Company property, Anglo-American employees held a 
celebration of the March 1952 coup that deposed President Carlos Prío Socarrás because the 
overthrow of Cuban democracy by Batista “was good for the company.” A North American 
housewife of a UFSC executive invited Virginia M. Schofield’s family to join in the festivities at 
the social club in Guaro because Walton Schofield, of British descent, served as a middle 
manager for United Fruit. Schofield recalls, upon answering the phone to receive the invitation, 
“My [Cuban] mother was insulted. I remember [her] asking, ‘and how would you feel if 
something like this happened in your country?’…. [The North American housewife] answered: 
‘But, my dear, this could never happen in the U.S.’”169 The woman was of course accurate in her 
assessment of what would be “good for the company,” though very bad for labor and democracy 
in Cuba. Real wages for workers decreased by 16 percent in 1955 alone, while the cost of living 
remained constant.170  
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 Between 1952-1958 Batista dangled lucrative opportunities in mining, energy, 
agriculture, communications and tourism before foreign capital, including the U.S. mafia.171 As 
North American and British corporations and individuals found favorable terms of investment, 
the number of Anglo-Americans on the island grew. The 1953 census signaled a significant 
influx of Anglo-Americans with 6,503 residents from the United States, up from just 3,800 U.S. 
residents a decade earlier.172 By 1957, 12,168 U.S. citizens had established residency in Cuba.173 
The alliance between foreign capital and President Batista encouraged North American and 
British immigration, empowered Anglo-American corporations, while agitating a widening 
collection of Cubans.174  
 Anglo-Americans’ positive reactions to Batista’s political reemergence catalyzed 
significant anti-U.S. sentiment throughout Cuba. By extending recognition to the Batista 
government just seventeen days after the coup, Washington exposed a blatant disregard for 
Cuba’s political institutions and a hypocritical commitment to “democracy” abroad. The military 
support provided to the Cuban government until 1958 by the Eisenhower Administration aided 
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Batista in the Sierra Maestra and further stoked the ire of many Cuban observers.175 Yet it was 
not just the United States government taking sides in a civil war that deteriorated U.S. claims as 
a benevolent neighbor. Anglo-American businessmen, corporations and gangsters - as 
embodiments of U.S. interests in Cuba - all profited from the overthrow of Cuban democracy. 
 Paying deference to U.S. corporations, Batista encouraged tourism and protected Anglo-
American investments. Historian Samuel Farber concludes that with no natural attachment to the 
nation’s elite, due to his ethnicity and his humble origins, Batista promoted the investment of 
foreign capital in what Farber calls “giveaway programs” to mostly U.S. corporations.176 Batista 
received a “pure-gold telephone” from the Cuban Telephone Company (CTC) for signing a pact 
to raise rates on Cuban consumers. This “gift” became a symbol of Batista’s corrupt relations 
with foreign capital. The CTC would be the first U.S. corporation intervened on, and later 
nationalized by, the revolutionary government.177 In 1957 U.S. investment in the Cuban 
economy surpassed $800 million, revealing what Paul M. Heilman, President of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Cuba, explained as “the confidence of our investors in this country 
and their belief in her future.”178  
 Batista worked hard to assure Anglo-Americans that their investments on the island were 
safe and would prosper under his rule, including their relations with labor. After Cuban labor 
leader Eusebio Mujal was forced to align workers’ interests with management’s priorities, the 
Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba functioned as an apparatus of the government. Armed 
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patrols were organized to prevent worker uprisings during the mid-late 1950s, especially in sugar 
zones during the zafra.179 At the time, sugar represented 82 percent of Cuban exports, close to 
two-thirds of the national income, and 37 percent of production was controlled by the United 
States. In the late-1950s Batista prioritized the protection of the sugar industry.180 In 1956 the 
U.S. Department of Commerce conducted a survey of Anglo-American residents and their Cuban 
associates about the Cuban labor situation. From their point of view, the Department found that 
labor conditions had “improved materially during the period 1953-55.” The Commerce report 
continued, “A more balanced emphasis in Government policy brought the interests of labor, 
capital, and the public into better focus while declining economic activities acted as a warning to 
both Government and labor that the attitudes of the period prior to 1953 could not go on 
indefinitely.” The document explains: “Labor leaders have begun to recognize the long-term 
implications of blanket opposition to improved production methods and, by 1955, were even 
willing privately to entertain the possibility of modifications in the existing dismissal system. 
Top labor leaders have also taken a stand in favor of increased investment in industry both by 
domestic and foreign capital and their demands in matters of wage and fringe benefits since 1952 
have generally not been immoderate.”181 The coup represented a clear win for Anglo-American 
corporations. Cuban labor bent to the demands of foreign capital and the Batista government. 
 Between 1952 and 1958, following his unconstitutional seizure of power, Batista’s 
authority rested on support from his military and abroad. While U.S. executives and diplomats 
generally considered their situation much improved after the 1952 coup, over the next several 
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years, Batista’s credibility waned across diverse segments of the Cuban population. 
Disenchanted citizens from varied backgrounds and geographic locations in Cuban society 
would begin to stitch together strategic alliances with Anglo-American colony members, 
fortifying their opposition to Batista by the late 1950s.  
Batista and Cuba’s Moral Decline  
Perhaps no alliance infuriated Cubans by the late 1950s more than Fulgencio Batista’s 
close association with the U.S. mafia. While the Volstead Act of 1919 forced U.S. liquor 
distributors underground or out-of-business, in Havana the tourism industry boomed. During 
prohibition, Anglo-American styled restaurants and hotels opened throughout Havana, as did 
brothels and casinos for Anglo-American clientele.182 Enrique Cirules dates the beginnings of the 
relationship between Meyer Lansky and Fulgencio Batista to 1933. After organizing a meeting of 
leading mobsters, Lansky flew to Havana transporting suitcases filled with cash, which Cirules 
claims the mob boss delivered to Cuba’s rising leader Batista in exchange for the casino interests 
at the Hotel Nacional. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Lansky continued to funnel millions to 
Batista and other Cuban powerbrokers, increasing his stake in the Cuban “vice” industries.183 
Lansky and his business partner Charles “Lucky” Luciano cultivated relationships with other 
leading Cuban officials to secure their influence and access to profits. Senator Paco Prío 
Socarrás, brother to President Prío, became close friends with Lansky and Luciano.184 Luciano 
was also good friends with Cuban Senator Eduardo Suárez Rivas. Luciano would be spotted on 
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trips with the Suárez Rivas family in the Cuban countryside.185 While the presence of the U.S. 
mafia in Cuba dates back to Al Capone and the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
relationship strengthened in the 1950s, with the alliance between Lansky and Batista.  
 The tangled dynamics of U.S. mafia, labor relations and the rise of “sin” industries were 
particularly visible in the region surrounding Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. At the base U.S. 
officials recommended relatively low salaries for non-U.S. workers. A welcome pamphlet for the 
wives of recently arriving naval officers warned these women away from generosity with maids' 
salaries. Though the recommended pay “may seem ridiculously low,” the pamphlet suggested a 
limit of $15-35 a month “for experienced help.” The document went on, “[while] normal human 
relations require us to be gracious to our employees, it is well to remember that if you allow too 
much freedom to your maid, you do her a disservice as well as to the next Navy wife who might 
hire her.”186  
 With underpaid Caribbean and Cuban local base workers, the economies of Caimanera 
and Guantánamo City suffered.187  Over time, these communities grew increasingly dependent 
on dollars spent by U.S. troops on “liberty parties” in bars and brothels. Naval personnel would 
return from these excursions to segregated idyllic developments flush with U.S. social comforts, 
servants and detached from local culture.188 With the logic of informal empire, and in a discourse 
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of underdevelopment, Anglo-Americans advocated that foreign missionaries, philanthropists and 
diplomatic officials be sent to Caimanera and Guantánamo to address prostitution, as well as the 
spread of venereal disease among U.S. sailors. At the same time, powerful U.S. and Cuban 
financial interests pressured Cuban authorities to ensure the continued smooth operations of the 
brothels surrounding the naval base.189 In Havana these industries were often financed by U.S. 
mafia figures, and developed for the pleasure of patrons from North America and Europe with 
the support of Cuban officials. Cubans responded to the demands of Anglo-American tourists, 
sailors and civilian residents by participating as service workers in bars, brothels and nightclubs. 
Longtime Anglo-American resident John Parker remembered that drunken tourists, 
affectionately called americanos borrachos, became “a euphemism for North Americans.”190  
 Eager to collect the tourist dollars that mobsters generated, Cuban authorities encouraged 
the financial investments and activities of the U.S. mafia. In 1946, Lansky gathered the leading 
mob bosses for a private retreat at the Hotel Nacional to decide how they would expand 
throughout Cuba. The Cuban government intervened to ensure that the hotel workers, who were 
on strike, would not interrupt service for these distinguished guests. Prostitutes and performers 
from the leading hotels and brothels were brought in, as the U.S. mafia re-designed Havana to 
make it home to the largest gambling operation in the world.191  
 In 1952, Batista named Lansky as an advisor of gaming operations on the island after 
casino scandals tainted the perceived fairness of gambling in Cuba. Lansky developed a gaming 
school to prepare Cubans to work in casinos, and Batista ensured that dealers would be classified 
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as ‘technicians,’ and thereby exempt from income taxes.192 With Ley Hotelera 2074, T.J. English 
explains, Batista “provided tax exemptions to any hotel providing tourist accommodation, and 
furthermore guaranteed government financing…for anyone willing to commit one million dollars 
or more toward hotel construction or two hundred thousand for the building of a nightclub.”193 In 
this way the Batista government helped fund Lansky’s prized project, the Havana Riviera on the 
Malecón.194 By subsidizing the mafia’s presence in Cuba, Batista enriched himself and mafia 
figures while providing conditions for an alliance of convenience between the mob and the CIA 
after 1959. The presence and power of the U.S. mafia in Cuba dramatically altered Cuban, as 
well as U.S. history in the late 1950s and early 1960s.195  
Conclusions 
 While U.S. officials cultivated Cuban allies for control and profit beginning in the 1890s, 
no ally proved more fruitful and profitable than Fulgencio Batista. Batista spent his early life 
burdened by stratified contact with Anglo-Americans on the United Fruit and Sugar Company 
property in Banes. From a highly marginalized class and of mixed-race origin, denigrated by 
Anglo-Americans and the Cuban elite, Batista embraced the opportunity to become a partner to 
Washington and U.S. capital. During 1950s, bolstered by the loyalty of his U.S.-armed military 
and the support of Anglo-American executives and diplomats, Batista became isolated from a 
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wide variety of Cubans. The rural poor continued to struggle within the sugar economy. Many 
Cubans felt Cuba was drifting toward immorality for the profits of U.S. mafia figures and the 
pleasure of foreign tourists, residents and sailors. The country seemed to be moving further from 
the ambitions for true sovereignty held by many Cuban professionals, outraged that their island 
abandoned Western-democratic structures in 1952. Batista was unable to imagine a Cuba 
sovereign from the United States, and so a growing list of opponents began to plan for a Cuba 
without Batista. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SEDUCTION AND BETRAYAL OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
FARMING COMMUNITIES IN CUBA 
Introduction 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, thousands of Anglo-American farmers were 
lured to Cuba with the promise of profit and paradise.  These farmers established close to eighty 
farming communities in Cuba, searching for utopian versions of home on the island. They 
benefited from their national identities as they enjoyed access to foreign markets, business 
partners and Anglo-American transportation networks often inaccessible to Cuban farmers. 
Enticed by advertisements that promised a better life, cheap land and quick returns, these Anglo-
American settlers would eventually discover that they were expendable to U.S. power brokers in 
Cuba and abroad. The socio-economic alliances established between influential Cuban 
professionals and Anglo-American capital became prioritized over the interests of these farming 
communities. While most of these independent farmers left the island by the 1930s, those who 
remained integrated more deeply into Cuban society. 
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Settler Colonies in Informal Empire 
 
Figure 8. Cover of Pamphlet Advertising for Cuban Land and Steamship Company 196 
 
 Beginning in 1898, U.S. corporate and government officials advertised Cuba’s emerging 
citrus industry as a path for middle-and-working-class Anglo-Americans to relocate, plant new 
roots and begin again with the protective influence of the United States on the island. Many of 
these North American immigrants sought opportunities following the economically disastrous 
1890s in the United States.197 U.S. authorities, including Governor General of Cuba Leonard R. 
Wood, encouraged Anglo-American immigration to the island where “great opportunities 
[awaited] Americans who will come here and settle.... Land is cheap…. Returns would be 
quick.”198 The Cuban Land and Steamship Company (CLSC) out of New York advertised 
property in Cuba through informational pamphlets and U.S. periodicals, including the ones they 
published. The CLSC reported fail-safe conditions for those who invested in property on the 
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island. The Cuban Land and Steamship Company promised, “Any man or woman can invest here 
with the assurance that loss is impossible,” the reason being, “Anything that will grow anywhere 
in any country on earth can be grown here.” The CLSC declared, “999 out of every 1,000 can 
succeed in Cuba, and if that one doesn’t its his own fault.”199  
 In 1899 the CLSC magazine, The Cuban Colonist, encouraged investment in Cuba not 
only for wealthy foreigners, but also for the ordinary U.S. citizen. “That American capital would 
take the first opportunity to exploit Cuba has long been an acknowledged fact, but it has operated 
almost without exception heretofore in the form of closed corporations composed exclusively of 
shrewd capitalists, whose desire was to secure and monopolize the products and franchises which 
Cuba has so freely to give.” The article characterized Anglo-American Farming communities as 
inclusive and open to non-elites: “As is known to our investors and friends, the CUBAN LAND 
AND STEAMSHIP COMPANY was the first to see the base possibilities for organized capital 
and cooperative effort. We want to interest small investors. Not the great capitalist, but the 
industrious American, quick to see an opportunity and quick to take advantage of it.”200 These 
calls for a multi-class community seem to have been successful. The Cuban Colonist promoted 
the village of La Gloria, which would develop into the largest Anglo-American settler colony in 
Cuba with a population of close to 3,000 in 1917.  
 The publications of the Cuban Land and Steamship Company were not the only U.S. 
periodicals soliciting opportunities for middle-class Anglo-Americans in Cuba. In his work Cuba 
in the American Imagination, Louis A. Pérez notes a litany of claims made concerning Anglo-
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American prospects on the island for foreigners with and without significant savings. One 
developer was quoted in the Cuban Bulletin in 1904 explaining, “Nowhere else in the world are 
there such chances for success for the man of moderate means…as Cuba offers today.”201 The 
Commercial and Financial World published an article in 1906, recruiting emigrants from the 
United States: “Remarkable in the extreme are the opportunities that exist in Cuba for both home 
seekers and investors…. It is simply a poor man’s paradise and a rich man’s mecca.”202 Other 
newspapers marveled at the price, potential and profitability of Cuban land.203 These voices 
explained that settling in Cuba would provide opportunities for Anglo-American prosperity 
regardless of class.  
 The security of Anglo-American investments was assured by the dominance of the 
United States’ financial and political power on the island. Many settler colonists arrived with the 
hope, and expectation, that the United States would formally annex the island and Cuba would 
attain status as a U.S. state.204 The CLSC promised potential investors they would not have to 
assimilate, nor learn Spanish. The company claimed the town of La Gloria “will be as much an 
American town and as thoroughly under American laws as any town in the United States.”205 At 
the turn of the century the CLSC attempted to assuage the anxieties of potential immigrants who 
feared moving to a foreign land by emphasizing the role of the United States in Cuba’s future. 
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“Cuba only needs what she soon will have, a stable government or annexation to the United 
States to develop and transform this pearl of Islands into a vast garden of untold wealth. Her 
future is assured, it only awaits what is now developing to an extraordinary degree. American 
capital, enterprise and colonization.”206 The first issue of The Cuban Colonist published during 
the initial U.S. occupation (1899-1902) emphasized the security of Cuba and the already 
established and extensive U.S. influence on the island: “Cuba is practically ours, and its 
untouched wealth of field and forest or mine alike await but well directed labor…. That is the 
opportunity that Cuba offers to American capital and energy.”207  
 Unlike other sectors of the Anglo-American colony in Cuba, these fairly small farming 
communities developed as “settler colonies,” where, Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen argue, 
privileged outsiders “sought to construct communities bounded by ties of ethnicity and faith in 
what they persistently defined as virgin or empty land…. They wished less to govern indigenous 
people or enlist them in their economic ventures than to seize their land and push them beyond 
an ever-expanding frontier of settlement.”208 While other groups of privileged outsiders were 
developing socio-economic alliances with Cubans to augment their political and economic 
influence, these settler colonists attempted to create homogenous Anglo-American farming 
communities on the island, quite divorced from the Cuban society that surrounded them. 
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 The ideology of Cuban underdevelopment within Anglo-American farming communities 
was mobilized in ways that would justify Anglo-Americans moving onto, and profiting off of 
foreign land. The CLSC promoted the rhetoric of Cuban backwardness in The Cuban Colonist, 
where Thomas I. Madge, a veteran of the Cuban Wars of Independence, wrote: “I served three or 
more years with Maceo in the Ten Years’ 1ar, and I know the Cuban pretty well. The American 
will have to protect and produce the riches of the island, for the native never will. American 
capital should be invested here immediately. There is no occasion for delay...” Addressing the 
concerns of security held by immigrants to Cuba, Madge continued, “The more American money 
invested here at the present, the greater reason ‘Uncle Sam’ has to take care of his own, which he 
has always done and will do.”209  
 Still, the CSLC found it important to frame the Anglo-American immigrant as 
compassionate. The pages of The Cuban Colonist advanced the narrative of foreign benevolence 
and predicted “a great future for Cuba under the restraining influence of conservative American 
administration.”210 U.S. settlers seemed to have imagined themselves as benevolent modernizers, 
as well as pioneers looking to get ahead. They could simultaneously do good, and do well. 
 For many of these Anglo-American farmers, the easy life promised by U.S. companies 
like the CLSC proved false, and quickly. By 1900, complaints of the conditions in La Gloria 
reached the New York Times: “The land…was a swamp to a large extent, and several colonists 
had spent all their money and were in want.”211 The New York Times reported in February 1900 
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that many colonists in La Gloria “complained bitterly that everything was misrepresented to 
them, while others say that the prospects for the future of the colony would have been much 
brighter had there been efficient management.”212 U.S. nationals arrived in Cuba expecting a 
warm welcome. According to Major W.R. Graham, a disillusioned investor returning from La 
Gloria, they found instead “a seething undercurrent…. The Cubans want the Americans out of 
Cuba.”213  
Despite early hardships and a chilly welcome, within a few years of their arrival many of 
these farming communities were thriving, basking in the context of informal empire and the 
eventual--if temporary--responsiveness from the U.S. government.  By March of 1900, an 
investigation was ordered by U.S. Governor General Wood to address complaints from La 
Gloria.214 Pressure from U.S. authorities in Cuba and U.S. newspapers, including the New York 
Times, seem to have led the Cuban Land and Steamship Company to improve conditions. By the 
end of March, the CLSC promised deeds would be made available to North American settlers 
and the town road would be lifted two feet to prevent flooding.215 The support of the U.S. 
authorities in Cuba during times of occupation, combined with the negative coverage by U.S. 
press agencies, forced the CLSC to invest in the La Gloria project.  
 Soon these colonists were able to carve out comfortable homes in a foreign land where 
they would encounter no pressure to assimilate to local customs. Anglo-American schools and 
churches were established, which allowed foreign residents to continue speaking in their own 
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language, praying in their own houses of worship and building a homogeneous Anglo-American 
community reminiscent of home.216 Anglo-American educators and missionaries arrived to teach 
and preach in English.217 Over time, these settlers accumulated wealth in large part because of 
their access to Anglo-American markets and transportation networks. Eventually, many of these 
settlers were able to hire Cuban or Caribbean laborers and domestic servants.218  
 Despite the obvious advantages derived from their Anglo-American identities in Cuba, 
these colonists wanted more. Many believed annexation by the United States would be the best 
way to cement their status. On the Isle of Pines in particular, the potential for U.S. annexation 
encouraged Anglo-American colonists and land companies to purchase 90-99 percent of the land 
in the early 1900s.219 As was the case with the Cuban Land and Steamship Company in La 
Gloria, the U.S.-owned American Settlers’ Association, the Isle of Pines Land Development 
Company, and the Santa Fe Land Company purchased large tracts of property for sub-division 
and resale to Anglo-American nationals.220  
 These few hundred Anglo-American colonists commonly expressed hope that the 
ambiguous status of the isle penned into Article VI of the Platt Amendment would eventually 
lead to annexation of Cuba’s second largest island by the United States government. Anglo-
American settlers on the isle initiated a campaign to argue for absorption, on the basis of what 
they claimed to be Cuban incompetence, corruption, instability and a debt owed due to the U.S. 
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intervention in 1898. By 1904, however, with the signing – though not the ratification – of the 
Hay-Quesada Treaty, it was clear that Washington would not pursue jurisdiction over the isle of 
Pines.221 In 1905, the treaty came up for a vote in the United States Congress. According to Jane 
McManus: “More than a hundred American residents of the Isle of Pines rallied at Pearcy’s hotel 
in Nueva Gerona and issued a declaration of independence from Cuba…. From Havana, U.S. 
Ambassador George Squires supported them and was soon retired for his lack of tact.”222 That 
same year the American Club of the isle commissioned an annexation delegation to be sent to the 
Washington, which triggered a wave of protest by Cubans. Ed Ryan, a U.S. resident advocating 
annexation testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1906: “We who have had 
abundant experience, fear to trust ourselves to the administration of Spanish and Cuban laws, 
either by the courts or the executive officers, as they now exist in Cuba and the Isle of Pines.” 
U.S. national Charles Raynard told Senator John T. Morgan that U.S. citizens on the isle “never 
will sit silently [and] submit to being ruled by an incompetent government, administering ancient 
and obnoxious laws calculated only to retard progress and check development.”223 When U.S. 
authorities reoccupied Cuba in 1906, colonists were falsely encouraged once again.  Within a 
year, however, dreams of annexation faced another setback. In 1907, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Pearcy v. Stranahan declared the United States had no claim on Isle of Pines.224   
 Despite this judicial defeat, the accessibility of North American and European markets 
facilitated the relatively easy export of citrus fruit to the United States and later to Europe. 
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Settlers could rely upon U.S. shipping lines, often owned by U.S. land-speculator companies, to 
transport their goods abroad. Not only were they able to sell their products for higher rates in 
their home societies, which, of course, financially aided U.S. settlers, but Anglo-American 
residents benefited enormously from the political reach of the United States in Cuba. As U.S. 
citizens, they expected to be privileged by Cuban policymakers and, to a large degree, they were, 
by both U.S. and Cuban authorities. The Cuban government helped finance Anglo-American 
schools and infrastructure projects that directly benefitted these settler colonists, despite their 
foreign status.225  
The Anglo-American settler colony of Omaja prospered from Anglo-American networks, 
while preserving a distinctly foreign identity in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Carmen Diana Deere chronicles the vitality of the citrus industry nurtured by Anglo-American 
networks in Omaja. By 1912, Omaja accounted for close to one-quarter of the citrus trees in 
Oriente. Produce was shipped out on the U.S.-built railroad, transporting the fruits 80 miles to 
port at Antilla. The U.S.-owned Munson Steamship Line would then take the cargo to New York 
City docks, completing the journey after three days at sea. Omaja was home to five general 
stores, four of which were owned by U.S. and British nationals, as well as a Ford dealership 
during WWI. The Anglo-American colony of Omaja enjoyed a rich social existence during this 
period, with dances held at the town’s hotel, the Mohagany Inn. A school with a North American 
and a Cuban teacher enrolled 83 English-speaking students between 1914 and 1915. Methodist 
and Seventh Day Adventist services were offered to members of the developing colony. 226 Like 
Omaja, settler colonies throughout Cuba benefitted financially from their nationality, while 
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maintaining a thoroughly familiar cultural community and avoiding assimilation into Cuban 
society. This would begin to change at the end of the 1910s. 
A Series of Disasters  
 At the end of the 1910s, Anglo-American farming colonies across Cuba began to 
depopulate due to a combination of the shifting political commitments of the United States 
government, civil strife in Cuba, and a series of natural disasters. By the 1930s, the dwindling 
number of independent farmers who remained in the Cuban countryside and on the Isle of Pines, 
down to a few hundred, were forced to reinvent their identities and their relationships to Cubans. 
 In 1917 the town of Omaja became the symbolic beginning of the end for Anglo-
American settler colonies in Cuba. An uprising of liberals arose following claims of fraud in the 
1916 reelection of Conservative President and U.S. ally, Mario García Menocal. At one point, 
3,500 liberal rebels marched directly through the Anglo-American enclave of Omaja. A number 
of U.S. homes were burned, while transportation networks were discontinued for a period of six-
months. This conflict endangered not only the citrus producers of Anglo-American settler 
colonies, but also large sugar plantations and cattle ranchers who could no longer move their 
goods to Anglo-American markets.227  
 U.S. (in)actions during the 1917 conflict made evident the corporate priorities of Cuban 
and U.S. authorities and their willingness to ignore or sacrifice the needs and desires of 
independent farmers. The Cuban government sent one hundred soldiers to protect La Gloria 
where Anglo-Americans took refuge, while the liberal rebels ransacked Anglo-American homes, 
livestock, citrus groves and cane fields throughout the Cubitas Valley. At Bartle, a town 
populated by U.S. and Canadian nationals, the railroad station was burned to the ground. U.S.-
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run sugar operations in Las Tunas suffered serious damage, including the mill at Delicias. Eight 
million arrobas of cane were lost. An Anglo-American colonist remarked after the conflict, that 
their “confidence in the stability of property in Cuba was shaken up by recent events.”228  
 Carmen Diana Deere references a “third and final intervention” advocated by colonists to 
secure their investments on the island. U.S. troops landed in Cuba, but a formal occupation never 
materialized. Independent farmers soon came to realize that Anglo-American power brokers 
were not going to prioritize their needs or concerns.229 Despite the instability and lack of security 
for the settler colonies dotting the Cuban countryside, it remained in the best interests of the 
United States and U.S. capital to exert influence over Cuban affairs without formally colonizing 
the island. Deere explains, “the action of their government during the uprising [of 1917] made it 
fairly clear that its priority was to protect large American investments—the sugar mills and 
mines—and not small ones.” 230  
 The structures of informal empire in Cuba further shifted against the well-being of settler 
colonists after World War I in particular, due to the rise and fall of global sugar prices. With no 
beet sugar production in Europe during the war, sugar dramatically increased in value 
internationally, leading to the period called the “Dance of the Millions” (1919-1920). The land 
occupied by the citrus groves of these settler communities became extremely valuable to those 
looking to develop cane operations. In 1918 Omaja residents Sam Yoder, A.J. de Hoff, William 
Felker, Asmus Price and Mrs. A.E. Peirson sold their properties and made significant profits on 
their investments. Many of those who chose to stay and shift from citrus to sugar production lost 
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a great deal. The global sugar market collapsed from 22.5 cents to 4 cents per pound between 
1920 and 1921. The resulting devastation to the Cuban economy led to a buying bonanza of 
bankrupted properties throughout the island by North American and British financial firms.231  
 Growing competition with fruit growers in the United States further accelerated the 
decline of these settler communities. In 1922, the United States passed the Fordney-McCumber 
Tariff, doubling the duty for certain citrus products like grapefruits, commonly sold by settler 
colonists to the United States. Fordney-McCumber aided U.S.-based fruit growers, while it 
undermined Anglo-American citrus farmers in Cuba. Fear of disease led to the quarantine of 
Cuban fruit periodically throughout the first quarter century of Cuban independence, further 
debilitating Cuba’s settler colonies, while buttressing fruit growers in the United States and other 
places throughout the Caribbean Basin.232 By the 1920s, Cuba’s Anglo-American settlers found 
their livelihoods increasingly unsustainable.  
 In part because of increased competition from domestic U.S. fruit growers, a number of 
Anglo-American settlers on the Isle of Pines sustained their advocacy for annexation by the 
United States into the mid-1920s. Adamant in their demands, as captured by historian Michael E. 
Neagle, “Americans resented submitting to Cuban authority, which they largely viewed as 
ineffective (at best) or illegitimate.”233 A 1924 letter and petition written by the isle’s U.S. 
residents during debate on the Hay-Quesada Treaty, argued that “American settlers have been 
subject to an unlawful, most humiliating and unbearable de facto Cuban Government for over 20 
years. Many have lost faith and left; some died in despair, and a great majority are holding on to 
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their property in the firm belief and faith that our Government will live up to its representations 
that the ‘Isle of Pines is United States Territory.’”234  
 Yet in the 1920s, U.S. corporations to whom the Cuban government was deeply indebted, 
including J.P. Morgan and Company, were promoting Cuban solvency, siding with Cuba’s local 
elite and pushing the Hay-Quesada Treaty through the United States Senate.235 The settlers were 
disposable; they represented an obstacle to the socio-economic alliances developing between 
Cuban professionals and Anglo-American capital investing in sugar, not citrus production.  The 
eventual ratification of Hay-Quesada in 1924, compounded by the devastating hurricane of 1926, 
convinced a large portion of the Anglo-Americans on the Isle of Pines to return home.236 The 
U.S. population on the Isle of Pines dropped to 276 in 1931, from its zenith in the 1910s of an 
estimated 2,000.237  
 As a final blow, the hurricane of 1932 devastated the community in La Gloria. In 
November 1932 – the day after U.S. nationals throughout Cuba stayed awake to track the results 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first election – a cyclone in eastern Cuba forced Pastor Frank S. 
Persons II of La Gloria, “to reconcile the golden sunshine and blue sky with the utter 
devastation….”238 The eye of the storm passed directly over La Gloria; few buildings were left 
standing.239 Compounded by the violent aftermath of President Machado’s overthrow in 1933, 
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large numbers of Anglo-American settler colonists throughout Cuba abandoned their farming 
communities by the mid-1930s and returned home to the United States.240  
Isolation, Integration and the Development of Empathy 
 In the early part of the century, U.S. nationals arrived in small farming communities as 
colonizers. By mid-century they were humbled, economically and politically, by nature, 
competition and the “betrayal” of U.S. authorities. Independent Anglo-American farmers who 
remained beyond the 1930s now understood that Cuban and Anglo-American power brokers 
valued socio-economic hierarchies over nationality. Those who stayed began to integrate more 
deeply into Cuban society.  
       
Figure 9. The Rutz Ranch, 1950s 241 
 
 Nicolas Rutz arrived in Cuba in the 1910s after reading an ad in a Connecticut paper.  His 
grandson, Darrell Rutz, explained that by the 1950s, few Anglo-American settlers could be found 
in the area surrounding the city of Camagüey. Darrell remembers that the Matthews family 
owned a rice business, and the Rankins ran the Methodist mission, including Pinson College 
where Darryl boarded for school twenty miles away. Darryl’s father Anthony managed the 
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family ranch where ten to fifteen Cuban workers were employed. The Cuban children of these 
workers would attend school sometimes, though not every day, at the Florida Mill. In the late 
1950s, when anti-Batista rebels thought Anthony Rutz was a spy and threatened to hang him, it 
was his Cuban friends and workers who spoke in defense of the longtime ranch owner, likely 
saving Rutz’ life. Darryl’s parents Anthony and Pinky Kate Rutz remained in Cuba until 1963, 
long after the severing of diplomatic relations, a CIA-backed invasion and a nuclear 
confrontation.242  
 After the 1930s, without the support of homogeneous Anglo-American enclaves, those 
rural colonists who remained had little choice but to deepen their attachments to the Cuban land 
and Cuban people. Born to British parents who arrived in La Gloria in 1905, Walton Schofield 
lived his life between worlds.243 He grew up in a time when the spoken language of La Gloria 
was English, and when he left at the age of 32, he spoke Spanish with a heavy English accent. 
Schofield was educated in the Anglo-American school at La Gloria, which ended before high 
school. After marrying a Cuban of Chinese descent whose family owned the theater in nearby 
Morón, Walton secured a position as a middle manager at the United Fruit and Sugar Company 
in Oriente. His daughter Virginia remembers, “When he started working there, he was privileged 
in the sense that we were invited… We were privileged in the sense that we were invited to the 
club, we were invited to people’s homes… The Cuban workers were not. He spoke English. And 
remember, he played the violin, which is no small skill.”244 Still Walton found himself 
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consistently passed over for promotion by the company; his education had neither a North 
American nor British pedigree.  
 Provisionally accepted into the Anglo-American colony, the class and ethnic background 
of the Schofields set them apart from the other Anglo-Americans working at United Fruit. The 
U.S. school in Guaro rejected Walton’s daughter Virginia because she was “Cuban and spoke no 
English.” Virginia remembers, “My father earned quite a bit less because he was ‘Cuban’. He 
didn’t have a retirement. He didn’t have the paid vacations. He didn’t have the nice salary that 
their parents had. We didn’t have electricity in either company house. They had, you know, 
beautifully furnished houses with electrical stuff and maids and all this. And so I was 
different.”245 While Virginia eventually gained access to the school for Anglo-American children 
in Preston, and her parents socialized with the U.S. employees at the American Club in Guaro, 
they remained apart from the community of sugar executives who came from the North America 
and Europe to manage foreign interests.  
  In contrast to the Anglo-Americans who rarely left the barrios americanos of eastern 
Cuba’s mill and mining towns, the Schofields were deeply connected to, and empathic with local 
Cuban families and workers. Virginia explained that most Anglo-American employees “didn’t 
see the poverty around them.”246  Walton, as a middle manager fluent in both English and 
Spanish, was responsible for assigning work to Cubans during the tiempo muerto. “He used to 
agonize about parceling out the work. You can imagine everyone wanted work. And they would 
line up outside his little office. I mean my father suffered hell. I mean he just, because he was a 
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very Christian man and he came from this wonderful little La Gloria community, and there he is 
landed among the…basically very selfish and evil colonizers.”247  
 Walton lived between cultures, which influenced his views on politics and the revolution. 
In the late 1950s, according to his daughter, Walton delivered supplies to the rebels. In 1959 he 
accepted a job in the new government, only to be fired after critiquing the poor management of 
cane operations by the revolutionary authorities. According to Virginia, her father felt 
disillusioned and betrayed. When living in exile, he carried a sense of guilt and sadness for 
participating in the family’s loss of place on the island. In an effort to comfort him, Virginia 
would remind her father: “The only decent thing that you could do was help the rebels.”248  
Conclusions 
 Seduced to the island by false promises and dreams of annexation, most Anglo-American 
small farmers and ranchers would return home by the 1930s. Corporate and U.S.-government 
commitments to elite interests left settler colonists disappointed as their hopes for creating idyllic 
versions of home were dashed by the structures and priorities of informal empire. Those few who 
remained from the very Anglo-American communities who advocated loudly for annexation by 
the United States in the early twentieth century, developed warm and deep familial, social and 
political ties with Cubans by the late 1950s. Living between cultures, these Anglo-Americans 
held significant, and sometimes conflicting, loyalties. Many would ultimately support the 
revolutionary movement against Batista. After Batista was forced off the island, a small but 
sturdy group of Anglo-American farmers and ranchers would remain in Cuba, long after their 
national identity became a burden rather than a privilege.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: COLONIZING HEARTS AND MINDS IN HAVANA  
Introduction 
 Within a year of the expulsion of Spanish authority in Cuba, nearly 6,500 U.S. nationals 
became residents of the island and 4,178 U.S. citizens moved to Havana, which emerged as the 
center of an effort to construct a new nation.249 Anglo-American executives and diplomats 
engaged in agriculture, transportation, communications, tourism, mining, industry, advertising, 
energy, diplomacy and banking developed alliances with Cubans in garnering influence over the 
priorities of the Cuban government and its capital. The majority of foreign companies in Cuba 
established offices and headquarters in Havana, where Anglo-American executives could easily 
advocate for their priorities to Cuban-government officials. While many Anglo-Americans 
arrived to profit from Cuba’s land, labor and resources, foreign teachers, missionaries, and 
nurses generally expressed their desire to improve the lives of Cubans, as well as to support the 
Anglo-American colony. This chapter explores the influence exerted by Anglo-American 
schools, churches and the United States Information Services (USIS) section of the U.S. 
Embassy, all of which attempted to reform Cuban hearts and minds, and in so doing, reshape 
Cuban society.  
 To satisfy the needs of the burgeoning community of Anglo-Americans, permeate Cuban 
culture with values espoused by the United States, train a Cuban workforce and attract Cuban 
partners who could communicate in English, foreign capital invested in foreign-managed cultural 
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and educational structures. A network of distinctly non-Cuban cultural institutions and traditions 
proliferated, organized around the commitments of the Anglo-American colony in foreign-run 
private schools, churches, newspapers, clinics, and social clubs. These institutions often worked 
to maintain their foreign character, which preserved their elite status. Wealthy Cubans embraced 
Anglo-American schools, as they understood the significant opportunities these educational 
institutions provided their children and themselves, on an island saturated with foreign interests. 
Thus, many influential Cubans who could afford the tuition, encouraged their children to apply 
to schools like Ruston Academy, Merici Academy, Candler College, Colegio Buenavista, the St. 
George School, Lafayette Academy, the Phillips School, the Cathedral School, and other highly 
regarded Anglo-American-run educational institutions in Havana, anticipating and appreciating 
that knowledge of the English language and Western cultural norms would open doors in pre-
revolutionary Cuban society. The nature of informal empire on the island incentivized Cubans 
who assumed positions of power after attending Anglo-American schools, to advance the forms 
of knowledge that helped position them atop Cuban socio-economic hierarchies. In this way, 
Anglo-American educational institutions cemented and reproduced the privileged status of 
Anglo-American residents, cultural forms and political ideologies, as well as a small segment of 
Cuban professionals and their children.  
The White Man’s Burden 
 In a letter that commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the foreign Methodist presence 
in Cuba, Dr. George MacDonell wrote, “January 1, (1899) was a day never to be forgotten.” 
MacDonell explains, “I witnessed the transfer of government and the lowering of the Spanish 
flags on Morro Castle…. Then as the American flag was raised, pandemonium broke loose. 
Cannons from war vessels, whistles of former ships and factories, and the cheering of the 
populace, delirious with joy, heralded the coming of a new day for the island. I lifted my hat and 
105 
said out loud, ‘Thank God! Cuba is free.’”250 Early Anglo-American residents imagined 
themselves as Cuban liberators, but the paternalistic relationship also demanded Cuban 
apprenticeship. 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, the North Americans and Europeans moving to 
Havana embodied and enacted the calls of their intellectual contemporaries like Rudyard 
Kipling, who encouraged Anglo-Americans to “take up the white man’s burden” and bring 
enlightenment to the rest of the globe. Those arriving in Cuba to manage Anglo-American 
schools, newspapers, churches, clinics and intercultural institutions in the 1890s, 1900s, 1910s 
and 1920s often described their mission as more expansive than servicing the needs of the 
Anglo-American colony. They wrote of themselves as responsible for saving Cuban souls, 
modernizing Cuban structures and developing Cuban minds. They often employed a rhetoric and 
logic of Cuban underdevelopment to justify their influence to each other and their Cuban 
contacts.251 Anglo-Americans offered the adoption of Western ways and values as the path to 
modernity. 
 Early Anglo-American leaders of Cuba’s religious institutions in Havana cautioned that 
the process of modernization would be slow, but they assured Cubans that the benevolent Anglo-
American presence would eventually transform the island into a modern nation. At that point, 
Cubans would garner greater control over their political, economic and cultural institutions. In 
his 1948 book detailing the life of the Southern Baptist head of mission in Cuba, M.N. McCall, 
biographer Louie D. Newton explained in 1898 “[Cubans] completely lacked any experience 
which would make them capable of establishing and maintaining a stable democratic government 
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and had it not been for the supporting hand of the United States, her condition, free, would have 
been worse than her former servitude.”252 The Catholic Church was berated, and many 
foreigners, especially Protestant ministers, argued its influence needed to be curbed if Cubans 
were to attain freedom and prosperity.  
 Early Anglo-American observers generally explained Cuban economic and political 
instability as resulting from Cuban ineptitude deriving from their history and culture, rather than 
as products of informal empire. U.S. investment in Cuban graft and the overthrow of Cuban 
political regimes unresponsive to the demands of Anglo-American capital did not figure in the 
calculus of many Anglo-American colony members’ evaluations of Cuba and Cubans. In 1942 
the journal World Outlook published an article by Methodist missionary Arva C. Floyd, who 
explained the hurdles faced by missionaries as, “Honesty in official life is Cuba's pressing 
need.… Many factors have contributed to this state of affairs in Cuban life. Spanish overlords for 
three hundred years set the example. When their tyranny was broken at the beginning of this 
century, with America playing a prominent part in setting the people free, they had had no 
experience in politics, no precedent for self-government….” The article continues, detailing how 
these conditions stunted the development of Cuban citizens: “One senses in the people a rather 
strange adolescence. Grown men act like boys. Observe them on the streets and on the trains, in 
the busses and in the parks, and one gets the impression of immaturity. They are noisy in 
conversation and full of fun--boisterous but not rowdy. Each one wants the spotlight, but is not a 
bit subtle in his method of gaining it--on the contrary, he is apt to be quite naïve.” Cultural 
differences were identified as proof of immaturity and foreign residents repeatedly blamed 
                                                 
252 Louie D. Newton, Amazing Grace: The Life of M.N. McCall: Missionary to Cuba (Atlanta, GA: Home Mission 
Board Southern Baptist Convention, 1948), 54. 
107 
Cubans for their supposed underdevelopment. Floyd speculates the lack of challenges presented 
by the Cuban environment cultivated laziness among the population. She explains, “Indolence, 
perhaps born of the tropics, has laid its hand upon them…. There is no struggle against climate—
no winter to prepare for—and a very rich soil produces food almost of itself.” Floyd attributed 
the rampant larceny in Havana to the lack of moral character within Cuban culture: 
“Morals…rest lightly upon the Cuban.” Floyd viewed the political tumult of the early twentieth 
century as the responsibility of the Cubans and Cubans alone; not, as has been shown in the 
chapters above, due to the imprint of informal empire. As Floyd explains, “Like unsettled people 
anywhere, the Cubans are pie for the demagogue, and their presidents have been a string of 
dictators.”253 In the minds of many Anglo-Americans, Spanish tyranny, a generous environment, 
an immature culture and Catholic domination stunted Cuban development, undermined their 
political institutions and justified a significant level of foreign control in Cuban society. 
The trope of laziness appeared to legitimize the experience of Anglo-American privilege. 
As Albert Memmi argues, “Nothing could better justify the colonizer’s privileged position than 
his industry, and nothing could better justify the colonized’s destitution than his indolence.”254 
Memmi continues, “It becomes obvious that the colonized, whatever he may undertake, 
whatever zeal he may apply, could never be anything but lazy.”255 Many Cubans internalized 
these characterizations of their countrymen, or at least purported to do so in the presence of 
Anglo-Americans. Arva Floyd remembers an encounter with a Cuban businessman who had 
spent time in the United States, and told her, “I am constantly made ashamed of my own people. 
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They are always crying like babies for someone to give them something, but will not get out and 
work for it.”256 
 Racialized and gendered tropes that first became prevalent in 1890s when the U.S. press 
depicted vulnerable white Cuban women threatened by animalistic Spanish soldiers, continued to 
serve as justification for Anglo-American influence. While in 1897, North American papers 
dramatized the arrest and rescue of Evangelina Cossío Cisneros, the “white face, young pure and 
beautiful” daughter of an insurgent advocate for U.S. intervention, in the mid-1920s, Southern 
Baptist Una Lawrence Roberts justified U.S. influence by arguing Anglo-American 
Protestantism provided a path to liberation for oppressed Cuban women.257  Roberts wrote, “The 
Gospel and its teachings open to the women of Cuba the door of opportunity whereby [women] 
may break down the barriers that bind them as slaves in these little homes and make them 
powers for good in their communities.”258 She listed a litany of gendered policies which 
discriminated against women, in comparison to their North American counterparts. Roberts 
noted different expectations between the genders with regards to fidelity in Cuba. Further, she 
noted that increased rights with regards to property, rights in divorce and the right to publicly 
gather for women were only recently achieved on the island. Roberts argued that the Baptist 
gospel would prove a liberating influence for Cuban women.259 Anglo-American knowledge 
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producers, saving minds and souls in the first decades of the twentieth century, often viewed 
themselves as liberators and developers as they worked to reorient Cuban values and practices. 
Schooling Cubans 
 
Figure 10. White Cubans Perform Minstrel Show at Methodist School 260 
 
 Through a variety of educational institutions, North Americans and British nationals 
bolstered their cultural and economic authority, while encouraging Cubans to refashion their 
personal and national aspirations around norms and models exemplified by white, English-
speaking foreigners. Attending Anglo-American schools offered employment and social 
advantages to Cuban individuals, as familiarizing Cubans with North American and European 
business norms and customs produced ideal workers for jobs at foreign companies. During the 
first U.S. occupation, the United States aided in the establishment of the public-school system 
that functioned in Cuba during the republican era. By the 1920s, with the crash of global sugar 
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prices, public education began to decline. By 1953 Cuban illiteracy rates remained relatively 
high at 23.6 percent and a 60.4 percent of all Cubans ended their schooling by the third grade.261 
Most Cuban educational institutions, particularly the public schools founded under the authority 
of the first U.S. occupation, floundered during periods of economic downturn and political 
upheaval. Patrick Symmes notes that by the 1930s, just 21 public high schools remained on the 
island.262 By contrast, the stability provided by foreign capital and influence bolstered a growing 
system of Anglo-American academies to complement a large number of Cuban private schools.  
As the island’s educational system suffered from financial and political crises, Anglo-
American private schools, most designed with a religious orientation, gained elite reputations. 
Advertising the growth of prestige in their educational institutions, and the weakening of Cuban 
state schools, the 1938 Methodist journal World Outlook reported: “The schools of our church 
naturally had large enrollments during the period when government schools were closed. It is 
encouraging to find that the schools have such an enviable position on the island that their 
enrollments are steadily increasing even now that government schools have reopened.”263 The 
Cuban government could not easily maintain the capital and stability necessary to keep Cuban 
public schools competitive with Anglo-American private schools. As the quality of Cuban 
schools declined, the privately funded Anglo-American education system flourished. Anglo-
American businesses continued to dominate the employment landscape in Cuba, making it hard 
to deny the advantages of a private, English-based education.264 
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 Not all Cubans were excited about sending their children to the U.S.-organized public 
schools or foreign-managed private academies. Louis A. Pérez documents that, “increasing 
number of Cubans worried about the effects of foreign schooling on children’s capacity to 
develop ties to patria.”265 Patrick Symmes argues that private Cuban Catholic schools were 
established in part to ensure the offspring of middle and upper-class Cubans would not shed their 
Cuban identity under Anglo-American influence. In the early 1900s, private Catholic schools 
dominated the educational landscape. Highly selective Cuban academies like the Jesuit school 
Dolores in Santiago, where Fidel Castro attended, formed, at least in part, in response to the 
growing U.S. influence over the island’s educational system. Symmes argues these Catholic 
schools developed because wealthier Cubans feared a transformation of their children’s values 
within Anglo-American educational institutions.266  
In the first half of the twentieth century Anglo-American educators and religious leaders 
in Havana often limited their interaction with poorer and darker Cubans through exclusionary 
policies and practices. The importation of racial stratifications by some U.S. educators divided 
Cubans by color. Originally an institution managed by the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 
the elite girl’s school Colegio Buenavista denied entry to blacks until the mid-1950s.267 Una 
Lawrence Roberts explained the popularity of U.S.-run private schools like Buenavista in 
explicitly racist and exclusionary terms: “In the Cuban schools, there is no separation of the 
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races, and many prefer that their children go to a private school where they will have 
predominantly white associates.”268 Methodist Superintendent Pastor D. W. Carter attributed the 
popularity of Protestant schools, among Whites, in part to segregationist policies: “The well-to-
do white people are not availing themselves of the public schools…[due to] the mixing of the 
races.”269  
Before World War II, Anglo-American residents often justified U.S. influence in Cuba in 
discourses resonant with ideologies of Anglo-American racial or cultural superiority. In many of 
Havana’s foreign-run institutions, the select slice of Cubans with whom Anglo-Americans 
interacted represented the wealthier and whiter parts of local society. While Cubans held many 
racist traditions of their own, segregation as it developed in the U.S. South never took firm hold 
of Cuba’s public sphere during the republican era. Those foreign schools that did not explicitly 
restrict the attendance of darker Cuban students, largely excluded Cubans of color through the 
high cost of tuition. Racially segregated Anglo-American schools sought to cultivate political 
change in Cuba by developing Anglo-American values in the white and relatively wealthy Cuban 
youths who were best positioned to lead the next generation.  
 Anglo-American religious leaders managed a number of Havana’s top schools offering 
prestige and opportunities to their graduates. These institutions included the Methodist Candler 
College and Colegio Buenavista, the Episcopalian Cathedral School and the Catholic Merici 
Academy. Further, Anglo-American administrators and educators were poised to influence 
Cuba’s future power brokers at the elite secular school Ruston Academy. With few public 
                                                 
268 Roberts, Cuba for Christ, 227. 
269 Louis A. Pérez Jr., Essays on Cuban History: Historiography and Research (Gainesville, FL: University of 
Florida, 1995), 67. 
113 
options for high school in rural Cuba, and most of the elite academies located in major cities, 
boarding schools in Havana, and to a lesser degree in Santiago, provided an attractive option for 
families with means, or those lucky enough to earn a scholarship.270 Thus, Anglo-American 
educational institutions in Havana became a mechanism of cultural reproduction seeking to 
transform Cuban society.  
 The goals of Anglo-American educators in Havana stood in sharp contrast to those of 
educators in the Cuban countryside. In the capital, U.S.-run religious and secular private schools 
sought to mold the future leaders of Cuba through Western-styled education at elite institutions; 
in the Cuban countryside, missionary schools generally sought to inspire local leadership and 
self-sufficiency. Both were established with the prevailing ethos of benevolent development, but 
the trajectories of Havana and rural educational institutions would diverge dramatically between 
1899 and 1958.  
Building Elite Religious Educational Institutions in Havana 
  
Figure 11. Methodist Boys School Candler College and Methodist Girls School Colegio Buenavista 271 
 Established in 1899, Candler College, a Methodist boarding school for boys, quickly 
developed a reputation as one of the elite schools in Cuba. Named for Methodist Bishop Warren 
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Candler, the school was endowed with donations from Warren’s brother and the head of Coca-
Cola Isa Candler. A successor to the original headmaster Thad F. Leland, in 1909 Pastor Harry 
Brown Bardwell assumed leadership of the school. In 1913 Bardwell successfully relocated 
Candler to the Havana suburb of Marianao.272 Responding to requests from parents throughout 
the island for a sister school to send their daughters, in 1920 Colegio Buenavista opened its doors 
under the management of the Women’s Division of the Methodist Church.273 Retiring in 1949, 
Pastor Bardwell received the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes medal for his service to the youth of 
Cuba. Seven years later he was buried in Havana’s Colon Cemetery. Bardwell’s assistant Dr. 
Carlos Pérez rose to the position of director in 1949 and tore down Bardwell’s home to construct 
a new building to accommodate Cuban students.274 While it never shed its Anglo-American 
orientation, retaining the four-year U.S. High School program taught largely by U.S. 
missionaries, Candler and its sister school Buenavista evolved, over time, from a school that 
predominantly served Anglo-Americans to a school largely for Cubans seeking social mobility 
through contact with the Anglo-American colony.  
 With Anglo-American teachers and administrators, as well as substantial donations from 
U.S. corporations, Candler and Buenavista became commonly referenced symbols of U.S. 
benevolence in Cuba. Leading Cuban intellectual Jorge Mañach y Robato offered his perspective 
on Candler:   
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My opinion of Candler College is based principally on the moral character and nobility of 
purpose of the men who are the product of her teachings. Some of the Cubans of highest 
integrity, of solid consecrated citizenship, whom it has been my privilege to know, have 
come out from this Institution, some as teachers, others as students. Such results are 
never a mere coincidence. Upon the occasion of my recent visit to the school I 
understood the reasons for these results. ‘Candler College’ is not only a school with 
modern equipment and teaching methods, but above and beyond these it is a center for 
instilling moral ideals, a seminary of right thinking and right living.275  
 
The Methodist publication World Outlook confirmed the economic advantages attained upon 
graduation, reporting in 1950, “Many prominent business, religious, political, and professional 
leaders are graduates of Methodist schools.”276   
 While a basic level of income was required to afford the relatively high tuition costs, 
Candler and Buenavista solicited students from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. Enrique 
Levy, the son of a Jewish peddler without a formal education from Central Macareño, boarded at 
Candler alongside Eduardo González, whose Cuban father graduated with degrees from Harvard 
and MIT, and married a North American bride, before serving as chief engineer at the American 
Sugar Refining Company in Central Jaronú.277 Though Anglo-American institutions like Candler 
often offered scholarships, the school’s price limited the economic diversity of the students to 
middle-class and wealthy, mostly white, Cubans.278 Sustained by Anglo-American economic 
influence on the island and access to foreign capital, schools like Buenavista and Candler were 
stable educational institutions where privileged Cubans could attain economic prospects 
unavailable in Cuban schools and inaccessible to most working-class and poor Cubans. 
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 In Havana, Anglo-American religious schools provided not only economic and political 
ladders, but social and cultural opportunities for contact between Anglo-Americans and Cubans. 
These were indeed contact zones for privileged outsiders and relatively wealthy students from 
Cuba where new identities, relationships and knowledges were produced, even as various forms 
of assimilation to Anglo-American values were encouraged. Historian Margaret E. Crahan 
argues that missionaries facilitated the cultural assimilation of Cubans: “The ideals promoted by 
the churches did not threaten the established order of things, but rather urged the less fortunate to 
struggle to be incorporated into the privileged group. The Protestant churches provided schools 
that served to encourage the absorption of values of a middle and upper class that were becoming 
increasingly ‘Americanized.’”279 At Havana’s Candler College, juniors enrolled in a course on 
“American Writers” while seniors enrolled in classes including “English Writers” and “U.S. 
History.” Neither Cuban history nor Cuban literature was offered as a part of the high school 
curriculum.280  
 Still, as will be argued in later chapters, the lessons learned at Anglo-American schools 
simultaneously defended and eroded the status quo in the midst of revolution. Many Anglo-
American educational institutions articulated “creating good citizens” as core to the institutional 
mission. They pursued this aim by orienting young Cubans toward Anglo-American customs and 
traditions, including democracy and national sovereignty. While in many ways Anglo-American 
educators reified the influence of the United States, they also planted ideas in their Cuban 
students that would be used to eventually challenge the structures of informal empire.  
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 Given the benefits in securing employment and status, Cuban parents of means were 
persuaded to send their children to Anglo-American schools. Merici Academy offered girls an 
Anglo-American, but also a Catholic education that made it especially attractive to Cubans 
uneasy with the Protestant leadership of other Anglo-American schools.281 Beatriz Gausch 
explains her parents chose Merici, “[t]o say the education of my daughter is going to be Catholic 
and American...”282 Merici alum Joan Pieper Lanolin furthers this point, explaining that the 
prestige of Anglo-American academies like Merici was enhanced by being both Catholic and 
North American: “A lot of politicos came to my school and a lot of the wealthy Cubans because 
they wanted their daughters to learn English, you know, and of course Cuba was a Catholic 
country.”283 According to school historian María J. Cazabon, Merici’s founders expected the 
school to attract daughters of the Anglo-American colony. As it turns out, Anglo-American 
enrollment remained low and Merici instead attracted a student body comprised predominantly 
of the daughters of prominent Cubans. 284 The daughters of President Carlos Prío, sugar magnate 
Julio Lobo and the CEO of Bacardi, as well as the niece of the Cardinal Latiaga of Cuba, 
represented just a few of the many powerful families at the Anglo-American Catholic school. 285 
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 Merici alum Sonia Díaz explains, “My mother was very pro-American. She loved the 
culture, she loved everything. So the moment Merici opened in Havana in 1941…she knew 
about the school and then…I started school when I was four years old.”286 Interviews confirm 
that the children regularly sang God Bless America. Further, Merici uniforms were comprised of 
short sleeves, ankle socks and an open collar, which emphasized the Anglo-American character 
of the school while causing a stir in Havana’s conservative circles, which expected school girls 
to be more fully covered.287 However, most Merici parents recognized the value in their 
children’s ability to navigate Anglo-American culture. María J. Cazabon recalls that her “father 
had a great admiration for [the United States]. He wanted his children to learn English…. Most 
Cubans, educated Cubans, were very much aware of the need to teach their children English.”288 
Many Cuban parents hoped the liberalizing influence of Anglo-Americans would position their 
daughters for success in the modern world.289  
 As the Cuban students of Anglo-American schools took their place among the island’s 
power brokers, they privileged Anglo-American forms of knowledge and found it in their best 
interest to expand the influence of Anglo-American institutions. Their personal privilege 
depended on the reproduction and proliferation of Anglo-American culture across the island. 
Those educated in foreign-run academies fought to support and protect Anglo-American 
institutions, as their personal educational background was evaluated as prestigious, due to the 
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high-standing Western-styled schooling garnered in Cuba before the revolution. In the 1930s, 
Methodist Sarah Lou MacKinnon explained how Candler and Buenavista positioned their 
graduates for success, who in turn used strategic influence to support Methodist projects: “The 
former students and patrons of the school are now holding influential positions in the island; 
[they are] the best friends our educational work has, both in interpreting the school to the public 
and in securing fair and just government regulations.”290 In this way, Anglo-American 
educational institutions, both religious and secular, sustained the status of Anglo-American 
residents as privileged outsiders and fostered the rise of Cuban professionals as privileged 
insiders. The new alliances were mutually appealing; both groups benefited from the socio-
economic hierarchies established through cross-cultural cooperation. 
Ruston Academy  
Among the most well-established and celebrated schools in Cuba, Ruston Academy was 
distinguished as an elite knowledge-producing institution and the pride of the Anglo-American 
colony. Founded as a school for Anglo-American children in 1920, by the 1950s it had become a 
central contact zone where the children of prominent Cuban professionals would be educated 
alongside Havana’s Anglo-American youths. In the 1950s Cubans represented 65 percent of 
Ruston’s students and 72 percent of Ruston’s teachers as the school headmaster James Baker 
worked hard to ensure an elite, intercultural experience.291 As long-term residents of the Anglo-
American colony, the Baker family enjoyed the respect of Anglo-American residents, and many 
within the Cuban community. In the late 1950s John Molanphy studied at Ruston, while his 
grandfather Oscar García Montes served as the Minister of Development in the Batista 
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government. In an interview, Molanphy was ecstatic as he offered colorful memories of Ruston: 
“Ruston was an amazing fucking school…. There was an article in Time Magazine about the 
highest admissions rates to top colleges in the United States, and there were the Ivy League prep 
schools, and…one of the schools that had the highest admissions rates was Ruston Academy.”292  
Guillermo Martínez, class of 1959, remembers having “a fit” because he was being sent 
to Ruston, separated from his cousins bound for Belen Academy, the country’s top Jesuit high 
school. He recalls that his father tried to explain: “I’m going to give you a gift that someday 
you’ll thank me for…. My father [Guillermo Martínez Márquez] said English was the 
international language and I needed to learn English.”293 Though his father spoke little English 
himself, as the editor of El Páis, one of the largest newspapers in Cuba, Guillermo, the elder, 
recognized that mobility and success in a Cuban society saturated with Anglo-American 
influence required the ability to communicate in English. Martínez was not alone in his insight. 
Many relatively wealthy Cubans appraised Ruston as an opportunity for their children to thrive 
in an economy dominated by foreign capital and brokered in English. By the time Modesto 
Maidique’s mother and step-father were searching for a high school for their son, Modesto’s aunt 
had risen to the level of Inspector General of Public Schools in Havana. She advised sending 
Maidique to Ruston, which she described as “by far the best school in the whole country.”294 
Distinguished Cubans from across professions sent their offspring to Ruston, including the son of 
President Fulgencio Batista, the niece of former President Carlos Prío, the great niece of Cuban 
sugar magnate Julio Lobo, as well as the children of newspaper editors, bank executives, high-
                                                 
292 John Molanphy, interview by author, June 23, 2016, New York, NY. 
293 Guillermo Martínez, interview by author, November 4, 2016, Miami, FL. 
294 Modesto Maidique, interview by author, October 3, 2016. Miami, FL. 
121 
ranking military officers, lawyers, and future members of the first revolutionary cabinet. Many of 
these powerful Cuban families likely saw their child’s education at a school filled with the 
children of Anglo-American executives and diplomats as an opportunity to gain access to Anglo-
American social networks, and eventually Anglo-American capital for themselves or their 
children. In the midst of so many elite families, an awkward situation erupted on the Ruston 
campus when Batista ousted President Carlos Prío Socarrás in the 1952 coup. On that day, both 
Batista’s son and Prío’s niece, students in the same Ruston class, anxiously sought information 
about the safety of their respective families. They comforted each other as the family patriarchs 
sought to consolidate their control over the island and convince U.S. power brokers that they 
should lead Cuba. 295  
The history of Ruston traces back to the growing Anglo-American colony, that in 
September 1920, advocated for the development of an elite prep school for Havana’s white 
English-speaking youths.296 A decade later, doors opened to Cubans, offering them a curriculum 
distinct from that of the Anglo-American students, which would prepare Cuban youngsters for 
lucrative jobs within Anglo-American companies. According to former headmaster and school 
biographer James Baker, the school’s founder and namesake Hiram Ruston, “Saw the need for 
well-trained, bilingual secretaries and bookkeepers and opened a Commercio Department in the 
early ‘30s.... This Upper School department provided courses that developed proficiency in the 
two chief languages of Latin American commerce and prepared students for work in businesses 
concerned with Latin America.”297 A vocational track was established for Cuban children. A 
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decade later, in the early 1940s, Mr. Ruston decided that the school should also prepare Cuban 
students for admission to the University of Havana. He introduced the Bachillerato Department, 
which followed a state-mandated curriculum with an additional English-language component.298 
The division of students served the practical function of preparing Anglo-Americans and Cubans 
for a future of economic and political leadership that awaited them. Ruston Academy prided 
itself on providing an academic environment that nurtured intercultural interaction on school 
grounds, even if this was less apparent within respective classrooms.299  
At Ruston, most of the intercultural interactions among students took place in the school 
yard; not in the classroom, and generally not after school. Still, Ruston remained a rare setting 
where Cubans and Anglo-Americans could interact. Ruston graduate Joan Coles remembers, “At 
the school my best friends were Cuban,” but paused to comment that contact was limited to the 
school day. Coles does not remember socializing with these friends outside of Ruston 
Academy.300 Bonnie Wroth Reiff, who attended Ruston and whose father worked as Dean of the 
Episcopal Church in Vedado, recalls: “[I] Felt very close to Cubans, but don’t recall going to 
their houses.”301 The culturally gated character of the Anglo-American colony, in concert with 
the different educational tracks Cubans and Anglo-American youths pursued, stymied the 
development of more intensely integrated cross-cultural intimacies beyond school grounds. 
While Ruston aimed for diversity, it responded to local realities by rooting itself in Anglo-
American values and traditions, and, in large part, remained stratified academically by 
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nationality. Ruston’s leaders were deliberate in their desire to not become identified primarily as 
a Cuban school, as had happened to Candler, Buenavista and Merici. James Baker explains, 
“When more Cubans than Americans applied for admission to the Lower School, admission 
policies were established to maintain the balance of the two groups. We believed the school 
could best achieve its goals by seeking to have this balance.”302 Baker and Ruston understood 
that the Anglo-American identity of the school garnered it prestige. 
At the same time, however, Ruston’s leadership envisioned the school as a transcultural 
space, where Anglo-American ideals predominated, but remained in conversation with Cuban 
culture. An article in the Havana Post from February 1953 commented that Ruston “has always 
emphasized the value of Cuban culture and attempted to awaken Cuban students to the challenge 
presented by the great potentialities of their rich land. It has been Ruston’s desire to develop in 
students the most valuable type of patriotism, that which causes one to dedicate his life to 
working for his country to help develop her resources.” 303 With an emphasis on democracy and 
access to developing transnational socio-economic alliances, relatively wealthy Cubans, 
members of the Anglo-American business community, and foreign diplomats all seemed to 
approve of these goals. These groups not only enrolled their children at Ruston, but also 
contributed large sums of money toward the school’s maintenance.304 
To attract foreign dollars, James Baker emphasized the school’s Anglo-American 
character in his fundraising campaigns; he would explicitly detail the “democratic values” of the 
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school when soliciting support from U.S. power brokers in Washington and Havana.305  Baker 
explained “that by sharing [democratic values] with Cubans, the school could contribute to the 
development of democracy in Cuba…”306 In 1952, the same year Batista overthrew Cuba’s 
democratic structures, Baker solicited money for Ruston from the Inter-American Schools 
Service (IASS) of the State Department, after he had been warned that continued funding efforts 
were potentially going to be curbed. Addressing the IASS, he emphasized the essential link of a 
Western-styled education and the rise of democracy by articulating: “How great is the need for 
an understanding that education should provide methods for developing mature, responsible 
adults, well prepared for a democratic way of living.”307 For another seven years, through to 
1959, the school continued to receive generous contributions from the Department of State. 
Ruston depended on these payments, as James Baker expressed to William E. Dunn, director of 
the IASS in October of 1955, “We are also encountering difficulty in collecting some of our 
pledges. As the idea of contributions of this sort is new to Cubans, it seems that some of them do 
not appreciate the hardship caused by their failure to make promised payments.”308 By 
mobilizing the development rhetoric popular among U.S. policy makers at the time, and 
celebrating the commitments to education as “democracy,” Baker convinced potential donors 
that the stability of Ruston as an intercultural knowledge-producing institution was key to their 
larger diplomatic agenda in Cuba.  
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 North American and British businessmen with interests in Cuba recognized the economic 
advantages of an Anglo-American-run, elite knowledge-producing institution in Havana from 
where they might recruit employees. Many foreign executives sought Cuban workers fluent in 
English, comfortable with Western norms and exhibiting healthy admiration for Anglo-American 
culture. Donating to Ruston could be interpreted as an investment in the development of Cuban 
personnel who would willingly work for or with Anglo-American corporations. G.N. Boesinger, 
Secretary of the Cuban Atlantic Sugar Company, donated $3,000 in December 1953, to Ruston 
Academy through American Council of Education.309 The American Sugar Refining Company 
donated $1,000 to Ruston in 1955.310 Readers Digest, with close ties to the Anglo-American 
colony, also contributed $1,000 in 1953 alone.311 Wealthy and influential Anglo-American 
residents like Burke Hedges, who held deep roots in Cuba and grew his father’s textile company 
to become one of the largest industrialists on the island, served on the Ruston Board.  
Despite intimate relationships developed in occupational, educational and social settings, 
Cubans did not fully fit within the imagined community of Anglo-American residents. Ruston 
proved unexceptional in this regard. Ruston alum John Corbin, today an anthropologist who 
writes about his childhood in Cuba, remembers, “When, as sometimes happened, school 
authorities sought to ensure American practice outside the school, they usually excluded Cubans. 
On one occasion…[Baker], concerned that American boys might be adopting the Cuban practice 
of visiting brothels, called an extraordinary, after-hours meeting of the American high school 
boys…. Cuban boys were excluded from the meeting.” Corbin explains, “Cuban sexual behavior 
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was excluded from the field of Americanisation and American boys were pressured to exclude a 
Cuban practice.”312 Institutional integration did not erode, and often reinforced national 
identities.  
The variety of economic and strategic political benefits of Ruston were obvious to Anglo-
American corporations, to Cuban professionals and to parents in the Anglo-American colony. As 
envisioned by educational leaders like James Baker, Ruston and other Anglo-American cultural 
institutions altered Cuban expectations of their own society. Further, schools like Ruston 
operated as contact zones that catalyzed personal intimacies between Cubans and foreigners. 
From within the halls of these schools emerged both a rich revolutionary movement, and later a 
counter-revolutionary ethos, where Anglo-Americans engaged with Cuban allies both for, and 
then against, the structural changes sweeping the island. Attempting to exert influence over 
Cuban students, and in doing so alter Cuban society, the Anglo-Americans themselves were 
fundamentally altered by their participation in these contact zones. 
Reforming the “Cuban Personality”: A High-Priority Objective of the U.S. Embassy   
Until the social personality of Cuba is remade, the United States will always find it 
difficult to obtain from Cuba full and forthright cooperation. For that reason a high-
priority USIS objective in Cuba must be precisely that of contributing toward the 
remaking of the Cuban personality, and much of the work toward that end must be 
carried on in the schools.  
– U.S. Embassy Dispatch, February 19, 1953313 
 
As Anglo-American cultural institutions sought to impact Cuban values, their efforts 
were aided by the United States Information Services (USIS) of the U.S. Embassy in Havana that 
developed educational projects in the broader community to reorient the Cuban personality and 
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to ward off communist threats to U.S. influence in Cuba. To this end the U.S. State Department 
planted stories and cartoons in Cuban papers like Mañana and Excelsior, while distributing 
North American-authored books to Cuban schools and students. 314 These efforts mirrored the 
CIA program, Operation Mockingbird, which during the same time period sought to recruit U.S. 
journalists to propagate narratives, carry out assignments and gather intelligence to advance 
prerogatives of the U.S. intelligence community.315 In the 1950s the State Department created 
radio programing which strove “to promote the support of democratic ideals and to combat the 
propaganda of communism and other forces of totalitarianism.” They found most Cuban radio 
stations “demonstrated a willingness to cooperate.” 316 By using the medium of radio, the U.S. 
Embassy could propagate pro-American and anti-communist messages to Cubans who were not 
literate and held no formal educational training.  
With rising tension on the island in the late 1950s, the U.S. Embassy also sponsored 
Cubans seeking an education in the United States. While framed as altruistic, this project 
developed in pursuit of the State Department’s geopolitical goals. The stated aim of exposing 
Cubans to U.S. forms of knowledge was “directed toward creating in Cuba a public opinion 
receptive to U.S. foreign policy objectives, as well as a greater understanding of those objectives 
as a direct by-product of study and training in the U.S.…” In funding Cuban students abroad, 
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Embassy officials aimed to “insulate Cubans against the economic illusions of Communism.”317 
The expressed hope of embassy officials was that Cubans “in such key fields as the arts, science, 
education, journalism, radio and TV…realized the increasingly important cultural contributions 
made by the U.S. to the world’s treasure house, thus giving the lie to Communist charges that the 
U.S. is without a culture of its own.” 318 
Embassy officials further sought to re-orient Cuban perceptions of the United States 
through popular culture, working with foreign corporations to expose Cuban and Caribbean 
workers to U.S. films that would stymie dissent among the rural poor. U.S. diplomats organized 
showings of North Americans films to tens of thousands of Cubans monthly, particularly in 
regions dominated by U.S.-owned sugar mills. Their target audience included “labor groups, 
teachers and their students, and Negroes” as these groups presented the greatest potential threat 
to Anglo-American capital and control. An embassy dispatch from June 19, 1953, concluded, 
“The films of highest impact are those that teach something, which offer the people something 
they could use, those which awaken an interest in things American and which spark admiration 
for United States ‘know-how.’” While developing a healthy admiration for “things American,” 
challenges to the status quo would not be promoted through this propaganda. The embassy 
explicitly avoided films on the struggle of workers, as they could “plant the seeds of further labor 
unrest, possibly even against the best interests of American employers.”319   
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Conclusions  
 At the turn of the twentieth century, along with large financial investments, Anglo-
American missionaries, educators, journalists and diplomats arrived in Havana with the aim of 
modernizing Cuban society and exporting Anglo-American values. They continually evolved a 
logic and cultivated Cuban allies to advance Anglo-American authority in the first half of the 
twentieth century. By the 1950s, many Cubans came to understand that fluency in the language, 
engagement with the customs and operating in the same social circles as Anglo-Americans could 
position them and their children for socio-economic success. In promoting Anglo-American 
knowledge forms, North American and British schools and diplomats legitimized foreign 
influence, while creating partners and/or employees for Anglo-American capital. In this way, 
generally earnest efforts to improve the lives of Cubans led to the reproduction of socio-
economic hierarchies that maintained the elevated status of Anglo-American residents and 
incentivized privileged Cubans to perpetrate and legitimize foreign forms of knowledge. In this 
way, a small group of relatively wealthy Cubans who were locked in alliances with Anglo-
Americans in Havana worked to normalize informal empire, on which their own positions had 
been established, and through which their own privilege would be maintained.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE SEGREGATION AND TRANSCULTURATION OF HAVANA’S 
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLONY 
Introduction 
 In his volume Orientalism, Edward Said argued that dominant groups expand their 
cultural reach by “othering” groups who have been colonized, oppressed or marginalized through 
the marketplace, social ideology, political institutions and in the intimacies of social 
relationships. Through segregated residences, language, media, social practices, schooling of 
their children, and religious services, a close-knit Anglo-American colony merged the white 
English-speaking foreign residents of Havana by celebrating internal commonalities, and 
marking differences from Cubans. While justification for Anglo-American influence generally 
centered on presumably benevolent notions of economic, political and cultural development, 
Anglo-American social institutions often pursued and enforced stratification between Anglo-
American residents and Cubans. John Corbin commented that Anglo-American “institutions 
were imperfect vehicles for transmitting North American forms… [as they] systematically 
excluded Cubans.”320 These vigilant identity commitments were particularly apparent in Anglo-
American parents who were anxious to secure their children’s national identities while they grew 
up abroad. Through their embrace of heritage and a commitment to Anglo-American cultural 
institutions, North American and British residents consistently reminded the children of the 
Anglo-American colony of their “true” homelands. While, over time, select Cubans were invited 
into many of these institutions, the intent largely remained to recreate Anglo-American havens, 
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distinct from Cuban society at large, and to assimilate those Cubans who entered, while avoiding 
assimilation themselves.  
 Between 1898 and 1959, despite the institutional segregation by nationality, members of 
the Anglo-American colony in Havana became deeply entangled with Cubans from a range of 
socio-economic backgrounds. They developed stratified relationships with most Cubans, 
particularly those who served as lower and mid-level employees in Anglo-American companies, 
or as service workers in Anglo-American homes, as well as the bars, casinos, restaurants and 
brothels visited by Anglo-American residents. Yet simultaneously, socio-economic alliances 
formed between Anglo-American residents and the families of Cuban professionals who spoke 
English and sent their children to Anglo-American schools in Cuba or abroad. These Cubans 
transcended their status as “other,” entering with provisional acceptance into the Anglo-
American social orbit, and occasionally marring foreign nationals. As cultural translators, these 
Cubans influenced the perceptions of the Anglo-American colony extensively during the tumult 
of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 In his 1947 work Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar, Fernando Ortiz challenged 
the premise of acculturation in Cuba, that Cubans merely adopted the culture of the politically 
and economically influential Spanish or later Anglo-American residents. Ortiz argued instead 
that through the processes of transculturation, members of Cuban society selectively and 
strategically adopted, rejected and negotiated aspects of a variety of cultures. He explained, “In 
Cuba the term Ciboney, Taino, Spaniard, Jew, English, French, Anglo-American, Negro, 
Yucatec, Chinese, and Creole do not mean merely different elements that go into the make-up of 
the Cuban nation, as expressed by their different indications of origin.” 321  Ortiz continues “The 
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result of every union of cultures is similar to that of the reproductive process between 
individuals: the offspring always has something of both parents, but is always different from 
each of them.”322 The language of transculturation helps decode the complex mechanisms 
through which hierarchies of nationality reproduced themselves, but also how those structures 
diversified with the strengthening of cross-cultural socio-economic alliances.   
 This chapter explores the dynamics of segregation and transculturation in Anglo-
American institutions within Havana. By interrogating transnational relations within 
intermarriage, social clubs and schools, we observe the reproduction hierarchies that enshrined 
the status of privileged Anglo-American outsiders and a select community of privileged Cuban 
insiders. These cross-cultural alliances shifted identities and aspirations for Cubans, as well as 
Anglo-Americans residing on the island.  
Moving to Havana, Becoming a Privileged Outsider 
 
Figure 12. Havana Yacht Club, Circa 1950s 323  
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 Anglo-Americans eagerly embraced the luxuries afforded them as privileged outsiders in 
Havana. U.S. resident John Parker reflected that Anglo-American executives “spent years 
jockeying their way up the corporate ladder to qualify for a Havana post which was considered 
the top.”324 Anglo-Americans could live with luxuries unimaginable in their home societies. 
Joseph Goltz, a movie distributor for Columbia Pictures, Fox, United Artists and Paramount, 
moved his family from Texas to a home in Miramar a half block from the ocean with a Jamaican 
live-in maid. His son Albert explained that in terms of “standard of living, there was no 
comparison…. By American salary standards [dad earned] a very middle-class salary. It wasn’t a 
phenomenal salary, but translated into local currency in those days, it allowed them to live at a 
much higher standard of living.”325 Anglo-American employers enticed North Americans and 
British nationals to move their families to Havana by offering numerous benefits unavailable to 
the majority of workers in the United States, England and Canada. Often their companies 
provided support for home expenses, as well as membership to elite social clubs like the Havana 
Yacht Club and the Biltmore Yacht and Country Club for their U.S. employees. British and 
Canadian residents--along with a few U.S. nationals--often belonged to the Rovers’ Club instead. 
Their salaries allowed for the employment of full-time domestic servants, while also providing 
significant vacation time. Ann Landreth Gund, the daughter of the Sterling Winthrop manager in 
Cuba, detailed the standard package for Anglo-American residents in Cuba: “a bigger salary 
and…usually…a three-month home leave in the summer” for working abroad.326  
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 The comparative luxury enjoyed by Anglo-Americans and Cubans of means made 
Havana a desirable home for transnational couples. Ann’s childhood friend, Deirdre Todd, was 
born to a Cuban father, Carlos Todd, and a U.S.-born mother, Ann Cotter. Todd recalls, “When 
you had money in Havana, you lived a lot better than if you had money in the United States.”327 
 Like Todd, with a U.S.-born mother and a Cuban father, Michael Sanjenis held 
membership in both the relatively exclusive Anglo-American colony and the surrounding Cuban 
society. From this unique position, he observed that members of the Anglo-American colony 
“had lavish lives…they all lived much better than they would’ve lived at home [in the United 
States], you know. Maids, chauffeurs, this, that and the other, nice places, nice houses.”328  These 
domestic luxuries were articulated by Cuban Rosalie Pincus who married U.S. national Meyer 
Fuchsberg in New York City, got pregnant and “decide[d] there is no way she’s washing clothes, 
and in Cuba you have a lot of help. She want[ed] to go home…. There was no comparison.”329 It 
did not take long for Anglo-American partners of Cuban wives and husbands to come to 
appreciate their improved status after moving to Havana. 
 Most Anglo-Americans enjoyed a level of luxury and social prestige unimaginable in 
their home societies. Cathy Brown Crescioni remembers her father Melville adored the leisure of 
his Havana lifestyle: “There wasn’t the pressure to be at work…if you want to play golf, go play 
golf.” She remembers the frequent visits from people at the company headquarters “in Cedar 
Rapids who had any excuse to come to Cuba.”330 U.S. resident J. Bruce Swigert concurred, 
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explaining that the cache of an Anglo-American identity led to real benefits in the workplace: 
“For those of us in business, there was a faint sense of greater security…. Nobody could fire us, 
even if we screwed up.”331 U.S., British and Canadian residents in Havana enjoyed privileges out 
of reach for most Cubans, as well as their compatriots living back home. Many began their time 
in Cuba at one of the luxury hotels, perhaps the Hotel Nacional or Ambos Mundos. Although the 
boundaries around Havana’s exclusive neighborhoods expanded outward over time, by the 1950s 
the Anglo-Americans lived comfortably among wealthy Cubans in the posh neighborhoods of 
Vedado, Country Club, Biltmore, Coronela and Miramar.  
 Domestic help was a staple of the Anglo-American household in 1950s Havana. Anglo-
American homes in Havana typically employed at least one live-in maid.332 Anglo-American 
households with children often hired a Cuban or a British West Indian nanny as well. Many also 
employed a cook, a chauffeur and/or a gardener, who either lived in the homes they served, or 
commuted to and from the house for what generally amounted to a six-day work week. A local 
economy revolved around the comfort of privileged outsiders. Gund recalls, “To our credit, I 
don’t know if it was the case too with other people down there, but we had six servants, one of 
them, the gardener, didn’t live with us; the others all lived with us and we supported them.”333 
John Parker’s collection of essays published on the Anglo-American experience before the 
revolution confirms the pattern of increased expectations for comforts for privileged outsiders in 
Cuba. Parker explains, “many Americans who came from ‘do it yourself U.S.’ were new to the 
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custom of having servants to do the housework.”334 Still, it seems that most found little difficulty 
adapting to their new realities. Mrs. J. Dykes Granberry described Havana as a “homemaker’s 
paradise, thanks to the climate and the availability of domestic help.”335  
 Anglo-American needs were well accommodated, including in the realms of child care, 
domestic assistance and emergency health care. In the event of a health crisis, the advantages of 
being an Anglo-American in Cuba were substantial. When Evelyn Edstrom Benson lost her 
ability to walk after contracting polio, B.F. Goodrich, the company that employed her husband 
Donald G. Benson, encouraged the family to move back to headquarters in Akron, Ohio. Their 
son James remembers his father declined the company’s offer explaining, “I can get help here for 
my wife that I can’t get there.” James continued, “This was way before the Americans with 
Disabilities Act where you had ramps and all the other stuff…. So we stayed down there and 
basically had people in the house. We had a cook and a maid.”336 The Bensons remained in Cuba 
until July 24, 1960.337 
 Often Anglo-Americans compensated domestic workers poorly, relying upon existing 
salary models provided by wealthy Cubans. Ken Campbell, whose family traced its settlement in 
Cuba back to the late 1910s, or early 1920s, recalls, “I think we paid our household help like $20 
a month. So were there people who resented us? Sure, but they resented the rich Cubans too I 
think.”338 With social interactions largely limited to Cuban professionals, Anglo-Americans 
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buttressed existing class hierarchies between rich and poor on the island and rarely had to 
confront the resentment prior to 1959. 
 As in rural Cuba, black British Caribbean workers were often preferred as domestic 
servants for Anglo-Americans in Havana who did not speak Spanish. Their historic contact with 
British colonists, and their lack of privilege in Cuba forcing them to assimilate into Cuban 
society, made West Indians ideal translators of culture and language to newly arrived Anglo-
American colony members. Margaret Benson came to Cuba when Esso moved the family down 
in the mid-1950s. Esso was an English-speaking business environment. Margaret reflected on 
why her mother hired Violette, the West Indian maid: “The reasons we hired the Jamaican was 
because they spoke English and Spanish…. It was easier for mom.”339 Similarly, Cathy Brown 
Crescioni fondly recalls her Jamaican maids Cybil and Kathleen, who raised Cathy and her twin 
siblings, just 13 months younger, as triplets. Like Cathy’s mother, many Anglo-American 
residents depended on their British West Indian servants, as they themselves never learned 
Spanish.340  
 Lack of fluency in Spanish was typical for newly arriving and short-term Anglo-
American residents, but also for some long termers who enjoyed life in segregated, English-only 
settings. John Parker recalls, “We knew Americans who had lived in Cuba for twenty-five years 
whose knowledge of Spanish consisted of only a few words. Most, though not all of these, were 
women who rotated in their own little colony orbit, hired English-speaking Jamaican servants 
and managed to survive very happily.”341 As shown in early chapters, the legacy of British 
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Caribbean subjects serving the needs of Anglo-American residents extended well beyond 
cosmopolitan Havana. They proved pivotal to Anglo-American corporations throughout the 
island and along with Haitians--mostly imported during the U.S. occupation of Haiti--were 
particularly vulnerable to the anti-immigrant nationalist legislation of 1933, 1937 and 1940.342 
Their presence in Cuba helped the Anglo-American colony to mold local conditions to fit the 
needs of informal empire.  
 Often darker than their Cuban counterparts, people from the British Caribbean who 
worked as domestic servants faced racial hostility from some within the Anglo-American colony. 
In John Parker’s collection of essays, he writes, “With all due respect for the occasional rare 
jewel that someone else had, the average Jamaican maid in Cuba was a freewheeling, man 
hunting, food stealing female who was a complete stranger to anything resembling the truth.” 
Parker recommended to prospective members of the Anglo-American colony that they hire a 
Cuban maid who “would be willing enough, but would know nothing about practically 
everything, having just arrived from some town in the deep interior.”343 Still, British Caribbean 
women and men, uprooted by empire, displaced by language, and serving privileged outsiders, 
proved ironically pivotal to relatively smooth integration of Anglo-American corporations and 
families throughout the island.344  
 While they arrived in Havana with a variety of professional and personal aims, Anglo-
American residents found themselves occupying space within an influential subculture of the 
cosmopolitan capital, constructed to their desired specifications. Close ties with Cuba’s political, 
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professional and economic power brokers allowed Anglo-Americans and wealthy Cubans to 
reinforce the socio-economic hierarchies of the city and the nation that sustained their collective 
privilege. Their access to capital and status allowed Anglo-Americans living in Cuba luxuries 
most could not have achieved in their home societies. Meanwhile, their ability to depend on 
colonized British subjects accommodated the structures of informal empire.  
Cultivating Privilege Through Segregation 
 
Figure 13. The Mothers’ Club 345 
 
 By developing fairly exclusive social, as well as business institutions in Havana, and by 
celebrating their respective national holidays with great flourish, the Anglo-American colony 
created mechanisms by which North American and British residents could solidify their own 
distinguished identities and avoid assimilation. This policy of segregation allowed Anglo-
American parents to reinforce the national identities of their children raised abroad. With 
different degrees of orthodoxy, the Mothers’ Club, the Daughters of the American Revolution, 
the American Legion, the Anglo-American Welfare Association, the American Chamber of 
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Commerce, the British Chamber of Commerce, the Petroleum Club, the American Club, the 
British Club, the Women’s Club and the Episcopal Church Youth Group all reified an Anglo-
American identity through nationality-based, exclusionary policies and/or practices. The 
widespread celebration of holidays including, the Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, Memorial Day, 
Empire Day, Saint Andrew’s Day and Canada Day, emphasized an identity based on nationalist 
constructions of heritage.  
 Anglo-American families enjoyed separated English-language sermons at U.S.-led 
Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Catholic, and Jewish congregations in Havana. 
Shortly after their premier in the United States, foreign entertainment companies released a 
barrage of English-language movies and records by Anglo-American artists that arrived in 
Havana’s shops and theaters.346 U.S. companies and foreign governments often paid for their 
Anglo-American employees’ membership in an impressive collection of country clubs dotting 
the Havana landscape. At these clubs, the social leaders of the Anglo-American colony 
organized regular golf and yachting tournaments for member of the Anglo-American colony.347 
Annually, the Dayton Hedges Cup Tournament pit the top resident golfers from the United States 
against those from the United Kingdom.348 A former Cuban student at Ruston Academy, John 
Molanphy remembers, “The Americans saw themselves as typical Americans. They saw 
themselves as typical sort of suburban Americans.”349 For these “typical [white] Americans,” in 
the move to Havana they gained an economic and social status unavailable to Anglo-Americans 
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in their respective home societies, in large part by holding on to, as opposed to shedding their 
national identities. 
 Annually, the Anglo-American colony celebrated the Fourth of July with a breakfast or 
lunch at the American Club, before heading to a picnic hosted by the American Legion at the 
Hotel Nacional.350 While members of the Anglo-American colony often participated in Cuban 
celebrations, and many Cubans came out for Anglo-American holidays, the Fourth of July 
proved a special event for the U.S. citizens who resided in Cuba because it helped reaffirm their 
national heritage. In 195,7 over 1,500 members of the Anglo-American colony showed up to 
celebrate the event at the Hotel Nacional.351 Longtime Anglo-American colony member William 
P. Bryant dressed up as Uncle Sam nearly every year for the two decades preceding the 
revolution.352 U.S. companies marked the occasion by donating prizes to be raffled off to Anglo-
American colony members, and the popular U.S.-owned restaurant The Yank donated a hot dog 
stand for the occasion. The Star-Spangled Banner was sung, followed by the Pledge of 
Allegiance, before the community held a slew of track and swimming competitions for the 
children of the Anglo-American colony.353 The Times of Havana reported, “the President of the 
Republic and other officials join every year in offering their friendly congratulations to their 
friendly neighbor to the north and the Cuban newspapers prominently display American liberty 
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bells and other symbols of the Fourth of July.”354 Daughters of the American Revolution hosted 
an annual trivia contest for Independence Day, while Ambassador Earl Smith inaugurated the 
Responsible Citizens Program “designed to encourage American High School Students in Cuba 
to live up to the ideals of American citizenship abroad.”355 The size, influence and prosperity of 
the Anglo-American colony allowed this collection of foreigners to reproduce their own culture 
in ways inaccessible to other migrant communities. After nearly six decades of intensive foreign 
influence, these foreign nationals living their lives in Havana largely remained distinctly foreign. 
 The story of the Mothers’ Club reveals the thick entanglements of Anglo-American 
identity, capital, political influence and social institutions. Five Anglo-American women founded 
the Mothers’ Club in 1923 “to gather [Havana’s] English-speaking boys and girls together.”356 In 
September 1956, the Mothers’ Club was moved to a larger space in La Coronela and became a 
central meeting place for the children of the Anglo-American colony. An intentional space of 
identity formation based on language, race and nationality, Anglo-American women attended the 
Mothers’ Club on Wednesdays with their youngsters and Thursdays with the older children. 
Representing over 250 families, the Mothers’ Club hosted youth track meets, ping-pong 
tournaments, hula-hoop competitions, baseball, softball, and volleyball matches.357 Major 
League Baseball players participating in the Cuban Winter League occasionally came as guest 
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instructors for the boys of the Anglo-American colony.358 Annually, the Mothers’ Club held a 
Halloween party, a May Day celebration and a Valentine’s Day dance. May Day proved a 
special event at the Mothers’ Club, as races were held for the children who also decorated a May 
Day Pole.359 Children selected a May Queen from among the 15-to-18-year-old girls who 
belonged to the club.360 The Ria Jeffre Cup was awarded to the most outstanding boy or girl from 
the Anglo-American colony.361 
 North American and British companies invested in the Mothers’ Club, a social space 
where cross-generational bonds were strengthened between the Anglo-American residents of 
Havana. In 1927, the British-owned United Railways of Havana purchased a plot of land which 
opened as a playground for the Mothers’ Club in Marianao. Shortly thereafter, the Anglo-
American Community Chest, a philanthropic cooperative of the Anglo-American business 
community in Havana, named the Mothers’ Club as a beneficiary of the charitable organization. 
In 1929 the American Legion donated supplies and labor to construct an edifice for the mothers 
to meet. With the aid of these funds the Mothers’ Club became an exclusive retreat for the 
children of privileged outsiders where young Anglo-American identities could be cultivated in 
the comfort of a relatively homogeneous community. 
 The Mothers’ Club was not wholly an Anglo-American enterprise. The club’s 
constitution explicitly confirmed the wives and children of the Cuban president, Havana’s mayor 
                                                 
358 “Mothers’ Club Ballplayers Get Pointers from Stars,” Times of Havana, November 7, 1957, 7. 
359 “Pomp and Unceremonious Games Highlight May Day Fiesta,” Times of Havana, April 28, 1958, 4. 
360 The Fifth Annual Program of Mothers’ Club of Havana, 1958-1959, provided by Cathy Brown Crescioni. 
361 “Mothers Club Prepares for Presentation Supper,” Times of Havana, May 13, 1957, 7; “Interesting Program of 
Events Slated as Mothers’ Club to Open 35th Year,” Times of Havana, September 27, 1958, 6. 
144 
and the Governor of Havana as honorary members.362 While Margaret Benson remembers the 
youngest Batista son struggling to get down the slide of the Mothers’ Club in the 1950s, few 
other former members recall significant participation by Cubans who did not have at least one 
Anglo-American parent.363 In practice, the participants in weekly events represented, almost 
exclusively, Anglo-American households. Still, children from marriages between Cubans and 
Anglo-Americans actively participated in the Mothers’ Club with the North American or British 
wives of Cuban professionals occasionally attaining roles in the Club’s leadership as was the 
case with Helen López-Fresquet. A very small number of Cuban youngsters with close friends 
from North American schools attended events at the Mothers’ Club, as in the case of Guillermo 
Martínez, whose mother was not a member.364  
 By design, Anglo-American residents attended the Mothers’ Club, along with a number 
of other foreign cultural institutions, to reinforce the distinct national identities of their children 
growing up in a foreign country. By celebrating their respective nationalities, which garnered 
them privilege in Cuba before 1959, Anglo-Americans protected their influential status in 
Havana and throughout the island. 
Philanthropy in Havana’s Anglo-American Colony  
 The bonds that tied the Anglo-American colony together strengthened through 
community-wide charity projects. Yet Anglo-American philanthropy in Cuba largely reinforced 
existing hierarchies. Charity proved to be an important mechanism for bringing the community 
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together and manifested in a number of ways. The most obvious example was the development 
of an Anglo-American Welfare Foundation, which raised money for the benefit of Cuba’s 
Anglo-American residents. Additionally, fundraising drives frequently collected cash for Anglo-
American-led philanthropic projects, generally in the fields of education or toy drives around the 
holidays. Anglo-American residents also supported Cuban-led religious and educational 
institutions that promoted intercultural exchange, often training Cubans in Anglo-American 
customs, or the English language. Finally, the Anglo-American colony rallied around Cuban 
initiatives, often in support of Cuban medical projects, which they themselves could someday 
benefit from. Like most charities, Anglo-American funds supported causes that held meaning or 
value to the donors: investing in the Anglo-American colony itself and training Cubans to work 
for, serve and/or communicate with Anglo-American residents. Due to their disproportionate 
access to capital, these initiatives gained prestige for the causes they supported and improved 
reputation of the Anglo-American colony overall.  
 In Havana, charity programs of the Anglo-American colony often supported community 
functions. Established in 1927 as a project of the then-president of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Cuba Hugo Hartenstein, the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation and its fund, the 
Community Chest, mobilized, collected and distributed charitable donations from the Anglo-
American colony of Havana.365 Theoretically, the fund supported the English-speaking 
community overall, yet in practice this generosity mostly benefitted the Anglo-American 
residents of Cuba, over the tens of thousands of African descendants from the United Kingdom’s 
Caribbean colonies who also lived on the island.366  
                                                 
365 “Hugo Hartenstein Pioneered Community Chest for Colony,” Times of Havana, April 17, 1958, 8. 
366  Whitney, Subjects or Citizens, 29, 156. 
146 
 By 1958 the annual budget for the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation reached 
$85,000.367 The Welfare Foundation prioritized the non-profit Anglo-American Community 
Hospital as the primary beneficiary of this fund. Founded in 1921 as an English-language 
medical center designed specifically to serve the needs of U.S., British and Canadian residents, 
by the 1950s the Anglo-American Community Hospital relied on tens of thousands of dollars in 
donations from the Community Chest, as well as a number of the Anglo-American colony’s 
charitable organizations including the Woman’s Club of Havana, The Book and Thimble Society 
and the American Legion Auxiliary.368 With Community Chest resources and the support of 
U.S., British and Canadian volunteer nurses, the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation founded 
the Anglo-American Home, a residence for elderly members of the colony with neither family, 
nor adequate income.369 The Anglo-American Association established a burial center, creating a 
final resting place for Anglo-American residents of Cuba. The Community Chest sponsored the 
funerals of colony members who could not afford a burial.370 The British Embassy provided 
donations to the Anglo-American Association that sponsored a second burial center for “colored 
nationals,” thus, entrusting Anglo-Americans to manage funds for Havana’s black British 
Caribbean population.371  
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 In the late 1950s the head of Community Chest Drive, Chairman Kenneth Crosby, 
ensured close links between the charitable and business arms of the Anglo-American colony. 
Crosby simultaneously maintained his chair at Community Chest, his role as VP of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Cuba and his day job as manager of Merrill-Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and 
Beane in Havana.372 The Manager of the Royal Bank of Canada Philip H. Eaton took over as 
president of the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation in 1958.373 By placing some of its 
wealthiest and best connected members at the head of the Anglo-American Welfare Foundation, 
the organization ensured it would remain financially solvent. 
 When the charities of the Anglo-American colony in Havana explicitly chose to support 
initiatives that aided Cubans, more often than not the funds were donated to Anglo-American-
managed cultural endeavors. For instance, the St. Rita Guild held Rummage Sales to benefit 
underprivileged Cuban students at the El Cristo Parish School run by U.S. pastor John J. 
McKniff and located in Old Havana.374 For the years before the revolution, El Cristo occupied a 
central position in the charitable campaigns of the Anglo-American St. Rita’s Guild.375 The 
Woman’s and Mothers’ Clubs undertook a concerted effort around Christmas to collect food and 
toys for underprivileged Cuban children. 376 The arrangement encouraged Anglo-Americans to 
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donate to Anglo-American institutions, which then provided material relief to Cubans during the 
holiday season. While the toys were almost certainly appreciated by poor Cuban children, this 
type of exchange legitimized the logic and perceived trustworthiness of Anglo-American 
influence, without empowering Cubans. 
 The Anglo-American colony also joined Cuban-led welfare initiatives, acknowledging 
their own dependence on health of the Cuban society that surrounded them. In 1958 Gloria Grant 
Brandon issued an appeal to the Anglo-American colony to support a Cuban drive to raise 
money for the cancer treatment at Curie Hospital. In her appeal, Brandon focused on personal 
interests of the Anglo-American colony to encourage contributions to the cause writing, “We’d 
very much like to enlist the support of the colony in this drive considering the large number of 
colonyites who have been treated at the Curie Hospital in the past for cancer.” Donations on 
behalf of an Anglo-American youth guaranteed the listing of the child’s name “in the annual 
Anti-Cancer League drive booklet…in a special section [of Diario de la Marina] dedicated to the 
A-B-C committee.”377  
 Anglo-American charity at times took the form of promoting international exchange, 
providing opportunities for Cubans and Anglo-Americans to better understand one another’s 
culture. Between 1944-1958 the U.S. State Department and a collection of Anglo-American 
foundations like the Woman’s Club donated over $500,000 to support Cuban students at U.S. 
educational institutions, as well as North Americans studying in Cuba.378 The Anglo-American 
colony’s Little Theatre donated its earnings from the production “The Sleeping Prince” to benefit 
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the Instituto Cultural Cubano-Norteamericano run by History Professor at the University of 
Havana Herminio Portell Vilá. With respected figures including educator James D. Baker, sugar 
magnate Laurence A. Crosby and intellectual Portell Vilá sitting on the board of the institute, the 
instituto, founded in 1943 attracted large sums of Anglo-American capital.379 With support, 
instructors and money contributed by Anglo-Americans and the U.S. Embassy, the instituto 
offered a range of classes for Cubans, the most popular being English classes. By the late 1950s, 
the center offered three daily classes in English.380 Thus, the charity from the Anglo-American 
colony in Havana that aided Cuban projects often simultaneously supported the economic goal of 
creating Cuban employees who could navigate Anglo-American norms and communicate in 
English while working for foreign corporations on the island.  
Moving Between: Privilege and Identity Flows through Friendship and Marriage 
 Despite the overwhelming privilege and structured separation of Anglo-Americans in 
Havana, a slice of colony residents in many ways did integrate into the society in which they 
lived, through work, school and/or personal relationships. Americanos aplatanados became the 
term used by Cubans and colony members to acknowledge those Anglo-Americans who moved 
between; these women and men, and even children were partially integrated into, and 
comfortable with, Cuban society. Americanos aplatanados enjoyed distinguishing themselves 
from new arrivals, short-term residents and tourists. Christopher Baker, the son of Ruston 
Academy headmaster James Baker explained, “The americano aplatanado usually had the 
vernacular as a language down pretty well. They had complete fluency. They had no difficulties 
interacting in most cases to different cultural patterns and differences.” Speaking from his 
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Maryland living room in 2016, Baker explained that for him and other americanos aplatanados, 
“Home was always Cuba. In fact, we share that in common with ‘exiles’ in the sense that you 
can’t go back. That’s the overriding feeling and shared emotional experience.”381 Anthropologist 
and former Anglo-American colony member John Corbin concurred. Born in Cuba as the son of 
an Anglo-American restaurant owner, John Corbin observed the unusual space occupied by 
americanos aplatanados in 1950s on the island. Corbin and his Cuban friends from Anglo-
American cultural institutions “were most at ease with one another, with others who could follow 
when talk switched in mid-sentence from Spanish to English and then back again any number of 
words later, who stayed on the dance floor when guaracha followed rock and roll and vice versa, 
who enjoyed cokes as much as granizados, tamales as much as hot dogs.”382 The intimate 
relationships developed between americanos aplatanados and Cubans ensured that the ideas, 
aspirations and frustrations of Cuban professionals seeped into even the most segregated spaces 
of Havana’s Anglo-American colony. 
 Firmly grounded as citizens of the U.S., England or Canada, and yet raised in Cuba, and 
moving between cultures, americanos aplatanados became more integrated into Cuban social 
lives than other members of the Anglo-American colony. They attained fluency in Spanish, 
surrounded themselves with Cuban friends and coworkers and lived in Cuba for extended 
periods of time. They generally enjoyed the semi-segregated edifices constructed by, and for 
Anglo-Americans in Cuba. Many would return to the United States, Canada or Europe for 
extended vacations and would attend summer camp, as well as university in their home 
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countries.383 However, the inter-group solidarities and empathy formed by americanos 
aplatanados and Cubans featured prominently during the revolutionary events of the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Because they had forged genuine relationships with members of the host society, 
americanos aplatanados held insight into Cuban society, witnessed dynamics of Cuban suffering 
and shared a sense of struggle during the upheaval of the revolution and then the counter-
revolution, significantly more than the typical Anglo-American transplant on the island.  
 For many, their intimate knowledge of the sounds and tastes of Havana came from their 
early years. Raised by Cuban domestic servants, from whom they learned Spanish, some 
remembered Spanish as their first language. Allyan Watson was born in Cuba to a mother from 
the United States and a Scottish father who worked for U.S.-owned Cubana de Electricidad. 
Watson explains, “I learned Spanish before I learned English because I was at home with the 
maids all day.”384 Within the long-term sector of the Anglo-American colony, the experience of 
being raised in Spanish by Cuban maids was fairly normative. Anglo-American children of new 
arrivals often acquired the ability to communicate in Spanish before their parents who would 
generally use English at work, in their social circles and at home.  
 The long-term business community and the cultural brokers of the Anglo-American 
community who carried the label americanos aplatanados prided themselves on their relative 
integration into their Cuban surroundings. They enjoyed being contrasted with the “other” 
Anglo-Americans who were in Havana for short work assignments, who rarely ventured beyond 
Anglo-American institutions. Americanos aplatanados generally appreciated the advantages of 
Anglo-Americans being raised in Havana. Chris Baker reflected, “I felt that we were privileged 
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to be Americans, but...growing up in Cuba gave us a whole range of things that we would not 
have had otherwise.”385 U.S. born Anglo-American colony member Dorothy Todd Tanner 
affirmed this sentiment, marveling at the “fortune of [Anglo-American] children educated [in 
Cuba] who naturally grow up to be bilingual, never provincial, and with a world-wide view of 
life.”386 Kathryn Wroe French felt Cuba offered an “opportunity for growth in practical 
knowledge and in social experience.”387  
 For americanos aplatanados, identities proved complicated. Even in interviews between 
2013-2018, many bristled at, or rejected, the simple identity signifiers Anglo-American or 
Cuban. John Corbin described the emergence of “a wider society of people who participated to 
varying degrees in both cultures. It contained Cubanos, who were familiar with American 
culture, people who were in some way both Cubano and American, and Americans who were 
familiar with Cuban culture.”388 Former americanos aplatanados and the Cubans with whom 
they engaged as peers articulated a fluid sense of self, that fell between pure or essentialist 
national identities. As Pérez has argued and Corbin explains, this new identity developing 
between Cubans and Anglo-American residents grew new layers, in social, educational and 
religious institutions managed or frequented by Anglo-Americans. As we will see, those who 
moved between the Anglo-American colony and Cuban society proved incredibly significant in 
mobilizing political consciousness among both Cubans and foreign nationals, emerging as 
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leaders and allies in both the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. 
 More than any other form of relationship, intermarriage between Anglo-Americans and 
Cubans ensured that even in segregated Anglo-American spaces, Anglo-American residents were 
never totally isolated from or ignorant of the political upheaval in the 1950s. Over the course of 
the decade many Anglo-Americans became aware of the rising revolutionary consciousness and 
some became personally invested in these events. The Anglo-American community was home to 
many long-term romantic relationships between Cubans and U.S. nationals. Of the close to 1,000 
married couples listed in the Havana section of the 1960 Anglo-American Directory of Cuba, 
262 Anglo-American residents were married to Cubans or Cuban-Americans.389 Intermarriages 
became the epi-center of transnational cultural exchange, though the dynamics varied depending 
on a number of factors including respective occupation, backgrounds and gendered nationalities. 
 Cuban men who studied in North America often returned to the island with Anglo-
American wives. These foreign wives would generally participate in Anglo-American cultural 
institutions or serve as teachers at Anglo-American schools, while their Cuban husbands 
frequently took jobs that rewarded their foreign education. They were also likely to be 
incorporated into the Cuban families of their husbands. Oscar R. Casas met Bessie Sams in 
North Carolina where he earned a scholarship to study at the University of North Carolina – 
Chapel Hill. Despite her parents’ objections, the couple eloped to New York in the mid-1930s, 
before moving to Cuba in 1938. Bessie Sams Casas would become the principal of the 
Episcopalian Cathedral School while Oscar took a job as an accountant for Gillette Razors before 
                                                 
389 The Anglo-American Community provided a home to many long-term romantic relationships between Cubans 
and U.S. nationals. Anglo-American Directory of Cuba 1960, Cuban Information Archives, Accessed July 9, 2015,  
http://cuban-exile.com/doc_201-225/doc0215.html.  
154 
starting a chain of furniture stores in the Cuban capital. Their daughter Mary Casas Knapp tied 
her North American identity to the traditions and activities of the Anglo-American colony, 
particularly within the Cathedral School and the Episcopalian Church. She described her Havana 
childhood as “everything good about small town America in a major city and foreign 
country.”390  
 Like Bessie Sams, Anglo-Americans married to Cubans commonly participated in the 
cultural institutions of the Anglo-American colony, and often worked in Anglo-American 
schools. A significant number of well-educated Anglo-American wives, eager to maintain their 
ties with Anglo-American culture, embraced the opportunity to teach at foreign-run schools. A 
teacher at Lafayette Academy, Martha de la Cal met her Cuban husband at a university in Kansas 
City. Mrs. Mariel Coghlan Salas Cruz taught at the Philips school as her husband Richard served 
as the Cuban Police Delegate to the U.S. Embassy. Mrs. Felice Moore Delgado taught at Ruston 
Academy while her husband Héctor J. Delgado worked for Warner Brothers Films.391 Becoming 
an educator at an Anglo-American school allowed these women to maintain their connection to 
home, even as they married into a new nationality. Further, it ensured their children would have 
access to a community of privileged outsiders who could advance their potential on an island 
heavily influenced by Anglo-American political and economic interests. 
 During the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles, the cultural capital many 
Anglo-Americans derived from contact with the Cuban husbands and wives of colony members 
shaped their respective political consciousness and helped catalyze some towards activism. Many 
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members of the first revolutionary government, including Cuban Minister of Treasury Rufo 
López-Fresquet, were married Anglo-American women. Helen López-Fresquet became a leader 
of the Mothers’ Club serving as its corresponding secretary in 1957.392 Luis Sanjenis, who would 
later serve under López-Fresquet in 1959 and 1960, married an Irish-American woman. Their 
son Michael reflected on his identity in Cuba before 1959. Expressing a sentiment common to 
the children of these mixed marriage households Sanjenis remembers himself as, “one of those 
rich expats living the good life.”393  
 The Casas, Salas Cruz, Delgado, Lopéz-Fresquet, and Sanjenis families were not unusual 
among intermarried couples in their embrace of Havana’s Anglo-American subculture. Carlos 
Todd, the nephew of Cuban sugar magnate Julio Lobo, married Anne Cotter, who herself came 
from a politically connected family in Boston. Carlos would become a central figure in the Little 
Theatre, performing shows and musicals for the Anglo-American colony and their Cuban 
friends.394 While relationships between Cuban men and Anglo-American women generally 
formed overseas prior to returning to the island, marriages between a Cuban woman and an 
Anglo-American man more typically originated in Cuba. 
 Long-term Anglo-American male residents who married Cuban women generally either 
arrived as single professionals or they married a Cuban woman after a divorce with their North 
American or British wife.  Cuban women often wed Anglo-American men who were born in 
Cuba, or who came from Anglo-American families with deep roots on the island. This was the 
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case with long-term residents James and Burke Hedges.395 Longtime Ruston Academy teacher of 
German descent, Hal Neuendorf married his former Cuban student Elvira Ruga.396 Other male 
residents with long term commitments to cultural aspects of the Anglo-American colony or the 
surrounding Cuban society proved likely candidates for marrying Cuban women as was the case 
with President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Cuba Paul M. Heilman and Professor 
at Havana’s University of Villanova John Johnson.397  
 The death of a Cuban or Anglo-American parent could also reorient the family toward--
or away from--the Anglo-American colony. Former Chief Resident at John Hopkins Wilmer Eye 
Institute at Plinio Montalván met and married Ruth Warren from Richmond, Virginia while 
living and working in the United States.398 Their son, Plinio Montalaván, remembers it was 
“when my father died in January 1950, [that] my mother…really developed her American 
friends.” Ruth and her daughter Isabel became regular contributors to the plays performed at the 
Little Theatre. Further, it was not until after his father’s death that Plinio enrolled at the U.S.-run 
Ruston Academy.399 Eduardo González attended both Harvard and MIT where he met and later 
married Anne F. Johnston, a nurse at Mass General. The couple moved to Banes to work for the 
United Fruit and Sugar Company before transferring to Jaronú with the American Sugar 
Refinery Company. Upon Eduardo’s death in 1956, Anne moved to Havana and reoriented the 
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family toward the Anglo-American colony. She became a teacher at the Anglo-American 
Columbus School and transferred her son Ed from the Methodist Candler College, with Anglo-
American teachers, but mostly Cuban students, to Ruston Academy, the Anglo-American 
colony’s most competitive school on the island.400 Modesto Maidique came from a politically 
powerful Cuban family. When Maidique was just eleven-months old, an assassin (likely hired by 
a political opponent) murdered his father. His mother remarried a U.S. national who moved the 
family to Corpus Cristi, Texas. Maidique returned to Cuba to attend Ruston Academy for high 
school. Influenced by his time in the United States, his step-father and his experience at Ruston, 
Maidique recalled, “I identified myself as a Cuban who was very facile in English and 
knowledgeable of American civilization and culture and language.”401  
 Americano aplatanados and Cuban-American couples occupied and innovated a range of 
identities that could only emerge within an intimate community of local professionals and 
privileged outsiders. The particular dynamics that shaped the space occupied by Anglo-
Americans in Cuba before 1959 made it possible for these transcultural contact zones inhabited 
by americanos aplatanados and wealthy Cubans to influence the perception of Cuban events 
between 1952-1962 in both Cuba and abroad. As we will see later, intimate connections among 
Anglo-American colony members and relatively wealthy Cuban professionals helped form 
narratives and shape events during times of revolution.    
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Conclusions  
 Anglo-Americans generally moved to Cuba from their home countries for a better life. 
The promise of luxury, prestige and leisure made Havana an especially cherished assignment. 
The ability to operate in English; garner domestic support inaccessible to most Anglo-Americans 
in their home societies; to be respected by Cuban political, as well as economic authorities, and 
to escape to exclusive social structures and traditions that remind one of home, all provided the 
Anglo-American colony the benefits of colonists throughout the world. Yet the informal nature 
of Anglo-American influence enabled friendships and intimacies uncommon in formal colonial 
settings. Intermarriages, as well as close social, educational and business partnerships softened 
the edges of many exclusive Anglo-American institutions. Thus, Anglo-Americans in Havana 
reproduced values that legitimized their influence through knowledge production, while 
simultaneously forging contact zones where privileged outsiders and privileged insiders could 
together imagine a “new” modern Cuba.  
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CHAPTER SIX: FOREIGN MISSIONARIES IN INFORMAL EMPIRE  
Introduction 
 This chapter explores how Protestantism evolved from a vehicle to attain Cuban 
sovereignty from Spain, into a spiritual form of knowledge production that helped legitimize, 
and then undermine informal empire. While most Anglo-American missionaries arrived with the 
aim of improving the lives of Cubans, their influence in Cuba depended on networks accessed by 
their nationalities. Foreign capital funded the work conducted by many missionaries, as U.S. 
corporations often used Protestant missions to outsource health and educational services to their 
workers. Providing some semblance of a social safety net, Protestant schools, clinics, 
philanthropy and churches mollified some of the demands for services made by Cuban and 
Caribbean workers. Yet in comparison to their corporate patrons, missionaries arrived in Cuba 
with different aims, enjoyed different experiences and developed different relationships that 
caused them to question, and then contest the structures of informal empire. Working in close 
proximity to Cuban suffering under the weight of revolution, many rural missionaries would 
eventually challenge the socio-economic hierarchies that elevated foreign influence, from which 
their authority derived.  
Early Protestant Contact and Imperial Hubris  
 Born in Guanabacoa, Cuba in 1853, Alberto J. Díaz joined the Cuban army during the 
Ten Years War (1868-1878), before he sought exile in New York City.402 In the 1880s, following 
                                                 
402 During a battle in the Ten-Years War, surrounded by the Spanish, Díaz and some comrades floated on wooden 
planks out to sea. He was picked up by a steamer heading to New York, where Díaz began work at a cigar factory. 
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the Guerra Chiquita (1879-1880), Díaz and other revolutionaries who had converted to 
Protestantism in exile began migrating back to the island from the United States where they 
established some of the first Protestant churches in Cuba for Cubans.403 Without a substantial 
U.S. community in Cuba before 1898, Díaz proposed and received approval for projects from the 
Southern Baptist Home Mission Board based on the needs of his Cuban congregation.404 In 1896 
colonial authorities arrested Díaz for plotting with other Protestant workers against the crown.405 
A week after his arrest, the Southern Baptist Convention successfully pressured the United States 
government to intercede. Díaz was released, as he and his family left for exile in Atlanta.406 
Perhaps Díaz’ greatest achievement was the foundation of the Gethsemane Baptist Church of 
Havana. In 1897, despite his absence, the congregation was described as the most influential 
Protestant institution in Cuba.407 
 During the Cuban Wars of Independence, between 1868 and 1898, an estimated 100,000 
Cubans, or one tenth of the population, spent time off the island. Most emigrated north to escape 
the violence that enveloped Cuba and/or to plot the overthrow of the colonial government.408 
                                                 
During his recovery from an illness, his nurse Alice Tucker converted Díaz to the Protestant faith. Urbanek, Cuba’s 
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403 From the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, contact between Cubans and Protestant smugglers, pirates, and 
adventurers occurred on a limited basis due to restrictions on trade imposed by Spain. The 1762-1763 occupation of 
Havana by British forces opened Cuba economically and culturally to the British Empire, and significantly to their 
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Attaining U.S. citizenship while in exile provided many revolutionaries, including Díaz, a level 
of protection should they decide to return to their home island and continue to agitate for the 
cause of independence.409  
 Frustrated with continued Spanish rule, as well as the crown’s collusion with its close 
allies in the Catholic Church, many Cuban revolutionaries converted to Protestant denominations 
while in exile.410 Communities like those constructed by Díaz upon his return to Cuba worked to 
challenge and destabilize the ruling secular and religious orders of the island.411 Because the 
predominantly Spanish Catholic clergy collaborated so explicitly with the Crown to sustain their 
shared authority in Cuba, Catholicism became identified with Spain and the old order.412 Cuban 
national hero José Martí condemned the Church in Cuba for its complicity with Spanish rule, 
declaring “Catholicism must perish.”413 By contrast, prior to 1898, prominent Protestant 
institutions were managed by Cubans; many of whom actively participated in activities against 
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Spain’s rule.414 Becoming a Protestant in many ways signified a revolutionary act in defiance of 
the ruling order.415  
 U.S. Protestants saw advantage in linking the cause of independence with the downfall of 
Catholicism and the spread of Protestantism in Cuba. Baptist Pastor Henry L. Morehouse 
explained that Cubans “in their long and fearful struggle for independence, had a hearty hatred 
for the Roman hierarchy in league with the tyrannical power of Spain to keep Cubans under the 
yoke…. The spirit of independence asserted itself in religious as well as in political matters. 
Indeed, the latter was the overshadowing concern and there was little devotion to the church.”416 
U.S. Protestant publications celebrated Cuban revolutionary efforts. In 1896, The Christian Index 
reported that Cuba’s “struggle for religious freedom is inseparably linked with that of political 
deliverance…. The fall of Spanish power is the overthrow of the State Church in Cuba…. Her 
priesthood, who are all of Spanish birth, must follow the footsteps of the Spanish soldiery, and 
find a refuge in other land.”417  
 While Cuban and North American Protestants supported Cuba’s fight for independence 
from the Catholic Church and Spanish authorities before 1898, Cuban demands for sovereignty 
became a nuisance for foreign missionaries attempting to take over Cuba’s Protestant institutions 
after 1898. North American mission boards assumed control and demoted the leaders of Cuban 
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Protestantism, like Díaz, to subordinate roles within the church hierarchy. In 1901, Southern 
Baptist superintendent Charles David Daniel assumed leadership of the Cuban projects Alberto 
Díaz founded and voiced criticism of Díaz’ political activism. Díaz expressed opposition to the 
Platt Amendment that constrained Cuban independence, a cause Díaz had advocated 
relentlessly.418 While U.S. Protestant publications cheered the U.S. intervention in 1898, they 
proved less tolerant of challenges to U.S. domination in the years that followed.419 Díaz would 
break with the Southern Baptists and become a Presbyterian in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, as he grew increasingly frustrated with Baptist attempts to impose their bureaucracy, 
theology, traditions and politics on the institutions he worked so hard to establish.  
 Decisions concerning the mission and conduct of Protestant communities now centered 
on the goals and concerns of Anglo-Americans, often dictated by mission boards back in the 
United States. This transnational shift is perhaps most apparent in the strategic division of the 
island to suit the needs of U.S. mission boards. The lines granting distinct regions to different 
denominations were drawn at a 1902 interdenominational conference in Cienfuegos.420 The 
Baptists had already divided the island among themselves in November 1898, when 
representatives from the Southern Baptist and the American Baptist Conventions met in 
Washington. At that meeting, an agreement allocated the western portion of the island to the 
Southern Baptists, while Camagüey to the east went to the American Baptists. Following this 
accord, the Cuban Baptist pioneer J.R. O’Hallarón left Oriente and the churches he had 
organized. Perhaps he exited Oriente due to theological differences with the American Baptists, 
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as he was a product of the Southern Baptist Convention. Arbitrary lines drawn in Washington, 
likely without significant Cuban input, now declared O’Hallarón’s congregation to belong to 
another denomination. Were that not enough, O’Hallarón’s authority was subordinated to North 
American Hartwell Robert Moseley, who arrived in 1899, to assume charge of the American 
Baptist institutions of eastern Cuba. Shortly after Moseley’s arrival, O’Hallarón left his work in 
the region, relocating to the western part of the island.421 At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Protestant ethos that agitated for Cuban sovereignty became a causality of informal empire. 
Justifying Foreign Leadership in Cuba’s Protestant Institutions 
Surely when we think of all these things, we shall judge charitably and speak softly, and 
trust that under a new political, educational, social, and religious order there will evolve a 
new Cuban, worthy of his island home and leader in the creation there of a Christian 
civilization. 
Southern Baptist Missionary Howard B. Grose (Circa 1905)422 
 
 With the island shattered by three decades of civil war, foreign missionaries viewed 
Protestantism as a tool essential to the political, moral, economic and religious salvation of Cuba.  
Missionaries encountered a people whose development, they described as stagnated by the terror 
and neglect of Spanish rule. Many expressed the view that Cubans required nurturing through 
exposure to a Protestant work ethic, Protestant values and the Protestant gospel.  
 As a leading member of the American Baptist community, Henry L. Morehouse, the 
namesake of Morehouse College, detailed Cuban shortcomings to justify the introduction of U.S. 
leadership into Cuban Protestant structures after 1898. In the rhetoric of the contemporary 
civilizing discourse, articulated most famously in Rudyard Kipling’s 1899 poem The White 
Man’s Burden, Morehouse saw Protestant institutions on the island developed by Cubans before 
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the U.S. occupation (1899-1902) as lacking in “initiative” and “sense of personal responsibility,” 
and in desperate need of deliverance.  
[Cubans] had no initiative; no voice in the management of affairs, no sense of personal 
responsibility for success or failure in religious enterprises; they were utterly 
inexperienced and untutored…. They had to be taught the alphabet of a new vocabulary 
in religious matters and ‘how to behave themselves’ as members of a local church and in 
their relations with other churches. It required patience, tact and time on the part of our 
‘master builders’ to get this material harmoniously adjusted as a voluntary coherent 
body.423 
 
 Anglo-American missionaries described their task within the context of a larger project of 
Cuban uplift, which transcended both the religious and secular spheres. Many early missionaries 
assumed the duty of “improving” the character and condition of Cuban people. In 1908, the head 
of the American Baptist mission in eastern Cuba, Dr. H. R. Moseley observed what he 
considered to be a backward, unmotivated and lethargic Cuban population.424 “One of the 
greatest difficulties we have to encounter is the indifference of the people. They are not a serious 
people and are inclined to take everything lightly and carelessly.”425 A few years earlier, in 
September 1901, Dr. J. Milton Greene left his Presbyterian church in East Orange, New Jersey to 
evangelize Cubans.426 Pastor Greene’s task grew more ambitious after he arrived and perceived 
the same challenges as Moseley. “There must be a great deal of uplifting, of change, of 
improvement…new habits to form, new customs to adopt, before [Cubans] can reach the 
condition of civilization which they ought to have.”427 These missionaries believed that 
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promoting Anglo-American values through the vehicle of Protestantism would catalyze Cuban 
development. 
 Protestant institutions in Cuba often reflected the racial politics held by respective 
denominational hierarchies in the United States. In the 1920s Southern Baptist Una Lawrence 
Roberts described, “The Cuban is usually dark in complexion, slender, quick and nervous in 
temperament, volatile, easily provoked to quarrel, as easily satisfied, polite to an extreme 
degree…. Because he can grasp a subject easily, he rarely goes very deeply into it, being 
satisfied too often with a superficial knowledge that often prevents him from becoming expert in 
any line.”428 In 1931, nearly three decades after Cuban independence, the Annual Report from 
the Methodist Episcopal Church, South concluded, “Without doubt, one of the tendencies of this 
winsome people is to take life altogether too easy.”429 Cuban underdevelopment was explained in 
the language of scientific racism, “probably the result of an educational and racial process that 
traces back through the Latins and Greeks of early times.”430 In 1942 the John Merle Davis 
agreed, “The Cuban people are a race still in the making and are in the adolescent period of 
development.... Many Cuban traits come from inexperience, from youthful leaping of barriers 
and may be attributed to the sudden emergence of a repressed people from four hundred years of 
a corrupt and outmoded colonial system.”431 Just as they judged the qualities of the Cuban people 
to be inferior, so too many U.S. missionaries doubted the abilities of Cuban preachers. In 1946 
Methodist Pastor Garfield Evans wrote to Dr. A. W. Wasson “Cuban pastors ‘could not put over 
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a revival campaign’ because they lacked ‘the background and preparation of character.’”432 
Anglo-American explanations for foreign leadership in Protestant missions initially centered on 
ethnocentric logic by which the deficits of Cubans were attributed to the history of Spanish and 
Catholic domination. This logic justified continued Anglo-American influence fueled by the 
rhetoric of development.  
Friends in High Places: The Utility of Anglo-American Networks in Rural Cuba 
 At a young age, while attending the Colegios los Amigos of Banes, future Cuban 
President Fulgencio Batista was exposed to Protestant education, if only for a short time. His 
experience there led him to donate $2,000 to the Quaker school personally while he was 
president, and to arrange an additional $40,000 gift to the school from the national lottery fund 
during the 1944-1945 school year. Batista contributed toward the construction of a new 
schoolhouse. The remainder of the building budget was financed with donations from the United 
Fruit and Sugar Company ($2,500), the American Friends Board of Missions ($3,800) and 
Friends in Banes ($1,000). Before the revolution, the reputation and the facilities of the Friends 
project in Banes, as well as mission projects throughout Cuba, benefited not only from their 
connections to Anglo-American capital, but also from the endorsement of the Cuban state. After 
1959, these donations would pique suspicion of the Quakers by revolutionary officials.433  
 Like their corporate counterparts, the foreign missionaries benefited substantially from 
the socio-economic alliances formed within Cuba during the first six decades of the twentieth 
century. Further, despite divergent interests, relationships of mutual benefit often developed 
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between Anglo-Americans representing distinct economic, political and cultural institutions on 
the island. These dynamics were particularly complex in the rural areas. Donations of land and 
resources from U.S. sugar and mining corporations often sustained rural missions. In turn, these 
corporations would dictate the locations for Protestant schools, clinics and churches.434 Networks 
between missionaries ensured that Cubans could access a diverse list of services by entering into 
Protestant communities.435 Anglo-American financial networks provided opportunities to raise 
funds in Cuba and abroad. Due to their connections to foreign and domestic capital, Protestant 
missions maintained their economic stability, while often providing the only social services in 
these remote regions.  
 Yet the political commitments of corporations and the missionaries often conflicted. No 
doubt, the benefits of collaboration flowed in both directions. U.S. sugar, mining and military 
institutions relied upon rural Protestant missionaries to provide support to their workers. Their 
services provided a safety net for those impoverished by the structures of informal empire. 
Anglo-American corporate leaders in eastern Cuba eagerly invested in the social projects offered 
by Protestant missionaries, likely hoping to reduce demands for educational, health and 
community services from their Cuban and Caribbean employees. At the same time, Anglo-
American corporate authorities offered few structural remedies for rural suffering of their own, 
and only limited paths toward social mobility.436  
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 The United Fruit and Sugar Company entered into arrangements with both the Quakers 
and the United Methodists seeking to evangelize in eastern Cuba. In 1897, on a return trip from 
Jamaica to the United States, Captain Lorenzo Baker of UFSC made an offer to Quaker 
missionary Zenas Martin that would benefit both United Fruit and the American Friends.437 With 
plans to open a plantation centered in Banes, Baker offered $1000 to Martin to begin a mission 
on United Fruit and Sugar Company land.438 On March 29, 1900 the official announcement by 
the American Friends Board of Missions declared Zenas Martin the head of the Quaker project in 
Cuba. Shortly after, Captain Baker gave another $1,000 to the American Friends in Cuba. 439  
 While this partnership was deemed fiscally essential, ties to the United Fruit and Sugar 
Company made Martin uneasy. Martin decided he would not locate the Quaker mission in Banes, 
fearing it would become beholden to a “great soulless corporation.”440 The Quakers would 
instead begin their work in nearby Gibara. However, corporate sponsorship proved difficult to 
avoid and within a few years a Quaker mission would be founded in Banes, with Colegios los 
established in 1905. The United Fruit and Sugar Company leased land in Banes to the American 
Friends community for 99 years, charging a sum of $1.00.441 Former Quaker missionary Hiram 
Hilty explained,  
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The cynic may say that the United Fruit Company – which literally owned the town – 
was simply demanding service for value received when it urged English-speaking 
educational and religious work on Friends at Banes, and there were indeed times when it 
looked as if were merely a part of the company as Zenas Martin had feared they would 
be.442  
 
Hilty goes on to describe the amicable relationship he and other Quaker missionaries developed 
with Anglo-American employees of United Fruit, many of whom joined in the mission’s 
“English-speaking activities.”443 With the aid of the UFSC, the Quakers supported 
underprivileged Cubans like the young Fulgencio Batista, while bolstering the image of their 
corporate benefactor. The United Fruit and Sugar Company would continue to support the 
projects of Quakers in Oriente until the Cuban Revolution forced the company off the island in 
1960.444  
 Anglo-American networks proved extremely valuable to rural missionaries. In Báguanos, 
the Woman’s Division of the Methodist Church developed in the mill town of the U.S.-run 
Antilla Sugar Estates. Like Zenas Martin, head missionary Eulalia Cook expressed serious 
reservations about working in a place dominated by a foreign corporation. Having written her 
thesis at Scarritt College on President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, in 1942 Cook 
wrote, “I had studied too much about ‘American Imperialism’ to feel enthusiastic about working 
by grace of the permission of a big capitalist – feeling that I would prefer to work in a town 
where Cubans controlled their own government etc., however badly they might do it, to working 
under even a ‘benevolent despotism.’” Although initially hesitant, upon her arrival in Báguanos 
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she saw an “opportunity to learn more from first-hand experience how the sugar industry affects 
the social, economic and moral life of the people.”445  
 
Figure 14. The Báguanos Valley 446 
 Despite their frustrations with informal empire, many missionaries, including Eulalia 
Cook, developed a gratitude for the mission’s patron. Complex, if amicable relationships often 
formed between missionaries and the Anglo-American executives who funded the respective 
missions. Reflecting back in 1953, Cook credited the success of the mission, in part, to “the 
administrator of the sugar mill [who] felt the need to improve the social life and educational 
opportunities of the youth of the town and due to his concern at the rapid growth of occultism in 
the town.”447 Methodist missionary John Stroud felt a similar warmth to his corporate patrons. 
When leaving Cuba, he looked forward to reconnecting with friends from UFSC in Panama, 
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where both he and some United Fruit executives had been reassigned. He wrote, “I expect some 
old friends from Preston are in some of their places in Central America and I would like to 
unite.”448  
 The Anglo-American executives at the Báguanos mill, owned by a subsidiary of the 
Royal Bank of Canada, not only provided the space and material goods to found the mission in 
Báguanos, but their endorsement also garnered early legitimacy for the Methodist 
missionaries.449 Eulalia Cook expressed her appreciation of Mr. Miller in particular for 
enhancing the social position of the Methodist mission in Báguanos: “[the] company’s 
cooperation made it easier for townspeople to accept the ‘American nuns,’ as some liked to call 
us.”450 Mr. Miller, the chief executive at the mill in Báguanos, ensured a home for the 
missionaries, as well as access to a plot of land for a church and a school. 451 Miller further 
allowed the Methodist congregation to begin work on an “experimental farm.”452 Referring to the 
social hall being constructed in 1944 to support the activities of the mission, Cook explained, 
“the Company has carried the expense so far.”453 In 1948 when the mill came under new 
management and Cook noticed a change, “There is more friction between labor and capital, the 
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management is a bit harder to reach, -- but our work is firmly established now in the hearts of the 
people.”454  
 Despite different goals and certain tensions, rural missionary work depended heavily on 
the socio-economic networks developed in conjunction with Anglo-American capital, and 
influential Cuban power brokers, who also benefited from the image and practice of Protestant 
social services for their employees. The companies and Cuban politicians depended on rural 
evangelizers to blunt the devastation brought by systematic neglect and exploitation of labor in 
communities surrounding sugar mills. With ambivalence, missionaries entered into arrangements 
with foreign corporations to provide educational, health and religious services to desperate 
populations. However, under the weight of revolution, the underlying tensions between rural 
missionaries and their corporate patrons would be exposed as the pursued divergent agendas in 
pursuit of their contradictory ambitions for the island. While before 1959 many Protestant 
denominations hoped to transform Cuban society through their spread of the gospel and 
improvement of opportunities for Cubans, U.S. corporations sought to maintain the status quo, 
from which they were profiting enormously.  
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Contending with Corporate Sponsorship to Mollify Cuban Suffering 
 
Figure 15. La Granja, Late 1940s 455 
 In November 1946, a few months into his tenure at the Methodist Agricultural and 
Industrial School, director Richard Milk expressed his anxiety about the sustainability and 
potential of the project. Beholden to the multiple agendas of Cuban Methodist leaders, the 
families of his students, the mission board in the United States, his faculty, and the United Fruit 
and Sugar Company, Milk wondered how the school could function, governed by so many 
divergent interests. Milk feared that the location of the project undermined its goals: “[The 
school] is not in an area where there are many independent farm operators.”456 The spot was 
chosen because of a donation from the United Fruit and Sugar Company. Milk lamented, “…it is 
too completely dependent upon the sugar company for its existence.”457 The plot provided by the 
United Fruit and Sugar Company proved to be poor in quality, making “the magnitude of my 
task…tremendous. The land is a heavy, limestone derived clay. The topography is steeply rolling 
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and erosion has made a terrific toll…The land was abandoned for cane production by the United 
Fruit Company…because yields were low and costs high.”458 Finally, he expressed his 
frustration with the state of education in the region dominated by U.S. sugar and mining 
interests, “There is not even a junior high school within the entire municipio.”459  
 As had been the case for the Methodists in Báguanos, the corporate sponsorship of the 
United Fruit and Sugar Company determined the location of the Agricultural and Industrial 
School in Playa Manteca. Similar to the deal worked out between the Quakers and United Fruit 
and Sugar Company four decades earlier, on July 20, 1946 the Agricultural School, nicknamed 
la granja, began a ninety-nine-year lease with the UFSC at a token cost. Like Martin and Cook, 
the school’s director often expressed his disenchantment with the company. His son Robert 
explained: “United Fruit did not reflect the values that he would want his children to pursue. 
[Milk] believed in a life of service…not about how can I make the most money in the world.” 
Robert Milk attended the Preston Lee School for the Anglo-American children of United Fruit 
executives, but he lived in a very different world. His father warned him that among the Anglo-
American employees at UFSC, there were “bigots, racists, drunks…my father did not consider 
them good role models. It was us and them…. We were not considered them.”460 Due to their 
cultural, as opposed to corporate, orientation, Anglo-American missionaries viewed their roles in 
Cuba as distinct from, and often at odds with, their corporate sponsors. These were, indeed, 
fraught entanglements. 
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 The continued support extended by the United Fruit and Sugar Company nevertheless 
proved central to the survival of the school. UFSC provided water, electricity, telephones, roads, 
railroad service, building materials, technical workers, and capital to compensate the teachers at 
la granja.461 While the staff of the Agricultural School had access to the hospital in Preston, only 
“under certain conditions” did UFSC extend the same courtesy to the school’s Cuban students.462 
Eager to donate to the Methodist project, in 1959 Milk declared that “over 500 employees of the 
[United Fruit and Sugar Company] have given either time or money to the school in the 15-year 
period [it existed].” Milk continued, “A Bethlehem Steel Company subsidiary and the Atlantic 
Gulf Sugar [Company] have also contributed, as well as a number of other businessmen in 
Cuba.”463  
 Beyond the dominant corporate interests of the region, access to Anglo-American 
networks within Cuba and abroad garnered prestige and financial stability for the Protestant 
institutions of Oriente. The U.S. leaders of la granja purposefully shaped their message for their 
respective audiences when soliciting financial support from Anglo-American executives in the 
region of Oriente, elsewhere in Cuba and in the United States. In a fundraising pamphlet, the 
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U.S. leadership of the school appealed to the national myths surrounding the American Dream 
and the entrepreneurial spirit of the United States. The letter encouraged patrons to contribute 
funds so that Cuban youths could “EARN their way and learn how to live in that part of 
Cuba.”464 Nicholas Rutz, a U.S. rancher and citrus farmer in Cuba, whose children attended the 
Methodist Pinson College in Camagüey, donated a large tractor to the Agricultural School.465 
Milk also secured the purchase of a second hand mechanical corn planter from a North American 
farmer in Omaja, Cuba.466 A friend of Methodist Bishop Roy Short, based in Nashville, donated 
a Ford tractor.467 In 1947 Emily Towe of the Methodist publication World Outlook referenced 
support from “Many farmers of the southern United States [who] sent over livestock and money. 
The eight cows were gifts and more are expected.”468 These gifts supplemented a budget 
dependent on the limited tuition that could be paid by those students whose families could afford 
it, as well as the selling of farm produce, including corn and milk.469 While la granja was able to 
raise a substantial portion of the funds needed to run the school, the administration could never 
survive without outside support from Anglo-American networks.470 
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 With ties and obligation to the Cuban community and to U.S. capital, Richard Milk was 
forced to balance competing interests from groups that sought influence over the school. In 
March 1959, Milk outlined the numerous goals articulated for la granja. The faculty hoped to 
“[prepare] youth for adequate social and spiritual adjustments to meet the complex problems of 
life in a modern world.” Further, they sought to prepare Cubans for “democracy, by trying to 
practice democracy at all levels within the school structure.” In addition, “individual trustees” 
and Cuban “church leaders” hoped to train youth in “home farming” so that they could 
independently create a self-sustaining existence. They believed that combating illiteracy in the 
region could help enfranchise rural Cuban society.471 While the North American faculty sought 
to imprint the values of democracy on their Cuban students, the Cubans themselves emphasized 
the need to teach skills that could practically improve the lives of Cuban communities. Milk 
observed that the primary corporate benefactors of la granja, the U.S.-owned sugar and mining 
corporations of the region, by contrast, desired the school to “train semi-skilled workers” for 
industrial or agricultural work.472 Milk explained, “The trustees from the sugar 
corporation…were more concerned with practical technical education.”473 With seats on the 
board of directors, and as major contributors to the school’s stability, the United Fruit and Sugar 
Company – and to a lesser extent the Bethlehem Steel Company – positioned themselves 
strategically to make their influence felt. 474 Edgar Nesman recalled, “Dick Milk returned from 
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the meetings very frustrated over some of the restrictions that were imposed.” Almost certainly 
influenced by his experiences at the Agricultural School, Nesman explains, “Milk had a strong 
feeling for the need of agrarian reform if there was to be good land available for family farms 
and that may have been a source of frustration.”475 While Anglo-American corporate employees 
sought to profit from the existence of this school through the hiring of semi-skilled labor, the 
Cubans and missionaries at the school sought to create a more self-sufficient, as well as 
Protestant rural Cuban society.  
The Cultural Prestige of National Networks 
 The stability provided to Protestant schools, clinics and churches by Anglo-American 
financial capital complemented the human capital accessible within the networks of privileged 
outsiders. The presence of Anglo-American teachers strengthened the reputation of Protestant 
institutions. For many Cubans, Anglo-American missionaries offered a bridge between a social 
world dominated by Cubans and an economic landscape heavily influenced by foreigners. In the 
mid-1950s, Mario Casanella, director of the American Baptist Colegios Internacionales, 
requested two North American teachers for the academy.476 Casanella likely understood that U.S. 
educators improved not only the curriculum, but the reputation of the school. With the 
assignment of these new Anglo-American missionaries, Casanella explained, “we could give a 
great forward step to our work.”477  
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Figure 16. Richard Milk and Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace 1957 478 
 The prestige of the faculty, the school’s notable guests and privileges, all helped shape 
the positive perception of the Industrial and Agricultural School regionally, nationally and 
internationally in Cuban and Anglo-American circles. Appreciating the mission of la granja 
while attaining a comfortable home surrounded by Anglo-American missionaries, Mr. Van 
Herman, a noted horticulturist originally from Pennsylvania, retired to the school in the 1940s.479 
He came to the region with a reforestation project of the Bethlehem Steel Company and he, with 
his wife, chose to stay in Playa Manteca, elevating the school’s reputation.480 A visit from former 
Vice President Henry Wallace further enhanced the standing of the school; Wallace delivered the 
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graduation speech to the class of 1957.481 Edgar Nesman remembered the excitement of UFSC 
executives for Wallace’s visit to the area. One, after meeting him, commented, “I don’t think 
he’s a communist.”482 
 Throughout Cuba’s republican era, endorsements of Anglo-American institutions by 
Cuban political and intellectual leaders buttressed the collective reputation of Anglo-American 
cultural endeavors on the island. The Cuban government consistently honored members of the 
Anglo-American colony, as well as CEOs of Anglo-American companies with tokens of 
gratitude for their service to Cuba. The Canadian Dr. Robert Routledge (Director of American 
Baptist Colegios Internacionales), as well as U.S. nationals Milton Hershey (Founder of 
Hershey), Hiram Ruston (Founder of Ruston Academy), Pastor M.N. McCall (Southern Baptist 
Superintendent), Pastor Harry Brown Bardwell (Principal of Methodist Candler College) and 
Pastor Alexander Hugo Blankingship (Episcopalian Bishop) all received the Order of Carlos 
Manuel de Céspedes, Cuba’s highest awarded medal.483 President Machado created the medal to 
honor Cubans and foreigners for distinguished service to the island.484 Through the financial and 
moral support of U.S. capital and the Cuban state, the excellence of Anglo-American institutions 
became a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
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Cuba’s Evolving Protestant Hierarchies  
 Missions throughout Cuba, though to a greater degree in urban settings, maintained 
Anglo-American leadership well into the 1940s and 1950s. For many Protestant groups, only 
with the triumph of Cuban nationalism in the first years of the Cuban Revolution did North 
American missionaries lose their authority, along with their place in Cuban society. In an 
interview with Methodist missionary Edgar Nesman I asked, “Why do you think, after 60 some 
odd years, Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians--the mainline churches, didn’t create 
autonomous churches?” Nesman explained, “I think some of the older missionaries didn’t want 
them to. They would lose their jobs.”485 Power and control were obvious motives for North 
American religious institutions to maintain dominance within Cuba’s Protestant institutions. Yet 
Nesman also suggested that financial concerns proved paramount to the maintenance of North 
American leadership in Protestant institutions.  
 Foreign capital became less accessible once Anglo-Americans gave authority over 
Protestant projects to Cubans. In those denominations that granted significant leadership roles to 
Cubans prior to 1959, foreign capital waned. The Quakers were one of the first denominations to 
give significant leadership positions to their Cuban ministry.486 Yet this came at a cost. The 
Quaker withdrawal of U.S. missionaries in the 1948 led to an erosion of U.S. patronage.487 In 
1959, U.S. Quakers provided only $4,000 in funding to their missions in Cuba.488 Without 
foreign capital, other denominations were able to dwarf the Quaker presence on the island in size 
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and influence. As former Quaker missionary Hiram H. Hilty detailed, the lack of funds from the 
American Friends diminished the ability of Quakers to maintain their Cuban leaders. Hilty 
explains that many Cuban Quakers joined more adequately funded mainline denominations like 
the Methodists, American Baptists and the Presbyterians who, while providing less autonomy, 
could sustain their evangelizing work with foreign capital.489 By elevating Cubans to leadership 
positions, denominations were fiscally punished. 
 Cuban leadership in Protestant institutions often proved contentious for both missionaries 
in Cuba and mission boards in the United States. Following the 31-year tenure of Canadian-born 
Robert Routledge, the highly regarded Baptist School in El Cristo, Oriente, Colegios 
Internacionales appointed its first Cuban director in 1946.490 Not everyone celebrated the 
selection. In a letter written at the time, U.S. missionary Kathleen Rounds, a longtime teacher 
and director of the girls’ school, expressed her displeasure about the “timing” to the American 
Baptist Home Mission Society in New York: “To have national leadership is the ultimate goal of 
all mission work, but whether the time was ripe for it here, and whether the man chosen is 
intellectually and spiritually fitted and of the integrity of character necessary for the position are 
big questions. The enrollment this year has been large, but we have fallen badly in discipline, in 
the quality of teaching and in the basic things of character education.”491 Even someone as 
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integrated into the Cuban community as Rounds urged caution in the transition to Cuban 
leadership.492  
 It is likely that finances, more than prejudice, motivated Rounds’ hesitation in the 
selection of a Cuban to lead the school. Access to Anglo-American capital, as well as the ability 
to appeal to and satisfy foreign donors proved essential to the survival of Protestant missions. 
Those Cuban Protestants who were selected for leadership positions were typically trained in 
Anglo-American institutions in Cuba and often studied at North American seminaries. Before 
becoming the first Cuban principal of the Methodist Candler College, Carlos Pérez Ramos 
attended Scarritt College for Christian Workers in Nashville, Tennessee.  Episcopal Bishops 
Onell Soto, Anselmo Carral and José Agustin González all trained in U.S. seminaries. Eastern 
Baptist Pastor Elmer Lavastida studied at a Baptist seminary in Canada. Presbyterian minister 
Martin Añorga attended the Princeton Theological Seminary. The Presbyterian scholar and 
seminary professor Rafael Cespeda graduated from the McCormick Theological Seminary in 
Chicago.493 The principal of the Friends School in Banes, Miguel A. Tamayo also studied in the 
United States. A graduate of the Friends School, he attended Berea College and the Philadelphia 
College of Pharmacy. Quaker missionary Hiram Hilty recalls, “Dr. Tamayo’s mastery of English 
was always of great value to him in his dealings with Americans, whether the missionaries or the 
United Fruit Company.”494  
 Despite learning English and mastering Anglo-American practices within North 
American seminaries, these Cuban leaders were subject to power and pay differentials. 
                                                 
492 Two years later Pastor T.H. Schupbach returned the school to a North American administrator, before Schupback 
was replaced with Cuban Mario Casanella. “Annual Letter,” May 1, 1949, WABHMS, 71.14. 
493 Ramos, Protestantism and Revolution in Cuba, 153-168. 
494 Hilty, Friends in Cuba, 129-130. 
185 
Methodist intellectual John Merle Davis explains Cuban frustrations over these inequities: “The 
American missionary’s salary and household equipment, modest as these are, considerably 
exceed the Cuban standards. Frequently the American standards have become the norm against 
which the Cuban pastor tends to compare his own salary, living conditions, and cultural 
amenities.” Davis continues, “This often makes the Cuban dissatisfied with the limitations of a 
smaller income and set of goals for his family and for himself which are impracticable, burden 
him with debt, and are apt to give him a sense of injustice and chronic economic struggle.”495 
Mission boards undercompensating of Cuban Protestant workers exacerbated the national 
inequities of rural Cuban communities. Quaker missionary Hiram Hilty confirms this routinized 
disparity: “All those Cubans who have given pastoral leadership in Cuba…received part of their 
support as pastors from the United States. It was always a smaller amount than that given to 
American personnel…. Sometimes this was noted by the Cubans and caused some 
resentment.”496 By devaluing Cuban Protestant workers, U.S. mission boards made it more 
difficult for fully self-funded Cuban Protestant communities to flourish.  
 While in some Cubans were able to achieve leadership positions in church institutions, 
before the revolution, not one completely independent Cuban denomination would develop from 
any mainline Protestant tradition.497 Overtime, Cuban pastors grew frustrated with the situation. 
Many felt that the traditions of U.S. missionaries in Cuba had grown anachronistic and no longer 
offered the best model for Cuban Protestantism. In the late 1930s, or early 1940s, a Cuban 
preacher explained the situation to Pastor John Merle Davis: 
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The founders of our churches brought the social point of view and discipline of the 
American churches of thirty-five years ago. They have built that discipline into the Cuban 
churches and have rigidly held to it and have trained our pastor to it in spite of the more 
liberal belief and practice, which has arisen in the United States churches. Many of us 
have been educated in the United States church schools, and we know what we are 
talking about.498 
 
To express their resentment of continued Cuban subordination to North Americans, in 1940 the 
Cubans of Seventh-Day Adventists conference of Holguín voted to expel the foreigners. In 
response, North American missionaries established a new Seventh-Day Adventists conference.499  
 Bishop Armando Rodríguez contends that Methodists prioritized the goals and values of 
foreign missionaries not only because they were in the positions of power, but because they 
controlled the church’s capital. Rodríguez became head of the autonomous Methodist church in 
Cuba in the 1960s after Anglo-American missionaries left the island. The Bishop claims that 
while the missionaries were extremely capable with respect to managing church projects and that 
they sacrificed material goods and a life of comfort for poor Cubans, they failed to “emphasize 
the preparation and training of native workers to occupy their positions.” 500 Rodríguez concludes 
that before 1959 there were not real opportunities for Cubans to pursue their own goals within 
the Protestant church structures. Not only did Anglo-Americans direct missionary institutions, 
but Rodríguez estimates 60-80 percent of the Methodist District Superintendents in Cuba were 
foreign. When asked if Cuban pastors grew frustrated with the continued dominance of North 
American missionaries and the lack of a sovereign Cuban church until 1968, Bishop Rodríguez 
responded: “In the 1950s and earlier Cuban leaders asked about the possibility of an autonomous 
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church, however on each occasion the conclusion [by North Americans] was the same, ‘the 
Church in Cuba was not prepared for autonomy’.” 501 Equity with North Americans proved 
largely unachievable through the Protestant faith. After liberating the Cubans from the 
hierarchies of Roman Catholicism, U.S. Protestant missionaries implemented a new set of 
structures and constraints; Anglo-Americans and their institutions would supplant the Spanish as 
the primary moral authority, but not without Cuban resentment.   
Conclusions  
A lack of government presence in regions dominated by foreign capital exacerbated the 
demand for social services. In many places, the corporate and political authorities relied upon 
Anglo-American missionaries to soften the blow and fill the void. Rural Cubans, often with few 
other educational or healthcare alternatives, relied upon Protestant missionary institutions for 
services, stability, as well as the potential for social advancement.502 
 Paternalism within Anglo-American Protestant run institutions, however, prevented 
Cuban Protestants from attaining a determinant influence over their own spiritual development. 
Anglo-American missionaries gained influence through their national identities and depended 
deeply on networks between privileged outsiders, as well as ties to Cuban power brokers 
provided by their nationality. While rural missionaries were far more exposed to Cuban suffering 
than most Anglo-Americans, they played a significant role in stitching a social safety net 
designed, in part, to tamp down Cuban critiques of social and economic hierarchies. With the 
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onset of the Cuban revolution, the cleavages between Anglo-American missionaries and their 
corporate benefactors exposed themselves as these two groups of privileged outsiders found each 
other on opposite sides of Cuba’s defining conflict. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PROXIMITY TO SUFFERING: PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES 
IN RURAL CUBA 
Introduction 
 The daily routines of foreign missionaries in Cuba proved a humanizing and humbling 
exercise. They arrived with the aim of mollifying Cuban suffering in this life and the next. Many 
lived and labored in close contact with disenfranchised Cubans. In relative isolation from larger 
communities of Anglo-Americans, rural missionaries often became a part of the Cuban 
communities they served. An evolving emphasis on the social gospel among the ecumenical 
Protestant traditions focused missionaries on service-oriented projects, opening paths to more 
intimate forms of contact with Cubans. Rural missionaries, and specifically women missionaries, 
spread their faith through health and educational initiatives, leading to personal, as well as 
professional engagements with Cubans.503 They witnessed Cuban dependency on, and 
exploitation by, foreign corporations, leading many to re-examine their purpose in Cuba and the 
edifices that sustained the collective authority of Anglo-American residents. Further, by the 
1950s, a growing number of Cuban pastors achieved positions as the peers, and sometimes even 
the superiors of foreign missionaries. This encouraged Anglo-American evangelizers to take 
seriously the frustrations and aspirations of Cuban Protestants. In these material, social and 
spiritual contexts, Cuban pastors, Protestant parishioners and Anglo-American missionaries grew 
closer as they collectively pursued remedies for Cuban suffering.  
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Differentiating Rural Missionaries from Their Mission Boards 
 The persistent devaluation of Cubans and Cuban labor often reflected the biases of 
mission boards in the United States, who remained informed about, but disconnected from, 
Cuban struggles and aspirations. When missionary Eulalia Cook encouraged the empowerment 
of Cuban women by advocating their placement on the Methodist Woman’s Committee, she was 
met with a tepid response from headquarters in New York.504 They allowed Cook to proceed in 
1952 with certain stipulations. From New York, Elizabeth Lee warned, “We must get the right 
women elected to the field committee.” Lee feared a recognition of joint leadership could 
generate hostility, as Anglo-American “missionaries may feel their freedom is curbed in this 
arrangement.”505 While missionaries in Cuba, such as Cook, fought for more Cuban influence 
over Protestant institutions, mission boards who convened in the United States did not live 
among Cubans and seem to have been generally less supportive of Cuban leadership.   
 Disagreements between rural missionaries and mission boards flared over their vastly 
different proximities to Cuban suffering. These tensions can be found in the struggle over the 
Methodist run Churchwell Clinic, for example, which served as a dispensary for poor Cuban 
children in Mayarí, Oriente. By 1949, 5,250 children were registered by the clinic, enrolling 
close to 100 new members each month. It is estimated that 12,000 youths received treatment 
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annually.506 The clinic proved a central resource for Mayarí. A 1949 pamphlet explained, 
“[there] is no other help for these children.”507 In addition to providing medical services, Anglo-
American staff at the clinic taught Cubans basic sanitary and health initiatives, such as boiling 
water before drinking.508 
 In 1949 the Methodist leadership in New York urged the Churchwell Clinic in Mayarí to 
reduce the clinic’s financial expenditures. They urged the clinic to avoid “using funds from the 
States to buy medicines for sick children.”509 The Board of Missions forwarded a cost-cutting 
proposal, which included limiting the number of Cuban children served. Missionary John Stroud 
responded forcefully:  
I do not believe the people [who made this declaration] understand the situation. In the 
other places where we have clinics, there are public hospitals. Here there is none…. One 
reason we have so many [clients is] that there is no other place to go. The county 
government is giving us $56 monthly to help with this work. We cannot get more 
contributions from the public than we are—around $40 monthly. That means we have to 
have help from the outside or shut down, because we are not going to say the first twenty 
five only will receive help. The twenty sixth one might be the sickest or might have come 
all night to get here. We can not send that person home as the child might be much sicker 
the next day. If we can not serve at all, it will be better to close and do something 
else….510  
 
The Methodist clinic remained functioning into the revolutionary period. The constant and 
intimate contact between Cuban poverty and rural missionaries recalibrated their vision to 
privilege human needs over financial cost. 
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Implications of Cuba’s Rural/Urban Divide 
 Unlike these rural missionaries from the United States who lived with, among and bore 
witness to the struggles of the rural poor, Havana’s Anglo-American residents did not generally 
interact with destitute Cubans. While working-class and less educated Cubans populated the 
worlds of the Anglo-American colony in the capital as servants, service workers and wage-
laborers, the struggles of the campesino largely remained a mystery to privileged outsiders in 
Havana. The demographics of Havana enabled Anglo-American residents to seclude themselves 
among a whiter, wealthier, and better educated class of Cubans than those Cubans encountered 
by rural missionaries. Though missionaries stationed in Havana interacted with a range of 
Cubans, depending on the denomination, urban missionaries often disappeared into the capital’s 
larger Anglo-American colony after their daily duties for the church had ended. The standpoint 
of these missionaries were deeply affected by everyday contact with lives surviving in poverty. 
 Missionaries in rural Cuba, especially in Oriente, often came from more racially 
progressive Protestant denominations including the American Baptists, the Quakers, and 
eventually the United Methodists. While their ethnocentric attitudes manifested in subtler, if still 
paternalistic ways, they did not advocate or undertake exclusionary policies or behaviors pursued 
by some of their counterparts in Havana.511 Their placements among Cuban sugar and mining 
laborers put rural missionaries in close proximity to Cuban suffering, dramatically altering their 
sense of purpose on the island. 
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 The significant differences between life in urban and rural Cuba provide important 
context for the development of distinct Anglo-American subjectivities during the tumultuous 
decade between the 1952 coup and the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Members of the Anglo-
American colony in Havana enjoyed significant social segregation and superior standards of 
living. In urban areas, and particularly in the capital, widespread access to material goods, health 
care and education seemed to present Cubans with decent prospects for upward mobility. Despite 
a national illiteracy rate of 23.6 percent, in Havana only 7.5 percent of the population could not 
read or write.512 Though it held just 21 percent of the island’s population, six in ten doctors and 
dentists resided in Havana along with four-fifths of hospital beds.513  John Parker, Anglo-
American resident who lived in the capital wrote: “Cuba, before Castro, had one of the world’s 
best health care, cradle to the grave, systems.”514 By virtue of geography and relative advantages, 
Anglo-Americans living in Havana for the most part remained unaware of the devastating 
ramifications of a mono-crop economy controlled by foreign capital. For most, their 
understanding of the conditions for workers in the sugar economy were informed largely by 
superficial outings to nearby Hershey for a round of golf, or picnics in the company garden. Most 
within the Anglo-American colony of Havana were incapable of fully grasping the harsh realities 
faced by rural Cuban and Caribbean labor.515 
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 By contrast, rural missionaries in Cuba found themselves immersed in, and transformed 
by, encounters with socio-economic desperation. By 1945, 52 percent of Cuban agricultural 
workers were employed fewer than four months per year, a consequence of the seasonal nature 
of sugar production. With the harvest season shortening throughout the republican era, in the 
1950s rural Cubans faced perpetual poverty. Three-quarters of the children living in rural regions 
did not attend school and 95 percent of them suffered from parasites.516 Most rural households 
were without running water and over 90 percent of rural Cubans had no access to baths or 
showers.517 A 1956-57 study conducted at the University of Havana found that 34 percent of the 
nation worked in rural agriculture, but earned only 10 percent of the national income. Just over 
69 percent of their income was spent on food. Despite a national illiteracy rate of 23.6 percent, 
43 percent of rural workers could not read or write.518 Unlike their fellow evangelizers in 
Havana, the purpose of many missionaries in rural Cuba was to combat the economic, social and 
educational obstacles that faced campesinos.  
 Rural missionaries often found themselves shocked by the desperation endured in the 
Cuban countryside. In 1949 the Methodist journal World Outlook reported on conditions in rural 
Cuba: “One of the most amazing things about Cuba is the school system. All along the main 
highway that bisects the island, one sees modern buildings labeled ‘escuela rural’ (rural school). 
These buildings make a good impression on visitors who cannot fail to see them as they drive by. 
Many say the schools are purposely built near the highways to be seen, rather than used.” While 
perhaps trafficking in development narratives, the author stated a reality described by many rural 
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missionaries: “[The] losers are the children of the poor. One sees them everywhere. Half-starved 
and listless they go about their games in slow motion, as though every move were an effort…. 
Most of them are far too thin, except for their huge protruding stomachs, the result of 
malnutrition and parasites.”519 Another article from the same Methodist publication written a few 
years earlier explained, “The workers who have enabled Cuba to become the greatest producer of 
sugar for export are among the most impoverished people in the world. At the best, they can 
labor only six months in the fields. The remainder of the year must be spent picking up odd jobs 
or in idleness.”520 Rural Methodist missionary Edgar Nesman recalled that education and 
medical facilities, widely available in urban centers and at foreign-owned sugar mills, “were 
almost non-existent in the small towns, rural countryside, and mountainous areas.”521 When the 
Mexican-American rural Methodist missionary Sara Fernández first arrived in Omaja, Cuba, she 
encountered an impoverished community without drinking water, schools, clinics, or jobs.522 
Richard Milk, director of the Methodist Agriculture and Industrial School in Playa Manteca, 
Oriente, remembers on his first visit to what would become the school grounds, “I thought to 
myself, this must be a mistake…. The lack of clothing on the little children…the crude homes, 
the primitive agriculture, and the entirely different aspect of the vegetation—all these made the 
reaction come upon me…. I felt profoundly grateful that God had directed me to such a great 
need.”523  
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 These missionaries often encountered communities that were very diverse, but highly 
stratified by class, race and nationality. Still, for most missionaries, many of whom came from 
the U.S. South, the racial and national hierarchies proved less rigid than what they experienced 
back home. The South Carolinian Eulalia Cook, head of the Woman’s Division’s Methodist 
mission in Báguanos, chronicled her revealing journey to the sugar town:  
To reach Báguanos one leaves the main railroad and takes a line car, which takes one 
through vast green seas of sugar cane, occasionally stepping near a squalid group of cane-
cutters’ cabins. Turning one’s attention to the small but motley crew of fellow 
passengers, he may find that they include English speaking Jamaican Negroes, French 
speaking Haitians, Chinese, Spaniards and Cubans. After the dreary huts along the way, 
one comes unexpectedly upon the pretty little village of Báguanos. Its streets are marked 
off with coconut palms…. Here theoretically, one’s rank in society is determined by the 
color of house in which he lives. The mill officials live in the white and green houses on 
the hill, next come the brown houses of the skilled workers, then the gray houses and 
unpainted shacks of the unskilled laborers. In reality, however, the lines are not so strictly 
drawn….524 
 
 As Anglo-American missionaries integrated into these company towns, the persistent 
anguish of their neighbors and parishioners, due to doubled neglect of the Cuban state and 
foreign executives, grew increasingly personal. Speaking of the suffering she witnessed around 
her, in 1945 Cook commented, “We are in the midst of a serious drought here. The zafra 
[harvest] is going to be very short because of it – and that means real suffering.”525 She lamented 
the fate of Bobby Contes, the “twelve-year-old Methodist, oldest of eight children…[who] has to 
be taken out of school to help his father in the struggle to find food.”526 Rural missionaries like 
Cook recognized both the cruelty and fragility of the structures that governed Cuba before 1959.  
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Developing the Rural Methodist Church in Cuba 
 
Figure 17. Methodist Missions in 1950s Cuba 527 
 
 Rural missionaries in Cuba were inspired by the Social Gospel forwarded by Protestant 
intellectuals such as Dr. John Merle Davis.528 With input from renowned Cuban scholar 
Fernando Ortiz, Davis’ influential 1942 work The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy urged the 
pursuit of a service-oriented and independent Cuban Protestant institutions.529 As would be the 
case for missionaries who lived among rural Cuban poverty, Davis accused the foreign-
dominated sugar industry of undermining the potential for Cuban leadership and autonomy: “The 
Church of Christ in Cuba is a Church of the lower classes and thus it is that one of the chief 
obstacles to the progress and usefulness of the Church is the poverty arising from a sugar 
economy.” He advocated for “[the] need of greater popular use of land, the diversification of 
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crops, the use of spare time, training in farming and industries, the rehabilitation of the individual 
and the home.”530 Davis helped inspire the expansion of the rural work advanced by 
Methodists.531 After reading the work the year it was published, Methodist missionary Maurice 
Daily reflected critically upon earlier Methodist evangelizing efforts, “We have tried to save 
individuals without interpreting adequately…what that salvation means in terms of their own 
community life…. They are in the community and incidentally in the Church; they should be in 
the church so as to live purposefully in the community.”532  
 While the Protestant schools of western Cuba’s urban centers sought to influence wealthy 
Cubans, rural missionaries hoped to attract converts by sponsoring service-oriented projects that 
would provide a basic social safety net for Cuban communities, and over time transform Cuban 
society.533 From the first U.S. occupation until the early 1960s, rural Protestants centered their 
goals on helping Cubans endure the difficult conditions forged by conflict and poverty.534 The 
Presbyterians operated medical clinics, waged literacy campaigns and maintained transportation, 
meteorological, educational and social services on the island.535 The Quakers established a set of 
schools and churches surrounding Oriente’s Nipe Bay.536 Beyond their work for the relatively 
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well-off students at Colegio Internacionales,537 American Baptists provided basic health, food 
and elderly services to impoverished Cubans in eastern Cuba.538 Many denominations also 
organized short service trips for faith groups from the United States to visit Cuba for a few 
weeks and volunteer before returning home.539 The rural work conducted by denominations 
including the American Baptists, the Jehovah Witnesses, the Quakers, the Presbyterians and the 
West Indies Mission, likely pressured the Methodists to accelerate plans for the development of 
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rural service projects, which would often be maintained by women missionaries.540 By the 1950s, 
Methodists claimed the most active missionary community in Oriente.   
 While American Baptists and Quakers arrived in rural eastern Cuba at the turn of the 
century, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South limited their rural service activities until they 
united with the northern Methodist Episcopal Church in 1939. At the turn of the century, 
Southern Methodists established influential religious and educational institutions in western 
Cuba. A dedication to the most impoverished elements of Cuban society, however, would not 
emerge until later. Like the Southern and American Baptists, the Methodists split over the issue 
of slavery in the mid-1840s.541 Before reunification, the two Methodist traditions developed 
along divergent paths. Southern Methodists dedicated themselves to spreading the gospel 
through evangelism, and northern Methodists prioritized service projects in the realms of health, 
education and agriculture. Following the war of 1898, they divided Spain’s former colonies 
between themselves. Cuba was allocated to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South while the 
northern Methodist Episcopal Church acquired Puerto Rico. 
 The Methodist mission to Cuba seems to have been reinvigorated with the unification of 
the southern and northern traditions in 1939. World War II and the post-war mentality that 
framed North Americans as “protectors of the free world” further catalyzed the new Methodist 
commitment to rural development projects. Of the estimated 225 foreign missionaries in the 
country, the 38 Methodists seem to have represented the largest foreign presence for a Protestant 
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denomination on the island in the late 1950s and early 1960s.542 The Methodists took new forms 
in Cuba after unification, introducing themselves to a new, poorer and darker audience in 
Oriente. Lawrence Rankin, the son of Methodist missionaries Victor and Kathleen Rankin based 
in Camagüey, explains unification led to “a more global theology toward missions.”543 His father 
Victor Rankin chronicles the theological evolution of the Methodist commitment to structural 
transformation; Methodists, according to Rankin, came to Cuba during the 1940s and 1950s “to 
train Cubans, while eliminating dependency, promoting financial independence, and self-
sufficiency.”544 This new emphasis on rural service reinvigorated the denomination. In a period 
when most denominations decreased their foreign presence on the island, the renovation of the 
tradition led the Methodists to maintain the highest number of North American missionaries of 
any Protestant group through the 1950s.545  
Cross-Cultural Collaboration  
 Throughout the Methodist projects in eastern Cuba, engagement with impoverished 
Cubans led missionaries to be increasingly responsive to local needs. Discussions between rural 
missionaries and Cubans proved more participatory and communal than almost any transnational 
forms of contact in Cuba. Edgar Nesman, who trained as an agricultural engineer and served as a 
teacher and the temporary director of the Agricultural and Industrial School on United Fruit and 
                                                 
542 “History of the Methodist Church in Cuba,” provided by Edgar Nesman; Ramos, Protestantism and Revolution in 
Cuba, 27, 34, 71; Yaremko, U.S. Protestant Missions in Cuba, 3. 
543 Lawrence A. Rankin, “Early Methodism in Cuba–Towards a National Church, 1883-1958,” provided by 
Lawrence Rankin. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Most denominations were pursuing greater dependence on Cuban workers by the 1940s and 1950s. “History of 
the Methodist Church in Cuba,” provided by Edgar Nesman; Ramos, Protestantism and Revolution in Cuba, 71; 
Yaremko, U.S. Protestant Missions in Cuba, 3. 
202 
Sugar Company land in the 1950s, explained that missionaries responded to the observed 
problems in rural Cuban society, with respect for, and deference to traditional Cuban solutions.  
 Unlike their compatriots in Havana or the barrios americanos of foreign corporations, 
these rural missionaries worked with Cubans to provide sustainable solutions to local problems. 
Nesman understood well the power of local knowledge, and he appreciated the symbiotic 
relationship between agriculturally-oriented missionaries and Cuban farmers due to his efforts to 
cultivate relationships and share information with local growers. He wrote, “I learned a lot from 
these visits in the community. For one thing, it helped to make the classroom teaching at the 
school more relevant, and related to the real situations faced by the farmers….” Through these 
meetings Nesman learned to flexibly integrate his training with local knowledge developed 
through years of experience by Cuban farmers. “The most modern farm practices that came from 
the agricultural centers of the scientific world were not the most practical starting point for the 
needed changes in Cuba. It seemed best to search for the practices in the local community that 
were just a bit better than those presently used by most of the farmers, and start there with the 
hope that they would be ready for more change in the future as they saw improved results. In 
leading the discussions, I tried to find what seemed to work best among the farmers who were 
already doing something about the problem…and add some aspect of science to things they 
already knew from practice.” Nesman learned that the practicality of his lessons at Michigan 
State University were limited not just by the Cuban soil and climate, but also by Cuban financial 
realities. Nesman explains, “Many of the scientific solutions that had been used in modern 
agriculture had little application for them because of the cost.”546 Nesman attempted to find 
solutions with – not for – local agricultural farmers. 
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 Nesman shaped his goals at the Agricultural and Industrial School around the vulnerable 
position and limited options faced by his students due to the dominance of the sugar economy of 
eastern Cuba. He explained, “Most of [the students at la granja] came from settings where they 
did not have land of their own to use. Many came from sugar plantation areas, with limited 
occupational opportunities beyond the sugar company. Others came from towns and villages, and 
even though they were in a rural setting, they would not have a farm to return to where their 
agricultural skills could be practiced.” Nesman realized, “We were training rural leaders, but not 
necessarily future farmers or farm wives.” Aided by the expertise of Juliet Chick Milk in John 
Dewey’s methods of progressive education, la granja positioned itself to train Cubans 
committed to affecting change in their communities and their nation.547 This mission became 
increasingly important as Nesman and others tried to convince their students during the 
revolutionary struggle of the late 1950s to remain at the school rather than joining the rebel 
forces in the nearby mountains. Nesman argued to his pupils that their training would enable 
them to become leaders in the “new” Cuba to come.548  
 Clarifying the educational and cultural role of the Agricultural and Industrial School in 
eastern Cuba, Eulalia Cook argued, “[It] is the one place to which we can send our country boys 
and girls without a big outlay for scholarships, and hope to have them come back to live and 
work among us…. We have seen our boys and girls come back for vacation time anxious to 
share what they have learned, and making a real contribution…. We look to the school for 
training our adult leaders…”549 Cook continued, “The very fact that we have a school dedicated 
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to helping the campesino meet his problems of daily life makes friends for us and our work. The 
average Cuban, however indifferent he may be to religion, recognizes the need of such a school 
and appreciates what it is doing to lift the level of life of the campesino.” Cook explained that the 
people of the region “look to the school to help us introduce better seeds, wiser farming methods, 
better stock, milk goats, etc…[it is] training its student in extension work and helping the 
neighboring communities.” Seeing the potential for transforming rural Cuban society and 
disrupting the cyclical nature of rural suffering and dependency on foreign capital, Cook allowed 
herself to imagine what it would take for “the services of the school to be made more widely 
available to the country people throughout the island….”550   
 Through their daily contact with Cubans, and based on their goals in Cuba, many 
missionaries developed a participatory ethic and a sense of empathy for the struggles and 
wisdom of the Cuban population. In the 1950s, Nesman began to work with a group of boys who 
had never attended the Agricultural School and who the local company foreman called “a 
shiftless bunch of no-count delinquents.” 551 The school’s director Richard Milk recalls, 
“Nesman became deeply interested in this group of older youth. He began a youth club with 
them.” He worked with their parents to begin “garden projects…[a] neighborhood baseball 
team…a night class for [literacy]....” 552  Through these programs, Nesman helped a group of 
teenagers who had been forsaken by employees of a U.S.-owned company, to re-integrate 
themselves into an economy dominated by foreign capital. Milk recalled that one of the young 
boys, Sammy Pérez, became a tractor driver, and the United Fruit foreman even “began to speak 
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well of him.”553 While these efforts did little, of course, to alter the dependency on foreign 
corporations faced by rural Cubans, it enabled these young men to provide for their families and, 
ironically, to serve as labor for “the company”.  
Rural Women Missionaries 
In the early 1940s, after the publication of The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy, John 
Merle Davis was in close contact with the Executive Secretary of the Woman’s Division of the 
Methodist Missions Board based in New York City. Elizabeth M. Lee reported to Eulalia Cook, 
head of the Báguanos mission, that Davis “is very much pleased that several of you are following 
some of the lines he laid down.”554 The female-run Methodist circuit of Báguanos began in 1941. 
Three North American Methodist women oversaw sixteen churches, as well as multiple day and 
Sunday schools.555 These single female missionaries inoculated Cubans against diseases, tested 
them for parasites, helped with home improvement and organized literacy campaigns. Operating 
in a company-run mill town, women missionaries often offered the only social services available 
to community members. In 1943, Methodist missionary Eulalia Cook articulated one of the 
reasons for the success of the Methodist missionary work at the sugar mill of Báguanos, Oriente: 
“The missionaries have not tried to carry through any set program, but rather to meet the needs 
of the community as they have arisen…. There has been a conscious effort from the beginning to 
have the people help plan all activities and to take responsibility.” Distinct from Protestants in 
Havana who sought to cultivate the next generation of Cuban leaders, missionaries in Báguanos, 
including Cook, bore witness to the everyday hardship of the sugar economy. Her goals for the 
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mission were shaped by her desire to help these rural workers endure the conditions of informal 
empire. Cook wrote “We have tried to let the people know that the church is interested in all of 
their problems.”556  
 
Figure 18. Eulalia Cook 557 
 In the first half of the twentieth century women missionaries proved more likely to focus 
on social, educational and health endeavors, while male missionaries tended to become pastors. 
Thus, Cubans and female missionaries enjoyed personal engagements during service-oriented 
activities, while a more hierarchical lecturing dynamic developed between many male pastors 
and their Cuban parishioners. Historically, Protestant denominations placed various limitations 
on the ability of women to preach from the pulpit. However, in many traditions women could 
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organize cultural institutions with varying degrees of independence from male oversight.558 With 
few interruptions, from the time of their development in the nineteenth century, the Woman’s 
Divisions of the Methodist tradition in particular maintained near complete sovereignty over 
their finances, property and buildings.  More than other denominations, Methodist women 
missionaries enjoyed an autonomy that enabled them to form stable and independent rural 
schools, clinics and churches. 559 The isolation of rural women missionaries positioned them for 
power and influence secured by few North American women of the time. Without a male 
missionary counterpart in Báguanos, Cook preached to her congregation regularly. In an era 
when women were not being ordained by the Methodist Church, an exception was made for 
Eulalia Cook because she was a rural missionary. She was the first woman ordained by the South 
Carolina conference.560 
In Cuba’s most isolated posts, rural female missionaries lived primarily among Cubans, 
with few Anglo-Americans in their immediate surroundings. As Larry Rankin remembers, male 
missionaries “tended to hang out in the cities [while] the women were out among the very 
poor...”561 Due to their separation from other Anglo-Americans, their proximity to Cuban 
poverty, and their focus on ameliorating suffering, rural female missionaries shaped their 
ministry to serve the Cuban community that surrounded them, which they often embraced as 
their own.562 Rankin argued that in these roles,  
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Single women missionaries had a profound impact on the development of Cuban leaders. 
They founded community centers, schools, clinics, and chapels. They worked mostly in 
rural areas. They were multi-taskers, able to administer in a variety of ministries, serving 
as nurses, chaplains, teachers, and mechanics. Their influence among young men and 
women was profound, who would go on to be pastors and professionals.563  
 
Socio-Economic Inequities Provoke Revolutionary Consciousness 
 Transformed by their proximity to rural suffering and their ethical foundations, the 
former missionaries of Oriente narrated an empathic understanding of the revolution’s socio-
economic and anti-U.S. origins. Carroll English served as a teacher at the Agricultural and 
Industrial School in Playa Manteca, a few miles from the United Fruit and Sugar Company mill 
at Preston. In the mornings, before undertaking her duties at la granja, English ventured to a 
nearby batey and instructed the children of Cuban cane-cutters. English explains the one-room 
school “was just a little project that the agricultural school took on as part of their mission work.” 
Without the efforts of these Methodist missionaries, it’s unlikely these children would have been 
formally educated at all. The school ended at noon and English was the only instructor after she 
replaced another educator from la granja who had been reassigned. In her limited time with 
these children, English sought to expand upon the world they knew by taking them to the UFSC 
mill at Preston, as, “most, if not all, of the students had never been anywhere other than around 
the batey.”564 This small cane-cutting village and the lives endured by these cane-cutting families 
contrasted wildly with the luxury enjoyed by Anglo-Americans in Preston.  
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 The stark inequity in Cuba seems to have complicated English’s understanding of the 
U.S. presence on the island. English explained in a recent email exchange: “Americans were 
often tied in to the sugar industry…. President Batista protected those interests to keep himself in 
power and to keep the companies happy to be there.”565 English argues that the prioritization of 
North American interests by Cuban politicians radicalized those Cubans marginalized by this 
arrangement. Her time in Cuba exposed how socio-economic inequality can lead to political 
unrest. She explains, “As long as capitalism can rape the forests and soils and waters of the 
world, the indigenous peoples will forever be obliged to toil to serve their money-making 
interests without sufficient compensation to the people of the land. Their experience is of being 
oppressed with little or no opportunity to share in the wealth that capitalism creates. This feeling 
of being suppressed makes for revolution.”566 Operating on land donated by the United Fruit and 
Sugar Company, English and other rural missionaries in 1950s Cuba became acutely aware of 
the economic, social and political injustices resulting from foreign-influence, aggravated by the 
priorities of the Batista government in times of revolution.567  
 Rural missionaries bore witness to the myriad ways in which the conflict of the late-
1950s exacerbated Cuban suffering. Betty Campbell Whitehurst, a Methodist missionary 
stationed in Báguanos explained, “The rebels were burning cane fields in an attempt to cripple 
Cuba’s economy. The Báguanos sugar mill began work, but was producing hardly any sugar, 
because the cane-cutters were afraid to go into the fields. The army then said it would kill anyone 
who refused to work, so the workers were forced to go into hiding or join the rebels. Meanwhile, 
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their families were starving.”568 Unsurprisingly, living conditions deteriorated in Oriente during 
the revolutionary period. Agricultural production dwindled at the end of the 1950s, further 
crippling the economic stability of many communities. In this context, rural missionaries and 
Cuban Protestants shared fears and frustrations with the violence that accompanied their shared 
reality; and yet together they dreamed of the possibilities offered by a “new” Cuba.569  
Contesting the (Im)Morality of the Existing Order 
 
Figure 19. Sherman’s Methodist Church in Guantánamo570 
 
Figure 20. Plaque to Sherman at Guantánmo’s Iglesia San Pablo 571 
                                                 
568 Whitehurst. 
569 Ramos, Protestantism and Revolution in Cuba, 134. 
570 Provided by Edgar Nesman. 
571 Taken by author. 
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 Just as Edgar Nesman worked to create a better life for Cubans through the training of 
Cuban agriculturalists, in the city of Guantánamo Ira E. Sherman sought to end the sex industry 
constructed around the desires of U.S. sailors and marines. Arriving in Cuba with his family in 
1950, Sherman became pastor of Guantánamo’s Iglesia Metodista “San Pablo” in 1958. Sherman 
explained that both Cuban and U.S. observers “understood then and think now that the 
prostitution in Cuba, no doubt including that in Guantánamo and Caimanera, was controlled by 
American Gangsters.” 572 The conditions around the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station in the 1950s 
illuminate well how Anglo-Americans based in Cuba designed and sustained social, ethnic, 
economic and national hierarchies through the development of an exploitative service economy, 
and then judged harshly the immorality of the Cubans.573  
 Unable to challenge what he described as the malevolent elements of U.S. influence by 
petitioning his own government, in 1954 Guillermo Hernández turned to his transnational 
Protestant network. Hernández wrote the Secretary for Latin America in the New York 
headquarters of the American Baptists, chronicling how the U.S. personnel from Guantánamo 
Bay Naval Station brought sorrow to the surrounding communities through demands for sex and 
entertainment. Hernández detailed how U.S. sailors and marines ushered, 
the local population towards the abyss, promoting gambling, pillaging and evil…. Some 
of the officials and members of the Army and the Navy dishonor the uniform they 
wear…. The Cuban employees receive little recompense, many parents fail to achieve 
their most essential needs. The American employees receive high wages and comfortable 
facilities that are denied to the natives…. As a Christian man, I cannot remain indifferent 
to these things, so I submit to you. The Cuban authorities do not seem to pay much 
attention to these things…that the policy must change…the American people is very bad 
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in the eyes of Latin America. It's time to contribute to the understanding; goodwill among 
each other, to foster a climate in keeping the evanglio of Christ.574  
 
Cuban Protestants including Hernández helped shape how foreign missionaries understood the 
overwhelming U.S. influence in the region of Guantánamo.  
 The comportment of U.S. naval personnel horrified the missionaries of Oriente. Sherman 
recounted: “In Caimanera and Guantánamo, nothing was ‘off limits’ and the Shore Patrol merely 
walked in and out of the houses [of prostitution], presumably to see to it that the sailors were not 
robbed or assaulted.”575 Sherman recalls an incident at a rail station when he felt it necessary to 
hide his young female Cuban Methodist parishioners from a collection of intoxicated U.S. naval 
personnel.576 Anglo-American religious leaders and their Cuban parishioners witnessed not only 
what they perceived as the immorality of these young U.S. servicemen, but also the lack of 
accountability. Thus, both missionaries and their Cuban parishioners in the areas surrounding 
Guantánamo generally embraced the revolution’s demand to dismantle these “amoral” structures. 
Conclusions  
 The terms of transcultural contact, pursued by rural missionaries in close proximity to 
suffering, proved radically different from those of Anglo-American ranchers and farmers, as well 
as mining and sugar-mill executives living in the Cuban countryside and often financially 
contributing to these missions. For foreign missionaries, the goals of growth and development 
proved to be enticements, not obstacles, for developing empathic relationships with Cubans.577 
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Where a sugar executive saw a disposable laborer to serve capital accumulation, a missionary 
saw a potential student, parishioner, or fellow Protestant worker helping to transform Cuban 
society by reducing rural dependency.  
 Despite the tangled relationship between Protestant missions and foreign capital, in times 
made desperate by authoritarianism and violence, rural missionaries became invested in projects 
that worked to reorder Cuban hierarchies, even as this collaboration would eventually undermine 
their own standing in Cuban society. With Cubans, they hoped to challenge the cyclical nature of 
rural poverty and framed their goals around shared aspirations for a “new” Cuba. In Oriente, 
seemingly forgotten by the Cuban government, exploited by foreign capital and often visited less 
than once a year by a Catholic Priest, life in dependent “company towns,” hundreds of miles 
from Havana—the same conditions that made the region fertile grounds for Anglo-American 
Protestants seeking to build a following—contributed to the context for revolution.  
 While maintaining their status as privileged outsiders, the missionaries of eastern Cuba, 
and especially the women missionaries, deeply felt the trauma of the 1950s and became 
convinced of the need for radical, structural reforms. These missionaries largely sought a more 
democratic, equitable and just society, not beholden to the Catholic Church. They desired a 
nation where farmers could achieve self-respect through land ownership; where all children 
would be educated and no one would be exploited. While the radical changes implemented after 
1959 would go too far for most rural missionaries, they understood the socio-economic context 
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that birthed these demands. Their ambition to create a more egalitarian Cuba, in large part due to 
the obstacles presented by the informal empire that they helped sustain, and on which they 
themselves depended, led to the eventual displacement of rural missionaries. Following the 
model laid out by foreign Protestants during the first U.S. occupation, when the revolution 
reordered Cuban hierarchies, they did so without Anglo-American input. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RURAL MISSIONARIES IN TIMES OF REVOLUTION 
Introduction 
 Rural Anglo-American missionaries often mobilized their status as privileged outsiders to 
shield revolutionaries from Batista’s forces, and to lend credibility to the early social, economic 
and political goals of the revolution. They largely rejected the narrative forwarded by Batista, 
foreign corporations, and counter-revolutionary forces that framed the revolution as illegitimate 
and communistic. Missionaries had worked with, and often educated the revolutionary leaders. 
Missionaries of eastern Cuba, and especially the region’s women missionaries, bore witness to 
Cuban desperation and suffering in the 1950s and generally identified the goals of the revolution 
as noble. They often worked to protect vulnerable Cuban communities before the revolution and 
sought to influence Anglo-American power brokers in defense of the revolution after 1959. 
While poor rural Cubans could be ignored by Anglo-American residents living in western 
Cuba’s more peaceful and prosperous urban settings, foreign-born rural missionaries who 
experienced the violence enacted by Batista’s forces could not be easily silenced.  
 Over time, the foreign corporations that materially supported rural missions attempted to 
destabilize the revolutionary government through economic sabotage and accusations of 
communism. However, after witnessing the socio-economic inequalities, the violence of conflict 
and the displays of Anglo-American vice, rural missionaries generally followed the lead of 
Cuban Protestants in championing the early policies of new authorities. This led to an embrace of 
the revolution in its first few years, before rejecting the Cuban government once it targeted 
Protestant communities. Yet, perhaps more than any other group of privileged outsiders, rural 
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Anglo-American missionaries understood and advocated for the political, as well as the early 
socio-economic goals of the revolution. 
Revolutionary Educations 
 
Figure 21. Remains of Colegios Internationacionales, 2016 578 
 In 1907, the American Baptists serving in Oriente founded Colegios Internacionales in 
the hills surrounding Santiago de Cuba.579 Like many missions established by rural Protestant 
missionaries Anglo-American corporate interests helped determine the location of Colegios. 
American Baptists founded the school in the company town of El Cristo, financially dependent 
on the Quinto mine of the U.S.-owned Cuban Mining Company.580 As elsewhere, in El Cristo,  
foreign-owned institutions relied upon rural Protestant missionaries to provide support to their 
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workers.581 Working and living in Cuba’s eastern-most province Oriente, Colegios teacher 
Kathleen Rounds enjoyed a warm relationship with members of the local community.582 In the 
mid-1950s she lamented the economic suffering of El Cristo, where 2,000 workers in a 
community of under 10,000 people lost their jobs due to the closure of the U.S.-owned 
magnesium mine.583 Though she persisted in her work, the closure of the mine devastated the 
community Rounds called home.  
 Oral histories, letters and diaries reveal how and why rural Protestant missionaries, 
including those in El Cristo, developed transformative relationships with Cubans active in the 
revolutionary struggle against Fulgencio Batista. The director of Colegios Internacionales, 
Agustín González became a key figure in the Santiago resistance and a mentor to revolutionary 
leader Frank País. Rounds also worked for Mario Casanella who presided over País’ funeral in 
1957.584 Responding to the assassination of a former Colegios student by Batista’s armed forces 
in the late 1950s, Rounds’ students blocked the highway in front of the school.585 Before 1959, 
when Rounds read Castro’s name in the paper or heard it from the supportive Cuban citizens of 
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Oriente, she remembered her former pupil Agustina Castro, the sister of the rebel leaders Fidel 
and Raúl, who Rounds described as “faithful to her evangelical faith” having been baptized at the 
school.586 The labor, dreams, aspirations and struggles of Cubans gave meaning to the lives of 
rural evangelizers like Rounds, especially in times of conflict.587 
 
Figure 22. Kathleen A. Rounds
588 
 For Rounds and other rural missionaries, relationships with anti-Batista activists and their 
family members humanized the revolutionaries, while their proximity to communities surviving 
in conditions of oppression and destitution legitimized not only the democratic goals of the 
revolution, but also the more radical, and, to Anglo-Americans, more threatening socio-
economic aims of the struggle. The revolution advocated economic egalitarianism, as well as 
educational, health and “moral” initiatives that missionaries recognized as political extensions of 
Protestant service projects throughout the island. Unlike more secular elements of the Anglo-
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American colony residing in Havana and elsewhere, between 1959 and 1960 rural missionaries 
almost uniformly cheered the overthrow of Batista and the curbing of foreign influence.  
 In spring, 1959 Rounds celebrated how revolutionary policies “include[s] a reduction of 
the cost of living, work to combat unemployment, increase of small salaries and no racial 
discrimination. In April, the emphasis is ‘la Reforma Agraria’….” She noted the excitement of 
Cubans, explaining, “people are contributing one or two days of their month’s salary to buy 
tractors and further this campaign.... Our pastors and leaders, [are] whole-heartedly behind 
Castro and the revolutionary movement….”589 Energized by their goals, those of their Cuban 
contacts and fellow Protestants, rural missionaries including Rounds supported the redistribution 
of wealth and power on the island after 1959. This was not a typical position for other Anglo-
American residents in Cuba, and yet was deeply felt and shared by most of these rural 
missionaries. 
 It is perhaps no surprise that many of the Cuban revolutionary leaders came out of 
Protestant traditions, giving comfort and a sense of familiarity to rural missionaries and the 
larger Anglo-American colony. Commander of the Army in the province of Camagüey Huber 
Matos, Minister of Recuperation of Misappropriated Goods Faustino Pérez, Minister of Social 
Welfare Daniel Álverez, Minister of Education Armando Hart, Minister of Interior José A. 
Naranjo, and Undersecretary of Labor Carlos Varona, all attended Protestant schools or were 
themselves practicing Protestants.590 With the revolution mirroring their goals for Cuban society 
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and being led by Protestants who shared their values, Anglo-American missionaries embraced 
the “new” Cuba that they believed to be emerging in 1959 and 1960. 
The War Zone: Bearing Witness to Violence 
…[Surely] you realize there are people who expect to be tortured and others who would 
be outraged by the idea. One never tortures except by a kind of mutual agreement…. The 
poor in my own country, in any Latin American country. The poor of central Europe and 
the Orient. Of course in your welfare states you have no poor, so you are untorturable. In 
Cuba the police can deal as harshly as they like with émigrés from Latin America and the 
Baltic States, but not with visitors from your country or Scandinavia. It is an instinctive 
matter on both sides…One reason why the West hates the great Communist states is that 
they don't recognise class-distinctions. Sometimes they torture the wrong people….  
Captain Segura to Mr. Wormhold, Our Man in Havana591 
 
 In the late 1950s Batista’s forces in Oriente regularly tortured, murdered, and terrorized 
Cuban pastors, students and parishioners, for both alleged and actual aid to the revolution. 
Unlike the children of wealthy Cuban professionals attending foreign-run private schools in 
Havana, who were ushered out of the country to avoid punishment for their activism, most 
Cubans who participated in rural Protestant institutions belonged to what Graham Greene’s anti-
hero Captain Segura referred to as the “torturable class” of Cubans.592 Stationed in Báguanos 
Oriente, Betty Campbell Whitehurst memorialized in her diary how expendable her parishioners 
seemed to Cuban authorities, “Soldiers would go to a house after midnight to arrest someone, 
take him out and shoot him. The people they killed were ‘the enemies of Batista’ – often boys of 
16 to 18, usually high school students.” 593 She explains a state of fear gripped the region as, 
“College and high school students were considered revolutionaries, and it was a crime 
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punishable by death to be seen in a high school uniform. The Constitution had been suspended 
and there was no freedom of speech, press, or assembly…”594  
 The brutality of the Batista government shaped the sympathies rural missionaries held for 
the revolution. On December 1, 1957, the violence reached Báguanos in a way that devastated 
Whitehurst. In her diary she wrote, “[We] found the bodies of four missing boys from Báguanos, 
mutilated but recognizable. After torturing them for a day and half the night, the soldiers shot 
them…. Big chunks of flesh had been cut off in various places. Knives had been shoved into the 
front of their arms and pulled out the back. Their faces are bruised and swollen. Another thing 
they’d done before killing the boys was put out their eyes.”595 To Whitehurst and the other 
women missionaries of Báguanos, these were not just anonymous victims of Batista’s war 
against civilians; these were youths whose families she knew well.  
 Because the Methodist mission in Báguanos directed most of the cultural institutions in a 
town of close to 1,000 people, the families of the victims asked Whitehurst and her fellow 
missionaries to deliver the eulogies for three out of the four young men. In her role as a spiritual 
and educational community leader, Whitehurst comforted the families of the victims. She 
expressed the pain of this experience in her diary that night: “I went…to try to console Mongo’s 
mother and one sister. The other sister was in another house, completely crazed. In every family 
there is at least one person who has gone crazy…. When Hugo’s casket arrived at his home…the 
first thing his mother noticed was the missing fingernails….”596 Whitehurst continued, “I had 
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seen and heard so much that I felt heartbroken.”597 As we will see, these emotionally devastating 
experiences shaped Whitehurst’s expectations and assessment of the Cuban revolution. 
 With frequent contact between foreign missionaries and Cubans, within and among the 
ecumenical denominations, the horrors of Batista’s rule spread quickly throughout this subset of 
the Anglo-American colony. Across communities, rural missionaries came to recognize a pattern 
of government repression, generally in support of the interests of the state and foreign 
corporations. Having heard many stories about acts of violence, at the end of 1957, Whitehurst 
recounted the brutality endured by the Cuban people throughout the island in her diary: “In 
Cienfuegos, after a big massacre, people were buried who weren’t even dead yet. One soldier 
went mad because a man he was about to bury begged him not to, and his superior officer, 
standing nearby, told him to bury the man or he’d be buried alive himself. The four who were 
killed this week in Marcané, between Cueto and Mayarí, were skinned alive, their hands were cut 
off….598 The trauma of the conflict permeated through conversations between Cubans and rural 
missionaries.  
 Far away from the blood and violence, most Anglo-American residents of Cuba remained 
oblivious to the horrors of the conflict until the last months of the revolution. Betty Campbell 
Whitehurst found the 1958 Methodist Conference in Havana to be “a difficult one, as we were 
divided into two groups: those loyal to Batista and those affirming the Castro revolution.”599 Her 
North American colleagues who worked in the more male-dominated western urban centers did 
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not know, and could not fathom the terror Whitehurst described. As Whitehurst herself noted, 
missionaries in western Cuba were largely unaffected by the revolution in early 1958.600  
 Not only were the Cuban contacts of missionaries impacted by the violence, but between 
1956-1958 foreign evangelizers often found themselves living in a war zone. Whitehurst 
remembers during the last four months of 1958, “There was no mail delivery, the company store 
soon ran out of food and most other merchandise, and even medical supplies were almost 
depleted.”601 Suffering alongside their Cuban students, parishioners and colleagues produced a 
revolutionary consciousness in many rural missionaries. While other Anglo-Americans on the 
island lived through this period in relatively blissful ignorance, rural missionaries grew closer to 
Cubans with whom the shared experiences of desperation catalyzed intimacy and yearnings for 
change. 
 With much of Oriente immersed in a state of siege between the end of 1956 and the start 
of 1959, many rural missionaries lived a tenuous existence. Edgar Nesman recalls at the 
Agricultural and Industrial School, in Playa Manteca on land donated by the United Fruit and 
Sugar Company, “We were in rebel territory at night for four years. Army territory during the 
day.”602 By the Autumn 1958, Batista’s forces “frequently arrested and disappeared” the school’s 
male students. 603 According to Nesman, “all of the teachers and students were sympathetic with 
the rebel cause, or were at least against the Batista government.  Nonetheless, we were within the 
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area controlled by the Batista Army during the day and they made frequent patrols.”604 The 
Cuban government’s treatment of students encouraged a pro-revolutionary orientation among the 
North American leaders of la granja. Nesman recalls, “Typical of what happened all over Cuba 
was the brutal slaying of a graduate of our school. His cruelly disfigured body was found 
hanging from a tree early one morning, with the only means of identification being the tattered 
remains of his shirt.”605  Though devastated by the violence, missionaries at the school sought 
ways to insulate their students from the conflict. 
 The staff at the Agricultural School protected the autonomy of the school from Batista’s 
forces by seeking to prevent students from joining the rebels in the mountains. They encouraged 
their students to prepare for the “new” Cuba they would build collectively after the defeat of 
Batista. Edgar Nesman, the school’s Director in the late 1950s, convinced a rebel comandante 
passing through the school grounds one evening to speak with the students about the importance 
of their studies. The comandante agreed to convey a message to the students that they should 
remain at the school, declaring what they would “offer for the future of the ‘new’ Cuba in 
agricultural development is very important.”606 To a significant degree, la granja succeeded in 
developing the next generation of Cuban agricultural leaders. After the triumph of the revolution 
Nesman recalled, “Our graduates were in great demand to take important posts as technicians in 
agricultural production as part of the government agrarian-reform program.”607  
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Anglo-American Missionaries as Revolutionary Actors  
 In the late 1950s Ira E. Sherman protected Cubans facing reprisals from Batista’s 
authorities, helping a Cuban pastor on a government “death list” to escape the country. Sherman 
subsequently feared for his own safety and sent his family back to the United States in late 
March 1958. For a time, Sherman himself felt it necessary to hide from Batista’s security forces 
at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, despite his scorn for the exploitative dynamics on, and 
around the base. 608 Even as Sherman challenged U.S. authority in the region, his nationality 
operated as a shield against reprisals from the Cuban authorities. On April 1, 1958 Sherman 
wrote to Pastor Lewistine M. McCoy in New York, “I am practically a refugee here in the United 
States Naval Base of Guantánamo Bay…. I am afraid that of necessity I am stuck here until such 
a time as there is a new government in Cuba….”609  
 The Methodist hierarchy later admonished Sherman for failing to follow procedure, as he 
was required to write the head of his district or the Bishop to gain permission to send his family 
back to the United States. He also received a reprimand from Methodist Church General 
Secretary Eugene L. Smith for overstating the crisis he faced in Guantánamo.610 Unlike their 
missionaries stationed in eastern Cuba, mission boards in United States were far removed from 
the horrors of war, exploitation and poverty, making them skeptical of the need for radical 
action.  
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Figure 23. The Rankin Family611 
 Foreign missionaries in Cuba used their platform and privilege to condemn the Batista 
government before 1959. 612 While they themselves proved largely untouchable to government 
forces, their Cuban congregations often endured the consequences for the bold actions of North 
American evangelizers. In the late 1950s, Methodist pastor Victor Rankin publicly protested the 
U.S.-supported Batista government. On January 14, 1959, Rankin referenced a sermon he gave 
in 1958 in which he compared the culture of fear and silence under the Batista government to the 
intimidation and terror of life in Nazi Germany: “I spoke of the German pastors who did not 
speak out, who in effect allowed Hitler to express his policies…People liked to hear what I said, 
but they didn’t pause to say much as they fearfully hurried home after Church.” The day after he 
denounced Batista to his congregation, the police of Camagüey detained a member of his church. 
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Rankin remembers thinking painfully about his courage, his privilege, and the price paid by his 
parishioners. He said to himself: “[You] were a hero yesterday with your brave sermon. But they 
won’t hurt you, you’re an American. They won’t do anything to you, because they want 
American favor. But they will take it out on your Church people.”613 Through their acts of 
solidarity, foreign missionaries confronted the implications of their privilege during the 
revolution. 
A Protestant Revolution 
 After 1959, enthusiastic Cuban Protestants skillfully connected the revolution to the 
values they absorbed in Protestant institutions throughout the island. Cubans recalibrated the 
lessons garnered in Protestant churches and schools in attempts to influence U.S. policymakers 
as tensions between the two countries grew more intense between 1959-1960. While ultimately 
unsuccessful in affecting U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations, Cubans articulated a Protestant 
revolutionary program that profoundly impacted the Anglo-American missionaries who 
recognized their own teachings in these pleas for justice. 
 In July 1959, an interdenominational group of Protestant Cuban youth composed a letter 
addressed to the “President of the United States, Congress of the USA, State Department of the 
USA and Ambassador of the USA” narrating the shared vision of evangelism and revolution. In 
English the young writers explained: “The pillars that will sustain this building are: politically—
Freedom and democracy; economically—Land Reform and Industrialization; Socially—To 
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redeem the poor people and applying the Christian principles of social justice.”614 The youth 
demanded, 
…a radical ECONOMIC, POLITICAL and SOCIAL restructuration so that [Cuba’s] 
happiness can be durable; so that we won’t have to suffer again, neither the bitter 
experience of the past or the future threat of the materialistic, atheist communism, that 
surely will take over all of Latin America if a real, humanist and just Revolution like 
Cuba’s does not take those people away from the inhuman conditions in which they die, 
and lift them to better standards of living where all the most indispensable material and 
spiritual needs are rightly tended to and filled.615  
 
Like the North American leaders of rural Protestant institutions, the Cuban students chided the 
“false Christianity” of landowning elites who would claim religious ethics and yet choose to 
ignore rural suffering:  
The Land Reform Law, that makes proprietors out of thousands of hungry peasants, has 
caused certain landlords, Cubans as well as Americans (who call themselves Christian, 
but that do not want to see the spirit of Christian justice contained in the law) to 
worry…they are taking sides against the Revolution…These persons, and all who are in 
one way or the other helping that calumnious campaign, should remember, among other 
things, the words with which our Lord Jesus Christ started His work: ‘The Spirit of the 
Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath 
sent me to heel the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives…’ –St. Luke 
4:18. And in Sermon of the Mount: ‘Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after 
righteousness: for they shall be filled.” – Matthew 5,6,7. The Cuban Revolution is 
making true these Christian principles of justice.616  
 
The young Cuban Protestants defended the revolution against charges of communism and 
blamed U.S. policymakers for Latin American radicalism: 
It is evident that the unjust foreign policy of the State Department toward the countries of 
Latin American is a dark shadow that obscures the democratic light of the United States. 
It is widely known that a determining factor for this policy is the pressure of certain 
financial circles that oppose the development of our countries. That terrible way of 
acting, carried more than once to the extreme of violating the sovereignty of some of our 
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nations, has made us think reasonable that the State Department is the best advertising 
agent that Russian communism617 
 
These youth leaders narrated the morality of the revolution in a language that highlighted the 
values promoted by foreign missionaries, articulated in defense of their new government.  
Besides, being Protestants, how could we keep from backing this revolution if, as a 
consequence of it, the moral standards of the country have been raised? Gambling, 
alcoholism and other vices that had made Cuba famous as a corrupted nation, are not 
permitted, and with word and action many noble virtues are being exalted with the 
Christian purpose that Cuba may be and appear before the world as a nation where 
dignity, democracy, freedom, justice and love prevail.618 
 
 
Figure 24. Ondina Cervantes619 
 The discursive linkage of Protestant values and revolutionary demands could be heard in 
the language of the youth, as well as Cuban Protestant leaders. Ondina Maristany graduated from 
Colegios Internacionales in 1941 and by the late 1950s had become a leader in the American 
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Baptist Church in Cuba. Like other Cuban Protestant leaders, she was very well educated, both in 
Cuba and the United States. Maristany attended the University of Southern California, the 
University of Havana and the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, earning graduate 
degrees in Law, Social Work, and Religious Education.620 She taught Faustino Pérez, a 
revolutionary leader and a Protestant.621 After 1959, Maristany embraced the interconnected 
missions of the revolution and the Baptist church. Southern Baptist Superintendent Herbert 
Caudill wrote to the American Baptist Latin American Secretary Wilbur Larson praising 
Maristany’s ambition to fulfill the goals of the revolution through mission work in Oriente in 
May 1959: “Naturally she has been greatly interested in the political situation in Cuba, and since 
the change of government she has felt called to the Sierra Maestra…. She is interested in doing 
something to improve the backward educational and social condition in the Sierra Maestra. She 
has definite convictions about what she wants to do and I believe she can be useful to the work in 
Oriente.”622 
 Missionaries galvanized a rich and complex critique of economic and political 
oppression; they often drew their understanding of events from Cuban groups with whom other 
members of the Anglo-American colony never associated. In November 1960, well after most 
Anglo-Americans left the island, the ecumenical Protestant organization, the Cuban Council of 
Churches wrote a “Social Creed” criticizing both capitalism and communism. The document 
argued that capitalism “has been motivated predominantly by an obsession for profit and is 
characterized, at least in Cuba, by an unjust distribution of wealth, which has produced, on the 
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one hand, an excessive accumulation of wealth and on the other misery.” This group remained 
committed to “total democracy as a manifestation of liberty, equality, and fraternity, under the 
sovereignty of God.” Interpreting the government as “an instrument of God for the fulfillment of 
his plans…” they celebrated “the emergence of young nations free from colonialism and semi-
colonialism.”623   
 Inspired by the pro-revolutionary positions taken by Cuban Protestants, foreign 
evangelizers often blamed their long-time nemesis, the Catholic Church, for the decreasing 
popularity of the Cuban government within the Anglo-American colony and in the United States. 
In September 1959, Southern Baptist Lloyd Corder implicated the Church as possibly 
responsible for misinformation disseminated regarding Fidel Castro: “I would keep in mind that 
newspapers in the United States generally are greatly influenced by Roman Catholicism, and 
Castro is, if not anti-Roman Catholic, at least pro-evangelical in his points of view…. We could 
expect the Roman Catholic influence to brand [Castro] as a communist wherever they could.”624 
On December 7, 1959 Southern Baptists missionaries Hubert and Eva Hurt explained why the 
Catholic Church would spread lies about the new Cuban government: “Our national lottery 
which was a government sponsored gambling institution that provided a large proportion of the 
money for building Catholic churches and institutions has given way to the National Institute of 
Savings and Housing which is building low cost housing to get rid of the slum areas…it 
shouldn’t be hard to guess how [the Church] feels about losing the millions in gambling 
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money.”625 Answering to Herbert Caudill in Havana, and not to mission boards in the United 
States, Southern Baptist missionaries were able to remain comfortably on the island longer than 
almost any of their Anglo-American counterparts. Herbert and Marjorie Caudill remained in 
Cuba until 1965 when Herbert was arrested with his son-in-law David Fite.626  
 The demands of Anglo-American missionaries for moral, economic and political change 
developed within the same spaces that inspired the solidarity of Cuban Protestants engaged in the 
revolution. Together, these transnational religious communities embraced a vision of Cuban 
political autonomy, economic stability and moral clarity.  
“The Light that Shineth in Darkness”: Envisioning a “new” Cuba for Cubans 
 Early in 1959, long-time leader of the Báguanos mission Eulalia Cook took note of the 
tremendous changes the island had just undergone. As she drafted her 1958 Annual Report, 
under a section titled “Biggest Satisfactions,” Cook wrote, “[being] a part of a church in a 
country under military rule, in tremendous civil disorder gave me a new understanding of The 
Light that Shineth in Darkness and the Darkness cannot overcome.” Under the section entitled 
“Frustrations” she noted, “Not having been in Cuba when Batista fled the country…was like not 
seeing the sunrise after a long, dark night.”627 Having spent most of her two decades in Cuba 
stationed in rural Báguanos, Cook and her fellow missionaries celebrated with their Cuban 
friends, neighbors, and parishioners as they dreamed together of a “new” Cuba in January 1959. 
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These relationships and shared dreams of democracy and socio-economic justice would continue 
to influence the perceptions of North American evangelizers, even as diplomatic relations 
between Washington and Havana strained.  
 Rural missionaries were encouraged not only by the religious convictions of the 
revolution, but also by the religious composition of the revolutionary leadership. Cuban 
Protestants, as well as the graduates of Protestant institutions, including Frank País, 
Faustino Pérez Hernández, José A. Naranjo, Rolando Cubela, Oscar Lucero Moya, Mario 
Llerena, Huber Matos, Daniel Álvarez, Manuel Ray Rivero and Samuel Salabarría all 
played significant roles in the struggle against Batista with many assuming high-ranking 
positions in the Cuban government after 1959.628 Further, the Cuban Protestant 
revolutionary contacts of missionaries proved extremely useful in navigating the 
structures of this “new” Cuba. Edgar Nesman explains, “The fact that two or three of our 
teachers were well connected to the revolutionary movement, did help to get the right 
permits.”629 Feeling firmly represented as a spiritual and religious movement within the 
new Cuban government, rural missionaries delighted in the birth of the Cuban revolution. 
 While U.S. corporate and political leaders grew alarmed by the unfolding of 
revolutionary demands, rural missionaries promoted policies pursued by the new Cuban 
government including mandates to dramatically curb the influence of foreign 
corporations, to regulate the tourism industry, and to redistribute resources to 
disenfranchised Cubans. Foreign missionaries accused the United States government and 
the North American press of hypocrisy in their misrepresentation of Cuban political, 
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economic and social reforms after 1959. As significant, they defended Cubans against 
accusations of communist influence.  
 While officials in Washington, the U.S. press and other elements of the Anglo-
American colony decried the executions of Batista officials in early 1959, for many rural 
missionaries the violence of the past few years was the context within which they 
understood, even if they did not condone, the revolution’s use of capital punishment. 
Having spent seventeen years in Cuba, mostly in Holguín, Methodist missionary 
Christine Stout Evans wrote in February 1959, “I don’t believe in capital 
punishment…but what else would you have done with men who have caused so much 
torture and misery?” Informed by Cuban Protestants and Anglo-American missionaries in 
Oriente, American Baptist Secretary Wilbur Larson pointed out the hypocrisy of U.S. 
reactions to the executions. In February 1959, Larson addressed the double standard at 
play: “The trials and executions of those responsible for atrocities under the old regime 
have been given wide publicity. However, the atrocities for which they are being 
punished were not given this publicity and are not now being given publicity.”630 He 
continued by admonishing U.S. officials for their collective failure to treat the new 
government fairly: “It is most unfortunate that responsible people in our government 
expressed judgments which neglected some of the facts of the situation. These 
expressions in turn brought violent reactions from the Cuban people who felt that the 
people of the United States were in no moral position to express any kind of judgment on 
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the activities of the new government since they had said nothing about the atrocities of 
the Batista regime.”631 
 Because of their experiences with both U.S. corporate and naval influence, rural 
Protestant missionaries understood the rise of anti-U.S. sentiment in ways that other 
Anglo-Americans could not. Edgar Nesman explained that, “Politicians, and particularly 
young people studying saw that the country was dominated. I remember a neighbor one 
time after the revolution said, ‘Well as Martí says, we may have to drink vinegar but at 
least it’s our vinegar.’”632 Nesman wrote in 1959 that while U.S. individuals were warmly 
welcomed, “official U.S. government policy, which includes all business and military 
associations, is not considered at all in friendly terms…. The primary cause of this feeling 
appears to Cubans to be that our foreign policy is based to a degree on self-interest and 
run by big business and the military.”633 Methodist missionary Morrell Robinson, 
stationed in Mayarí agreed, lambasting U.S. officials for their “callous indifference to the 
terror and death that stalked our cities and towns for six long years” during the Batista 
government.634  
 Throughout 1959, frustration with Washington swelled among rural missionaries, 
as U.S. officials demanded that revolutionary leaders temper their restructuring of Cuban 
society. In an interview with a Michigan publication, Methodist Nesman asked in 
October 1959, “Why should Americans apparently support (or tacitly approve) the 
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Batista regime which, from the Cuban perspective, was so obviously crooked and 
tyrannical? And why should a serious attempt at reform be so ridiculed, criticized and 
discredited as is the Castro government?”635 Founder of the Agricultural and Industrial 
School, John Edgar Stroud reinforced Nesman’s sentiment in April 1960 explaining, “We 
must remember that much of the land in Cuba has been owned by United States 
corporations that have made…four times what they could make in this nation because of 
cheap labor and taxes. When the much talked ‘land reforms’ were enforced our American 
economic concerns have not been able to take it.” Comparing the Cuban experience to a 
U.S-sponsored initiative to redistribute property Stroud wrote, “Didn’t McArthur 
introduce land reforms in Japan? We didn’t fuss there because American Companies did 
not own land…636 These missionaries and religious educators were quick to point to the 
hypocritical responses of other Anglo-Americans to the executions, land reform, and the 
radical economic transformations underway. 
 As the revolutionary policies seemed to mirror Protestant goals, many rural 
missionaries saw the revolution as an extension of their work in Cuba. Richard Milk 
noted, “The earliest major revisions of the educational program by the Revolutionary 
government seemed ‘right down our alley.’”637 Edgar Nesman explained the new 
government accelerated his efforts at la granja by creating a self-sustaining Cuban 
agricultural system: “[diversification] of agriculture is a partial solution. Our school has 
been stressing this from the beginning…[diversification] is one of the major aspects of 
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the agrarian reform laws. Castro and his government would like to see increased 
production of rice, corn and eggs eliminate the importation of these items.”638  
 Ira Sherman concluded that the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base had crippled the 
non-service-oriented economies of Caimanera and Guantánamo, ripening those 
communities for sexual exploitation. Further, he argued, the complicity of Cuban officials 
made the “new” morality pursued by the revolution very appealing. Decades after leaving 
Cuba, Sherman noted with satisfaction that the revolutionary government made a 
“successful effort to wipe out prostitution and to train the women involved in it in some 
other ways of earning a living.”639 Before 1959, Sherman risked his life to support 
Cubans who shared his vision to produce a more moral Cuban society. Decades later, he 
noted that many of the reforms implemented after 1959 represented initiatives that he, 
himself, had advocated. For many missionaries, the revolution was an embodiment and 
extension of their teachings.  
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Rising Cuban Nationalism and Painful Self-Reflections  
 
Figure 25. Lois and Morrell Robinson
640 
 In 1960, having experienced the revolution and the nationalist fervor in its aftermath, 
Morrell Robinson reflected on his own complicity in maintaining ethnonational hierarchies in 
Cuba. In a letter to James Ellis, Robinson explained, “I’ve been struggling with decisions 
concerning our future relations to work here…. [A]side from present nationalism, I doubt that the 
Cuban church needs what we can offer it.” Robinson continued, “I feel that a missionary, in 
order to warrant his presence in another country, must be able to contribute something that 
possibly no other national might contribute at that particular time. He should be an expert in 
some line or pioneer in some field. Unless he can do that he is competing with national pastors 
with the cards stacked against them for their salary is much lower and he often does not have 
access to funds from the states.”641 In the aftermath of the revolution, Morrell and Lois Robinson 
questioned the benefit of foreign missionaries in Cuba.  
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 Critical self-reflections by these Cuba-based missionaries distressed mission 
boards back in the United States. Ellis, who worked in the New York Methodist offices, 
attempted to engage Robinson in a debate on the matter:  
I am entirely in disagreement with much that is being said about missionaries all having 
to be specialists in this age. The certain number of missionaries in the pastorate working 
side by side with our national brethren and putting a certain quality into their work and 
experience and into the sessions and work of the Annual conference may not be classes 
as specialties or specialization or some of these other terms that are being used. Yet I 
consider that this is definitely one of the most important contributions that missionaries 
can make in this day when the responsibility is being shifted to the shoulders of our 
national brethren.642  
 
Ellis sent Robinson’s letter to the Methodist Bishop Roy H. Short, who responded, “I am a bit 
disturbed about our missionary situation in Cuba and particularly about the idea voiced by both 
Morrell and Schaeffer that they see no point in being ‘just ministers.’”643 The hostile reactions 
from Methodist leaders in the United States were unsurprising. Robinson’s concerns over the 
imperial legacy of Protestant missionaries challenged the self-assuring logic of benevolence 
embraced by Ellis and Short.  
 Living through the terror of war, working in close proximity to Cuban suffering, and 
exposed to intimate lessons about nationalism, capitalism and imperialism, many missionaries 
reflected on their purpose, complicity and legacy. Between 1952-1962 missionaries in Cuba 
responded to the tensions developing in this “new” Cuba, as they reassessed the utility and 
fairness of existing hierarchies.   
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Maintaining Revolutionary Solidarities in Exile 
 In 2016, when I asked Methodist missionary Betty Campbell Whitehurst, “What led to 
your disillusionment with the Cuban Revolution?” she answered: “I was never really 
disillusioned; the revolution was doing wonderful things.”644 When her missionary term expired 
in 1959, Whitehurst returned to her childhood home of Lemesa, Texas, a town segregated into 
white, black and Mexican-American sections. At the time Whitehurst and her former Cuban 
student from Báguanos, Ceferino Pavón planned to reunite and marry. However, Cold War 
tensions developing between Havana and Washington undermined their relationship. Instead, 
Whitehurst served as a teacher in Lemesa’s school for Mexican-American children where she 
was the only staff member who spoke Spanish. She explained, “I was back in very familiar 
territory, but I now saw it with different eyes.”645 
 When Sara Fernández, the Mexican-American Methodist missionary from Texas first 
arrived in Omaja, Cuba she encountered an impoverished community without drinking water, 
schools, clinics, or jobs.646 Fernández created cultural institutions, much like those operated by 
Cook and Whitehurst in Báguanos. Respected and accepted by the Cuban community of Omaja, 
Fernández chose not to return to Texas where she would resume her status as a second-class 
citizen. She chose, instead, to continue her work in a new context where her service-oriented 
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goals were being prioritized by the Cuban government. In 1963, however, she left the island, 
working first with Cuban refugees in Miami and then returning to missionary work in Costa 
Rica.  
Autonomy, Persecution, and Devastation for Cuba’s Protestant Community  
 The majority of foreign evangelizers and many of their Cuban counterparts grew 
disillusioned as the revolution took an anti-religious turn. Further, those Cubans who had 
attained leadership positions in Cuba’s Protestant institutions generally held close ties to the 
United States that made the severing of relations a devastating development. Their links to the 
U.S. made these Cuban Protestant leaders suspect to a revolution that increasingly viewed 
religion as an obstacle in their goal to transform society. By the mid-1960s the revolutionary 
government began to persecute those who could not adjust to the new order, placing religious 
leaders, homosexuals, counter-revolutionaries and other “anti-socials” in labor camps. It was in 
this context that U.S. Protestant organizations began handing power over to their Cuban 
counterparts. The benefits that had been garnered from association with Anglo-Americans and 
access to foreign capital, became a burden by the mid-1960s. 
 Cubans Methodists became autonomous from U.S. Methodists in 1968, according to 
Bishop Armando Rodríguez, “at the worst possible moment.” Rodríguez argued that propaganda 
efforts by the state sought to undercut religious authorities, in ways that mirrored Protestant 
efforts to undermine the Catholic Church at the start of the twentieth century. By claiming 
religion to be the “Opium of the masses” on a number of media platforms, the Cuban 
government framed socialism as the path to spiritual liberation. According to Rodríguez, the 
Cuban state declared science, not faith, would lead to progress for Cubans. During this period 
Cuban pastors were often accused of working for the CIA, which had been attempting to 
overthrow the government since the start of the decade. These developments led to an exodus of 
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the Cuban Methodist leadership and a decline in those Cubans who considered themselves 
Protestant. A lack of leadership proved catastrophic as close to 90 percent of Cuban Methodist 
pastors entered into exile, mostly to the United States. The Methodist denomination claimed 
11,000 members in 1959, but only 3,000 remained in 1968. This was due to the flight of Cuban 
Protestants and because the revolution incentivized the Cubans who remained to shed their 
religious identities.647  
 Persecution by the state left Cuban Protestants vulnerable. In 1963 Fidel Castro declared 
Protestants, particularly Jehovah Witnesses, Gideon’s International and Pentecostals as the 
“principal sects, which are instruments of today’s imperialism.” Castro claimed these Protestant 
groups were “directly headed by the United States …and they are used as agents of the CIA, 
State Department, and Yankee policy.”648 The attachment of Protestants to the United States 
made them suspect in the mid-1960s. Many Protestants ended up in labor camps, under the 
Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción (UMAP) program, leaving Protestant institutions 
rudderless.649 Between November 1965 and July 1968 the Cuban government demanded hard 
labor from groups considered “anti-social or “counter-revolutionary.” Among those persecuted 
by the revolution were conscientious objectors, homosexual men, corrupt officials, drug-addicts, 
Protestant pastors, Catholic priests, intellectuals, farmers who refused collectivization, and those 
planning to leave the country. These unpaid laborers reported poor conditions, physical torture, 
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and mock executions leading some to commit suicide.650 According to Héctor Santiago, 
imprisoned for his sexual orientation, Jehovah Witnesses were particularly targeted: “With us, 
they were terrible, but let me tell you the truth, they treat you like a lady compared to the testigos 
de Jehová. Oh my god, they really, really were terrible with them, terrible.”651 In a labor camp 
because of his continued participation in Catholicism, René Cabrera echoed Santiago’s 
sentiments: “The Jehovah’s Witnesses, as always, were the principal victims of the government’s 
intention of those crimes.”652 Protestant leaders became targeted by the Cuban state because of 
their attachment to foreign enemies and their dedication to a spiritual authority above the state. 
What was rewarded prior to 1959, was now severely punished. 
 After the flight of Anglo-American missionaries, Cuban Protestants finally got the 
sovereignty they had demanded. However, their independence came at a time when the 
Protestant churches were suffering debilitating population decline, were under attack by the 
Cuban state and cut off from Anglo-American capital. Attachment to a Protestant way of life had 
garnered material and social advantages before 1959, but now led to imprisonment and 
exploitation. The Protestant suffered alongside the intellectual, the independent farmer and the 
corrupted politician because of their shared attachments to ideologies, practices and cultural 
values, at least in part, introduced by Anglo-Americans. Protestants often found themselves 
buried in the rubble as preexisting value systems and socio-economic hierarchies were 
demolished by the revolution.    
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Conclusions 
 Prior to 1959, most in Cuba understood that the Cuban government valued the lives of 
Anglo-Americans over those of Cubans. Taking note of how Anglo-American perceptions of the 
conflict seemed to influence power brokers in Washington, anti-Batista forces used this 
knowledge to their advantage. While the experiences of disenfranchised Cubans seem to have 
mattered little to policymakers in Havana and Washington, Anglo-American missionaries 
wielded their influence – in Cuba and back home– to shield, connect and advocate for Cuban 
revolutionaries throughout the conflict. As former students and parishioners actively took up 
arms and joined the rebel forces, rural missionaries protected Cubans targeted by Batista’s 
military, undertook an unofficial letter-writing campaign to turn Anglo-American opinion 
against Batista, before fashioning a narrative that defended the early actions of the revolutionary 
government.  While as far as I have found none took up arms themselves, many of these 
missionaries took significant risks. 
Social psychologist María Elena Torre argues that a contact zone, “even in its most 
extreme forms, such as colonization, can provoke spaces where new ways of living, ideas, 
languages, [and] cultures are created.”653 In interviews, diaries, letters, and memoirs former 
missionaries painfully detailed the hardship faced by Protestants persecuted under Batista, as 
well as those who were subjected to the tortures of UMAP in the mid-1960s. While every former 
rural missionary interviewed for this project expressed disappointment over the lack of 
democratic reforms instituted in Cuba since 1959, all praised the early socio-economic policies   
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of the revolution. These women and men viewed redistribution and nationalization as an 
extension of their own spiritual and ethical work in the economic, social, moral and educational 
spheres. Ironically, and with pain, they embraced the very policies that led to their expulsion. 
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CHAPTER NINE: HAVANA’S STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL REVOLUTION 
Introduction 
 Before the Cuban Revolution, personal intimacies developed between Anglo-American 
residents and a group of upwardly mobile Cuban doctors, lawyers, politicians, businessmen, 
military officers, bankers, industrialists, engineers, journalists, students, and Protestant workers 
in the contact zones of the Anglo-American colony. In Havana, mostly white and relatively 
wealthy Cuban professionals learned English, facilitating transnational relationships between 
privileged outsiders and Cuban professionals. Through their adoption of North American and 
British cultural forms, Cubans garnered influence and access to Anglo-American jobs, clients, 
capital and markets through personal and occupational networks developed with Anglo-
American residents. In the turmoil of 1950s and early 1960s Cuba, these cross-cultural 
connections evolved from social and occupational to form revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary solidarities between Anglo-American residents and their Cuban friends and 
colleagues. This chapter explores how the strategic negotiations of Cuban and Anglo-American 
identity, politics, and influence shaped events and perceptions in Havana in the context of 
revolution. 
Exerting Influence Over Anglo-Americans 
 By the late 1950s, influential Cuban professionals, through institutional contact, formed a 
collective community with members of the Anglo-American colony in Havana. Together through 
integrated schools, churches, social clubs and business associations, they cultivated a shared 
vision for Cuba. Though many of these institutions were established as exclusive spaces to 
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protect and privilege Anglo-American identities and interests, over the course of the twentieth 
century educational facilities like Ruston Academy or the offices of the Havana Post emerged as 
contact zones where knowledge exchanged between groups altered the perceptions of and 
relations between Cubans and Anglo-Americans. The evolution of these institutions dramatically 
altered the experience, critical consciousness and activist engagements of Havana’s Anglo-
American residents between 1952-1962. 
 Throughout the 1950s Cubans from across the island lamented the oppressive elements of 
Cuban society to their Anglo-American friends, educators, co-workers, peers and missionaries. 
Many spoke in a discourse of resistance that seemed to echo the teachings and ministry of 
Anglo-American schools, clubs and churches. Justifications for subversion were articulated in a 
language developed from their experience with Anglo-American cultural discursive forms, 
appropriated in Anglo-American educational, social, occupational and religious institutions. The 
ability of Cuban professionals to frame revolutionary, and later counter-revolutionary 
movements, as struggles to achieve Anglo-American values like political liberty, social 
development, and national sovereignty permeated the consciousness of many privileged 
outsiders.  
 Those Cubans who held the ear of Anglo-Americans in Havana, many of whom were 
leaders in the struggle against Batista, animated a revolution that hoped to achieve political 
modernity and parity with wealthy nations. From their vantage point, the Anglo-American 
presence could be viewed a resource for developing the “new” Cuban nation.654 Comfortable 
with the language and discourse of Anglo-American values and rhetoric, these Cuban leaders 
aligned with their Anglo-American allies, and together they were able to articulate the need for 
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the revolution to a world audience. Buoyed by socio-economic solidarities, these Anglo-
American residents and wealthy Cubans helped pressure the U.S. government to distance itself 
from Batista, worked to legitimate the revolution in its infancy, and heavily influenced 
Washington’s relationship with Havana ever since.  
 In this context, ambitions for a more just political society formed between select Cuban, 
North American and British nationals in Anglo-American institutions. Before 1959, this nascent 
solidarity manifested as a shared opposition to the Batista dictatorship. As the revolution 
undermined existing socio-economic hierarchies after 1959, a shared resistance to the revolution 
that challenged their collective influence, wealth and privilege manifested between Anglo-
American residents and many Cuban professionals. The political turmoil festering during the 
decade following Batista’s 1952 coup cemented solidarities between elements of a transnational 
community. 
The 1952 Coup 
 The tumultuous political events that unfolded in March 1952 held profound meaning 
for many of the Cuban professionals who formed part of a transcultural community with Anglo-
Americans in Havana. On March 10, 1952, Fulgencio Batista organized a coup that established 
him as President and consequently united Cubans of myriad backgrounds behind the common 
cause of reestablishing democracy. Over the course of his rule (1952-1958) many Cubans with 
Anglo-American contacts became revolutionaries, articulating democracy as a central tenet of 
the modernity they were trying to achieve for their nation. Cubans who enjoyed provisional 
status within the Anglo-American social and occupational orbit often translated the struggle 
against Batista to their North American and British co-workers, friends and family in the 
language of Anglo-American values. Batista’s termination of a legitimate electoral process 
undermined Cuban claims to democratic modernity, which particularly frustrated Cubans who 
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hoped to develop the island in ways that replicated the form of republicanism so valorized by 
Anglo-American societies.655   
 Influential Cubans with ties to the Anglo-American colony from across Havana’s 
political, economic and intellectual spheres expressed frustration with the termination of 
democratic order. Jorge Mañach was a leading Cuban intellectual whose praise of Candler 
College could be found in their brochure. In the aftermath of Batista’s rise to power, Mañach 
explained, “We had pride that the 1940 Constitution was one of the most advanced of our time.” 
Now Cubans were “losing their right to elect their Government,” representing a “humiliation” for 
the island.656 The Cuban Minister of the Treasury 1959-1960, Rufo López-Fresquet enjoyed deep 
ties to the Anglo-American colony. López-Fresquet explained Batista’s “dictatorship converted 
nearly every Cuban into a revolutionary, and on his departure the massive public support for 
those Cubans who had overthrown him opened the doors to the social revolution that began on 
January 1, 1959.”657  Mario Lazo, leading Cuban lawyer who managed the accounts of Anglo-
American firms and governments, explained, “I became disillusioned with [Batista] on March 
10, 1952, when he interrupted the democratic process and took over the Palace by a coup d’état. 
I viewed the event with dark foreboding. It seemed to me at the time that the clock had been 
turned back, that the slow progress Cuba had been making over the years toward free 
government had been dealt a crushing blow.” 658 President Batista remained good for the 
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business of men like Lazo, as his administration encouraged foreign investment and respected 
Washington’s influence. Still, because of his disruption of republican structures, Lazo would 
never speak to Batista again.659  The sense of betrayal Cubans with Anglo-American connections 
felt after the coup would eventually erode foreign support for a government that reliably 
prioritized the interests of Anglo-Americans.  
 Unlike in sites of formal colonialism in Africa, Asia and other parts of Latin America, 
prior to 1959, Anglo-Americans in Cuba could believe that their identities were separate from 
the political structures that governed Cuba. Though they benefited from the economic and 
political influence, the United States--and to a lesser degree England and Canada--enjoyed in 
Cuba, Anglo-American residents in Havana could work towards Cuban democracy while 
imagining a post-Batista Cuban government where they would continue to thrive comfortably in 
place; a government dedicated to democracy that would not challenge their status as privileged 
outsiders, as had happened in the 1940s. Well-respected Cubans who enjoyed close personal ties 
with the Anglo-American colony secured leadership positions in the movement against Batista. 
As a consequence, most Anglo-American residents eventually, if temporarily, viewed the 
revolutionary momentum as pro-democratic. Few anticipated that the movement to overthrow 
Batista would ultimately obliterate existing hierarchies, leading to the exile of Anglo-American 
influence, and those who benefited from this influence, from the island. 
Social Bridges Shape Anglo-American Reception of Revolution  
 Through varied institutions and relations between the Anglo-American colony and the 
professional elements of Cuban society, a privileged socio-economic lens shaped the shared 
goals of Anglo-Americans and Cubans. In Havana, most from this transnational community 
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expressed horror upon learning about the tortures of the Batista government and enthusiasm for 
the political goals of the anti-Batista movement. Many Cuban professionals risked their lives 
working to undermine the dictatorship. Still, compared to poor and rural Cubans who in the late 
1950s were hunted, tortured and killed by Batista’s henchmen if suspected of revolutionary 
activities, wealthier Cubans in Havana often proved able to employ their capital and contacts to 
escape punishment. 
 Perhaps more than any other Anglo-American-led cultural institution in Havana, Ruston 
Academy became a vibrant contact zone where identities and commitments grew fluid, while 
political solidarities were forged between the children of wealthy Cuban professionals and 
privileged outsiders. Cubans at Ruston helped frame and translate the anti-Batista movement to 
Ruston’s Anglo-American employees, to Anglo-American parents and to non-Cuban students. 
Due to the agitation of their Cuban friends, students and schoolmates, many Anglo-American 
residents became sympathetic with the growing calls for basic democratic freedoms on the 
island.  
 Of course, at a school that attracted influential Cubans, the parents of some students 
served in the Batista government, including, as discussed earlier, Batista himself. Connection to 
influential people in the state apparatus worked in the favor of those Rustonians who got caught 
organizing against the government before 1959. Guillermo Martínez remembers that his dad, 
then the editor of the Cuban publication El País, resigned multiple times throughout the 1950s 
whenever the Batista government imposed press censorship.660  Perhaps influenced by his father, 
and certainly enraged by the lack of basic freedoms under Batista, in April of 1958 the younger 
Martínez “organized a school strike against Batista.” Colonel Rojas, whose child attended 
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Ruston in the grade ahead of Martínez, telephoned the young rebel’s father to protect his son’s 
schoolmate. Martínez remembers, “my father got a message from a Colonel [Rojas] in Batista’s 
army saying, ‘If you want your son to not get into any trouble, get him out of the country.’”661 
Shortly following that phone call Martínez found himself in Connecticut’s Cheshire Academy.662 
Ed González’ mother sent her son to school at Saint Stephens in Virginia in March 1958 after 
Cuban authorities nearly caught him distributing anti-Batista flyers.663 Cuban youths who risked 
their lives for democratic liberty, and yet enjoyed privilege, as well as Anglo-American 
connections, were often able to avoid the darkest aspects of the Batista’s justice system by 
relocating to the United States. While their exit to safety makes visible a level of protection not 
afforded to most Cubans in the late 1950s, these anecdotes of Ruston students illustrate the 
commitment that privileged Cuban youths held to political revolution.  
 Cuban students at the schools of the Anglo-American colony often served as points of 
contact with privileged outsiders, humanizing and translating the growing movement against the 
Batista government for foreign youth. González and Martínez were not nameless Cuban 
classmates who took different classes and lived outside of the social orbit of Anglo-American 
students. González’ only surviving parent was a U.S. national. Martínez was one of the only 
Cubans who regularly attended events at the largely Anglo-American-only Mothers’ Club. In 
addition to being enrolled in the Cuban Bachillerato track, Martínez enrolled in the U.S. High 
School curriculum so that he could potentially be admitted to universities in the United States. 
He regularly shared classrooms with the children of the Anglo-American colony. These boys 
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narrated opposition to the Batista government and made evident a willingness to face very real 
consequences for democracy – which was a core focus of the school. Stories of political risk and 
vision traveled through the Anglo-American households of their friends and families throughout 
Havana. Few were untouched by the rising tensions.  
 After graduation, Ruston’s Anglo-American students would return to North America or 
Europe for continued education at a university in their home country, while most Cubans ended 
their studies, or attended the University of Havana. Still, a relatively small group of Cubans 
opted to simultaneously pursue the Cuban Bachillerato and the U.S. High School programs, 
which prepared them for universities both in the United States and Cuba. Aided by the 
accessibility of North American High School tracks in Anglo-American schools, 700 Cuban 
students attended universities in the United States by 1958.664 Cuba led all Latin American 
countries proportionally in terms of students pursuing higher education in the United States.665  
 With their close ties to many influential Cuban families, the Anglo-American staff at 
Ruston Academy felt obligated to signal support for the anti-Batista movement. While James 
Baker attempted to preserve Ruston as a “neutral” place in the escalating conflict, his secretary 
Mariada Comer Arensberg actively advocated against the Batista government. In March, 1958, 
the same month that the United States announced an arms embargo against the Batista 
government, Arensberg called the U.S. State Department to protest Washington’s continued 
                                                 
664 Though the custom of relatively wealthy Cuban students being sent to the United States for their education dated 
back to the Spanish colonial period, in the late 1950s many revolutionary Cuban youths were forced to flee the 
island to avoid arrest from Batista’s authorities. Others left due to the closing of the University of Havana in 1956. 
As a result, many of these students attended schools abroad. With large numbers of these young Cubans returning to 
the island in 1959, the networks of contact between Cubans and Anglo-American residents thickened, due to the 
possibility and reality of educational opportunities in the United States. 
665 Henry Goethals, “Cuban-U.S. Cultural Relations Steadily Growing, Says Portell Vilá,” Times of Havana, March 
31, 1958, 2. 
254 
support of the dictatorship. In a report written after the call, Deputy Director at the Office of 
Middle American Affairs, C. Allan Stewart, explained that Arensberg, “called by telephone from 
Havana to protest what she termed our support of the dictatorship in that country.” The 
memorandum continued, “She said she had been attempting to sell democracy in Cuba for the 
past 12 years, especially among educators, but that the supplying of arms to the Batista 
Government for the use in killing Cuban citizens had placed her in a desperate position….” 
Arensberg lamented U.S. action as ineffective, explaining, “Our policy of attempting to induce 
the civic institutions and others to support elections in Cuba was unrealistic since everyone knew 
the elections would be rigged.” Stewart commented that the call, “is an indication of the strong 
feeling that exists, even among American citizens, about the present state of affairs in the 
island.”666 
 With his participation in the American Club and his U.S.-born wife taking a leadership 
role in the Mothers’ Club, Rufo López-Fresquet was well known in the Anglo-American colony 
long before he became Minister of the Treasury in 1959. A leader in the opposition movement 
against Batista, López-Fresquet turned to Mariada Arensberg when forced to hide from the secret 
police of the Batista government.667 Arensberg’s son Walter remembers his mother “knew a lot 
of the people who were working against Batista, 26th-of-July Movement types, and she would 
help. She would play a role as an intermediary with the embassy or, in one case, I knew she 
would also hide people…because they’d heard that maybe Batista’s secret police were going to 
come get them that night.” 668  Walter remembered one poignant instance of his mother aiding an 
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opposition leader, Rufo López-Fresquet: “I came home from a date and went into my bedroom 
and there was a man with a 45 on the night table.” Arensberg continued, “He turned out to be 
Fidel’s first Minister of the Treasury, a guy named López-Fresquet.” Walter recalls, “Rufo’s wife 
was American…mother knew her and Rufo’s kids had been in school at Ruston, so they all were 
friends. Then Rufo started really working against Batista. So she got really involved.”669 The 
intimacy of someone like López-Fresquet with the Anglo-American colony led some like 
Arensberg to assume his cause as her own. 
 The future Minister of Treasury enjoyed an array of friendships with members of the 
Anglo-American colony. These relations became political such that a select group of privileged 
outsiders took risks in support of friends and a cause. In the late 1950s, Ruston graduate and a 
third-generation member of the Anglo-American colony Jay Mallin attempted to help López-
Fresquet leave the country. As a journalist, Mallin grew to abhor the Batista government, which 
he hoped to undermine through his reporting.670 In September 1957 Mallin reported to his 
contact at Time Magazine, “Dr. Rufo López-Fresquet, one of Cuba’s top economic experts, has 
queried me about the possibility of attending ‘Time’s’ forthcoming economic conference in San 
Francisco.” After enumerating López-Fresquet’s qualifications as a leading Cuban economist 
who had represented Cuban manufacturers abroad, Mallin pleaded, “Please do not mention him 
by name in any cables.”671 While Mariada Arensberg and Jay Mallin proved exceptional among 
Anglo-Americans aiding the Cuban underground against Batista, the sentiments they acted on, as 
well as the justifications for revolution, were appreciated broadly by Anglo-American residents 
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throughout Havana by the end of 1958. Jay Mallin, Mariada Arensberg and the López-Fresquet 
family embodied a bridge of shared values and courage, within Anglo-American circles, that 
informed privileged outsiders of the revolution’s grievances, while framing its ambitions in a 
language that could rally Anglo-American sympathies. 
 In the late 1950s, revolutionary Cubans with connections to the Anglo-American colony, 
such as López Fresquet, as well as the former and future President of the Cuban National Bank 
Felipe Pazos, utilized their Anglo-American contacts to undermine and embarrass the Batista 
dictatorship to international audiences. Pazos enjoyed close contacts with members of the Anglo-
American colony, sending his children José and Felipe to Ruston. Pazos utilized his contacts 
with Anglo-Americans as he took steps to expose the lies of the Batista government.  
 Shortly following Fidel Castro’s December 1956 landing in Cuba, the Batista government 
declared that Cuban forces killed Fidel Castro. Batista’s public relations advisor and biography 
Chester Edmunds assured the U.S. Embassy that the rebel leader had indeed died.672 Felipe 
Pazos sought out New York Times correspondent and longtime Anglo-American resident Ruby 
Hart Phillips to expose this false narrative circulated by pro-Batista forces. Phillips had lived in 
Cuba for decades, and proved sympathetic to the cause of political liberty advocated by her 
Cuban friends and contacts. She worked with Pazos to help him undercut the legitimacy of the 
Batista dictatorship by arranging the famous 1957 interview between Herbert Matthews and 
Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestras.673 The resulting articles published in the New York Times 
introduced the world to the Cuban Revolution in an extremely sympathetic light. Matthews wrote 
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in his first article on the rebel leader on February 24, 1957: “Thousands of men and women are 
heart and soul with Fidel Castro and the new deal for which they think he stands…hundreds of 
highly respected citizens are helping Señor Castro.” Accessing Castro’s agenda for himself, 
Matthews explained, “The program is vague and couched in generalities, but it amounts to a new 
deal for Cuba, radical, democratic and therefore anti-Communist. The real core of its strength is 
that it is fighting against the military dictatorship of President Batista.”674 These words 
introduced many U.S. citizens to the future leader of Cuba and the movement he headed. 
 Revolutionaries used the Anglo-American presence and contacts to cultivate strategic and 
diplomatic victories over Batista’s forces. In Santiago, revolutionary leader Frank País regularly 
met the U.S. consulate, sometimes joined by Vilma Espín, the U.S.-educated daughter of the 
Bacardí company’s lawyer. A CIA desk officer in Santiago noted the effectiveness of these 
meetings for the rebel cause: “My staff and I were all fidelistas.”675 Historian Richard Gott 
hypothesizes that País’ relationship with the U.S. Consulate may have convinced Santiago’s 
leading rebel of the utility of a broad front against the Batista government. The 26th-of-July 
Movement increased its legitimacy in the eyes of privileged outsiders by turning to established, 
and more politically-center figures like Raúl Chibás, Felipe Pazos and Roberto Agramonte. 
These moderate, pro-U.S. revolutionaries that Matthews alluded to in his article as some of the 
“highly respected citizens…helping Señor Castro,” comforted Anglo-Americans who feared a 
loss of status in a new Cuban order.676 Active participation by Cubans who held deep ties to the 
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Anglo-American colony gave privileged outsiders human anchors on which to ground their 
commitments to the developing revolution.  
 The uniting of various revolutionary factions in July 1957 for the formation of the Sierra 
Manifesto helped secure the triumph of the revolution as the wealthy Cuban professionals like 
Felipe Pazos, respected Cuban political figures Raúl Chibás and seemingly pro-U.S. 
revolutionary leaders like Fidel Castro attempted to mollify the fears of foreign interests by 
highlighting their unity in pursuing reformist aims after defeating the dictatorship. The Sierra 
Manifesto itself laid out moderate structural changes to Cuba’s economic system, while 
promoting political liberty in line with Anglo-American rhetoric defining a free and modern 
society. The document called for a return to the 1940 Constitution, declaring, “We want 
elections, but with one condition: truly free, democratic, and impartial elections…presided over 
by a provisional, neutral government, with the support of all, that will replace the dictatorship in 
order to induce peace and move the country toward democratic and constitutional normalcy.”677  
The Manifesto proposed “freedom of information, of the spoken and written press and of all.”  
The document implored the United States government to cease support for the “present regime of 
terror and dictatorship.”678  The Manifesto advanced reformist, not radical, economic promises 
concerning the redistribution of unutilized land.679   
 While a significant number of Cuba’s Anglo-American residents perceived Castro and 
the Cuban Revolution as threatening before the revolution took power, most adopted the view of 
their Cuban friends and contacts. Ruby Hart Philips, Marida Arensberg, Jay Mallin and other 
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privileged outsiders helped advance sympathy and provide some degree of legitimacy to the anti-
Batista movement. Further, Anglo-Americans recognized members of the resistance as moderate 
and pro-American. Prior to 1959 many within this transnational community articulated the 
struggle as a necessary political and social movement compatible with the continued presence of 
Anglo-American influence on the island.   
The Significance of an Anglo-American Presence  
 At Guantánamo, Cuban workers used their position as employees of the U.S. Naval 
station to aid the revolutionary cause. A gun-running operation took hold as small arms, gasoline 
and field artillery were taken from the base and smuggled to the rebels in the mountains. Given 
support among many U.S. servicemen, it is plausible to suspect that they actively aided these 
efforts.680 Cuban workers at the base further aided the revolutionary cause by documenting the 
continued support of Batista’s Air Force by the U.S. government, despite claims of neutrality 
after March 1958. By passing incriminating photo evidence of the Cuban Air Force receiving 
supplies at Guantánamo Naval Base onto 26th-of-July Movement officials, base workers shamed 
the United States government into keeping its word and cutting off aid for Batista’s military. In 
retaliation for its continued support, Raúl Castro initiated Operación antiaérea, or Operation 
Anti-Aircraft.681 
 On June 28, 1958, a bus carried twenty-eight U.S. servicemen on its way back from a 
“liberty party” in Caimanera. Cuban rebels stopped the bus, and with a Puerto Rican marine 
serving as translator, the U.S. sailors and soldiers were informed they were hostages of the 
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revolutionary army. When they arrived at the rebel camp, U.S. and Canadian employees of the 
United Fruit and Sugar Company, the Moa Bay Mining Corporation and the Nicaro Nickel Plant 
awaited them. Raúl Castro announced three demands of the U.S. government: to realize its 
proclaimed neutrality, desist in aiding Batista’s military, and send officials to tour the damage 
inflicted on Cuban villages during Batista’s bombing campaign. Due in large part to widespread 
support for the anti-Batista movement among Cubans in contact with U.S. power brokers, the 
invasion suggested by some North American policy makers never occurred. Instead, the United 
States government agreed to meet all of the demands made by Castro. Upon their release, it was 
clear that many of the Anglo-American hostages became convinced during their time in captivity 
that the rebel cause was legitimate. While the kidnapping of these U.S. and Canadian citizens 
received scant coverage in heavily censored Oriente, Castro achieved favorable coverage in U.S. 
publications, including the New York Times, Newsweek, Life, and Time.682  
 A growing consciousness among Anglo-Americans in Havana about the policy of torture 
enacted by Cuban officials in the late-1950s furthered negative perceptions of the Batista 
government. While Carroll English interacted largely with wealthier Cubans in Havana’s 
Colegio Buenavista after her transfer from the Agricultural and Industrial School at Playa 
Manteca, the staff and students at the school represented a lower economic stratum than the 
students at Ruston. In her diary English stated her belief that her friend, Pastor Mario Fernández, 
who was arrested by Batista’s authorities, was spared only due to the high-level contacts of his 
family and among his Protestant brethren.683 While Pastor Fernández perhaps escaped the most 
severe punishment due to his Methodist faith, English’s position among less affluent Cubans 
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exposed her to other stories of the treatment of prisoners by government agents. English wrote in 
her diary on December 14, 1958 “Someone was saying the other day how several persons they 
knew, including close relatives, had been forced to answer prison visits from family members 
while smiling and appearing in sound shape, and saying that, yes, they had been well-treated, 
while in reality their body except for visible head and hands was practically pulp from beatings 
and tortures.” English continues,  
One wife discovered when she claimed the body of her husband who had been hung, that 
he had been sat in a chair without a seat in it with a fire under it. Another lady suffered 
severe internal hemorrhages and injuries and wavered on the brink of death…because her 
torturers had been so degenerate and brutal. One youth’s feet soles were burned—to 
make an example out of him just in case anyone doubted the viciousness and brutality of 
the regime. He was completely innocent.684  
 
 Similarly, the Cuban contacts of Ruby Hart Phillips shared their stories of interrogation 
under Batista’s authorities with the New York Times reporter. Phillips recalls, “Stories of torture 
and killings were brought into my office almost daily by relatives and friends of the victims. 
Sometimes they brought pictures—horrible pictures of mutilated bodies. It seems incredible that 
there could be been so many sadists in the Cuban army.”685 With Anglo-Americans in Havana 
hearing these stories from Cubans they trusted, and spreading this information among 
themselves, the positive reputation the Batista government enjoyed in Anglo-American circles 
slowly eroded.  
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Building Consensus on Batista’s Overthrow 
 
Figure 26. The American Club, 309 Paseo de Martí, Havana, 1951686 
 Moved by President McKinley’s assassination, U.S. nationals founded Havana’s 
American Club on October 21, 1901, with 59 members. The social organization served as host to 
major events for the U.S. community in Havana. As observed in the previous chapters, the 
Fourth of July and Thanksgiving became annual traditions at the club for North American 
residents.687 Over time, the American Club became less exclusive and evolved into an 
intercultural space for Anglo-American and Cuban power brokers to meet, mapping their plans 
for Cuba. By the 1950s the club had nearly 1,000 members, including many of the most 
influential people on the island.688 While dominated by U.S. businessmen, club members 
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included Anglo-American colony educators such as Ruston Academy Headmaster James Baker, 
Protestant leaders like Episcopal Bishop Alexander Hugo Blankingship, as well as professional 
Cubans such as lawyer Mario Lazo and Cuban Minister of Treasury López-Fresquet.689 
Acclaimed in travel books as “A social club equal to the finest in New York or Washington,” the 
American Club became a space where Cubans and Anglo-American residents from corporate, 
political, and cultural institutions gathered together to share their ideas, experiences and to 
relax.690  As Herminio Portell Vilá explains, “The Businessmen, who have always constituted the 
vast majority of members of the American Club, have met with his compatriots who acquired 
distinction through other activities.”691 John Parker described the members of the institution as a 
collection of “the great and near great.”692 Portell Vilá wrote in the 1950s, “If one was to add up 
the balance sheet, the collective investment represented by the Anglo-American and Cuban 
members of the American Club would be billions of pesos that contribute to making Cuba a 
civilized country of extraordinary economic resources, and remarkable achievements.”693 The 
club served a collection of people that the Batista regime generally worked to enrich and protect. 
Yet, many of the Cuban members also hoped to modernize their country in the image of the 
United States through democratic reforms. The inclusion of these Cubans as leaders in the anti-
Batista movement gave legitimacy to the revolutionary government as it consolidated power. 
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 During the 1950s, conversations between Anglo-Americans and Cuban leaders in 
institutions like the American Club increased the critical awareness about Batista’s abuse of 
power among those who represented major international corporations, and by extension, foreign 
governments on the island. Yet this process took time. Batista had done his best to hide the 
horrors of the revolution from Anglo-American residents. He censored the press attempting to 
report on revolutionary crackdowns, while endeavoring to insure the violence never threatened 
the well-being of these privileged outsiders. Further, as Batista seemed to be prioritizing the 
interests of foreign capital, it proved difficult for many Anglo-American executives to look 
critically at his government. Ruby Hart Phillips characterized Havana’s Anglo-American 
businessmen as highly reluctant to recognize the problematic nature of Batista’s rule. She 
remembers, “I tried to tell an American businessman who had been living in Latin America for 
twenty years about the government methods. He refused to believe it. ‘Cubans are not that type 
of people; they would not torture and kill.’”694 Yet Phillips and others persisted, taking great 
risks to further the fight against the dictatorship. Their efforts would eventually pierce the 
consciousness of those who considered themselves “apolitical” Anglo-American residents. 
 Over time, the experience of the tumultuous 1950s inconvenienced most and scared many 
of Havana’s Anglo-American residents. Anglo-American lives were fundamentally altered in the 
late 1950s, as a revolutionary campaign repeatedly sabotaged the electrical grid and targeted 
public spaces with the aim of destabilizing the Batista government. Movie theatres became too 
dangerous to attend, and Anglo-American schools faced threats of violence. Anglo-American 
residents began to grow uncomfortable as rumors spread throughout Havana describing the 
torture and murder conducted by the government’s secret police, the Servicio de Inteligencia 
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Militar (SIM).695 Wealthy Cuban professionals, as well as foreign reporters, educators and 
missionaries helped to frame and translate the events of late 1958 and 1959 to increasingly 
sympathetic Anglo-American power brokers.  
 By the end of 1958, relationships between influential Anglo-American businessmen, 
other Anglo-American residents, and Cubans associated with the Anglo-American colony 
convinced most foreign businessmen, initially reluctant to challenge Batista, that the government 
would soon fall. Still some articulated the desire to find an alternative to Castro. In December 
1958, a few weeks before the fall of the Batista government, a group of U.S. businessmen met 
with Ambassador Earl T. Smith who urged containment of the situation. Esso executive George 
W. Potts feared the independence of the 26th-of-July Movement. Potts and the other 
businessmen recommended U.S. action against Batista’s government to better manage the 
transition of power.696 Yet just a few days after the victory of the revolution, with people 
celebrating throughout the capital, a group comprised of many of the same U.S. businessmen met 
with the second-ranking official in the U.S. Embassy, Daniel M. Broddock. This collection of 
U.S. nationals now knew Cubans like American Club member Rufo López-Fresquet would be 
serving in the revolutionary cabinet. At the meeting, they enthusiastically pushed for prompt 
recognition of the new government.697 Due to his family’s integration into the U.S. community 
through activities like the Mothers’ Club and the American Club, López-Fresquet hoped to serve 
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as a bridge between the two nations from his position in the revolutionary government.698 In 
other contexts, these foreign executives would likely be hostile toward, isolated from or neutral 
about local struggles. However, due in large part to their connections with Cubans in the new 
administration, and their inclusion in a community of privileged outsiders advocating for 
revolutionary change, these Anglo-American residents largely supported the government in 
January 1959. Institutional and relational bridges translated Cuban realities into a language that 
privileged outsiders could understand, saturating Anglo-Americans with anti-Batista sentiments. 
When Batista fled in the first hours of 1959, few saw his departure as a loss.  
A Moderate Revolutionary Government Fluent in Anglo-American 
 William Arthur Weiland grew up in Havana and in the 1920s took a job with the Havana 
Post.699 He began a career at the Department of State in 1941 and rose to become the director of 
the State Department’s Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs in 1958.700 While working in 
Washington, Wieland helped halt U.S. arms shipments to Cuba in March 1958. Able to convince 
senior policy makers that Castro was not a communist, Wieland and others forwarded the idea 
that supporting Batista was no longer a tenable option.701 Weiland is blamed by many Cubans 
and Anglo-Americans who left Cuba for encouraging patience towards revolutionary 
government, even as tensions escalated between Washington and Havana.  
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 Even today many within the Cuban exile community, as well as Anglo-Americans with 
ties to Cuba, continue to direct their frustration at the U.S. State Department for its failure to 
recognize the threat posed by a Castro-controlled Cuba earlier, when they could have 
conceivably curtailed his power. In the first months of 1959, Weiland remained convinced that 
Fidel Castro’s influence was “towards moderation and the establishment of a prosperous, 
democratic Cuba with honest government.”702 Cubans like Mario Lazo and North Americans, 
including former CIA officer Grayston Lynch, blame Weiland and his superior Assistant 
Secretary of State Roy R. Rubottom for supporting Castro’s rise. Yet, Weiland and Rubottom 
had good reason to believe the revolution was compatible with U.S. interests. 
 Rubottom and Weiland came to their conclusions in large part after listening to many 
Cubans and Anglo-Americans who advocated for U.S. neutrality before 1959, and patience from 
Washington for months and sometimes years after the revolution took power. With the notable 
exception of Ambassador Earl T. Smith, most embassy officials, influenced by contacts within 
and around the Anglo-American colony, voiced similarly optimistic political forecasts and 
expressed sentiments largely sympathetic with the anti-Batista movement. These U.S. 
government officials under-anticipated the deep desire for a socio-economic restructuring that 
was fomenting in the countryside and spreading across the poor and working-class Cuban 
communities outside of Cuba’s major cities. 
 In January 1959 Anglo-American residents, generally informed by Cubans, largely 
considered Castro’s goals to be democratic and reform-minded. Mostly isolated from the 
experiences of poor and rural campesinos by their wealth, location and nationality, Havana’s 
Anglo-American colony failed to appreciate the social and economic commitments of the 
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struggle. Their knowledge of the Cuban sugar industry was often limited to a twenty-eight-mile 
train ride to the idyllic town of Hershey on a golf outing or school fieldtrip. The Anglo-American 
colony in Havana rarely found itself exposed to the hardships endured by cane-cutters. Those 
Cubans with whom privileged outsiders interacted and who explained the revolution to the 
Anglo-American residents of Havana before 1959 generally stressed democratic, not socio-
economic reforms as the revolution’s objective.  
 By early January 1959 it was widely known among Anglo-American residents that the 
leaders of the anti-Batista opposition held close social and/or professional relationships with the 
Anglo-American colony; the revolutionaries were trusted friends and allies.703 Many had 
graduated from Anglo-American schools and others were socialized in Anglo-American 
religious institutions. Felipe Pazos and Rufo López Fresquet had integrated easily into the 
Anglo-American colony after attending Columbia University in New York. Minister of Economy 
Regino Boti, as well as head of the Federación de Mujeres Cubana (Raúl Castro’s wife) Vilma 
Espín had attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Elena Mederos Cabañas was 
raised by U.S. nationals and attended a Methodist school in Cuba. The Minister of 
Communications Enrique Oltuski Ozacki worked for Shell Oil and attended the University of 
Miami. Minister of Public Works Manual Ray grew up in Protestant institutions before enrolling 
as a student at the University of Utah.704 Prime Ministers José Miró Cardona was a known 
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commodity to the Anglo-American colony, having his promotion to titular professor of penal law 
announced in the Anglo-American press.705  
 The composition of these new Cuban authorities delighted Anglo-American observers. 
United Fruit and Sugar Company executive William S. Chambers, who had been living in 
Havana since 1950 explained, “The first year or so a provisional government was set up by 
Castro, and he appointed all kinds of good guys to run the various Cabinet positions, and so 
forth. Everyone wanted to give Castro a chance.”706 The Chambers family left in mid-March 
1960, the same month as the last of the cabinet’s moderates.707  Jay Mallin later explained, “If 
[The initial Revolutionary Government] had been permitted to rule Cuba, the future of the island 
might have fulfilled the revolution’s early promises of peace and liberty.”708 These Cuban 
leaders with prominent roles in the new government had strong ties to the Anglo-American 
colony, as well as Anglo-American traditions, social status and values; these men and women 
helped the revolution gain legitimacy in the eyes of Anglo-American observers, even as the new 
government was being undermined by corporate interests and the United States government.  
Defending the Revolution  
 In January 1959, while many in the Anglo-American colony were still celebrating the 
collapse of the Batista government, journalistic and political condemnations of the government’s 
executions began appearing with repetition in the U.S. press, and in statements delivered by U.S. 
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politicians.709 Newspapers of the Anglo-American colony on the island tried to emphasize, and 
translate, the complex context of the executions for their readers in Cuba and in the United 
States. On January 8, 1959, the Times of Havana posted an editorial re-framing the government-
sanctioned executions: “Never has there been a revolution in the history of the world where such 
incidents of summary justice have not occurred. The history of the United States itself shows 
                                                 
709 The mainstream U.S. media generally exhibited shock in their columns. On January 8, 1959, The New York 
Times headline read “Executions Announced.” On the same day, The Chicago Daily Tribune published an article 
“15 Cuban Officers Put to Death; 207 on Trial.” Neither of these pieces articulated any justification for the 
executions beyond “charges [included] torturing prisoners.” John O’Rourke of the Washington Daily News wrote on 
January 23, 1959, “Fidel Castro’s determination to proceed with ‘rebel justice’—drumhead trials, mob juries, and 
arbitrary executions—cannot avoid stirring second thoughts among those who hoped the revolution signaled the end 
of tyranny.” The U.S. press fixated on this morbid element in the consolidation of power by the revolution. In an 
article critical of the near unanimity of major U.S. political and media figures, Dale Francis noted in the national 
Catholic action weekly Our Sunday Visitor, “denunciations of the executions by the new Cuban government have 
followed no political lines. Fulton J. Lewis and Edward R. Murrow found themselves in surprised agreement. David 
Lawrence and Max Lerner wound up for the first time in years saying almost exactly the same thing… All without 
exception denounced the executions.” The Democratic Senator George Smathers from Florida was under pressure 
from his constituents to “jump on [Fidel Castro’s] bandwagon.” The Senator refused to do so and on January 20, 
1959 inserted into the Congressional Record that he urged “restraint on the part of all,” and that it was his “hope that 
all of us will stop shooting and shouting on these important matters where hasty decisions mean ill-considered acts.” 
That same day Senator Wayne Morse exclaimed, “It is necessary to keep the record straight, because there have 
been some reports out of Cuba to the effect that fair procedure trials were held prior to the early executions in Cuba 
after Castro took over…I know, as a matter of fact, that in some instances that was not the case.” Senator Morse 
continued, “To the contrary, certain members of the Batista regime—true, known to be men with a sordid record of 
cruelty, murder, and bloodshed behind them—were not subjected to any trial in the true meaning of the term but 
within a relatively few minutes after they were brought before military officers, were shot by a firing squad…the 
substitution of tyranny for tyranny does not beget democracy.” This was not the first time Senator Morse 
patronizingly derided the new Cuban government. On January 15 the Washington Post and Times Herald reported 
“Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) yesterday denounce[d] what he called the ‘blood baths’ taking place in Cuba under the 
new Fidel Castro regime.” The article quoted Morse, the Chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
Latin American Affairs: “[The] execution of political opponents ‘is not the way for the leaders of the new regime in 
Cuba to win the support of free men and women around the world…’ [he] pleaded with the new leaders to ‘withhold 
executions until emotions calm’ and trials can be held in a better atmosphere.” Objections to the revolutionary 
government could be found in both congressional houses. On January 19, 1959, New York Representative Katharine 
St. George voiced concern in a tone similar to that of her colleague from Oregon. Referring to the public’s adoration 
of Castro immediately following the revolution, the Congresswoman said “as these startling errors of judgment of 
ours keep recurring, one begins to believe the words of the late Senator Huey Long…’you can sell any ideology to 
Americans by calling it Democracy.’” “Executions Announced,” New York Times, January 8, 1959, 3; John 
O’Rouke, Washington Daily News, January 23, 1959, quoted in 105 Congressional Record, January 26, 1959, 1153; 
Dale Francis, “Why Were They Wrong About Cuba?—U.S. Commentators Have Taken For Granted That The 
People Being Executed “Were Merely Political Opponents—They Were Not—They Were Criminals Who 
Murdered, Tortured, Raped,” Our Sunday Visitor, quoted in 105 Congressional Record, February 3, 1959, A784; 
105 Congressional Record, January 20, 1959, 914-915; 105 Congressional Record, January 20, 1959, 924; “Morse 
Asks Cuba to End  ‘Blood Baths,’” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 15, 1959, A1; 105 
Congressional Record, January 17, 1959, A274. 
271 
many instances where undesirables were eliminated by drumhead court martials.”710  A more 
strident response to criticism abroad could be found in Times of Havana editorial titled “Voice of 
The People,” which defended the large-scale capital punishment enacted by the Cuban 
government as the will of the people: “Fidel Castro and his policy of rebel justice for accused 
war criminals received a resounding vote of confidence yesterday. It echoed in an affirmative 
shout across the Palace Square and through the adjacent streets when Castro asked all those in 
favor of continuing with the trials and executions to raise their hands.” The article closed with 
strong affirmation: “without a shadow of a doubt…the people are solidly behind him 
[Castro].”711 Though the Anglo-American press proved ambivalent on the question of 
executions, they recognized the legitimacy that revolutionary justice held for the Cuban people. 
 While most Anglo-American colony members arrived in Cuba after the overthrow of 
President Machado 1933, Anglo-American journalists reminded them of the violence that 
engulfed Havana a quarter-century earlier. In 1959 Mary Louise Wilkinson wrote in her weekly 
column for the Times of Havana, “This was the first revolution that had not been followed by an 
aftermath of rioting and rampaging, of utter uncontrollability.”712 Ruby Hart Phillips reminded 
the community that in 1933 the violence was far less controlled. In her 1959 monograph Island 
of Paradox, Phillips detailed how in the 1930s the mob chased the porristas, the paramilitary 
death squads of the Machado government and their sympathizers, throughout the streets of 
Havana. She described onlookers watching bloodthirsty mobs smash a man over the head with a 
stone and shoot him in the chest before he could unleash his revolver. As the man gripped a post 
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refusing to fall, a soldier approached and, to the cheers of the masses behind him, sent the man 
mercifully to the ground with a bullet through the head. The wife and children of the dead man 
looked on from the balcony at the Hotel Pasaje as the crowd diligently set to work to render the 
corpse unidentifiable. Blood stained the streets of Havana in the days following the abdication of 
President Machado. Homes and stores were looted. With the army guided by the blind rage of 
the masses, no end to the chaos was in sight.713 Whether or not they supported the executions, a 
good number of Anglo-American residents understood that the military tribunals and summary 
executions contained the potential for even greater violence. 
 Many Anglo-American journalists emphasized the restraint shown by the revolutionary 
government during the first weeks of 1959. According to a January 17 Times of Havana article, 
“a number accused of being pro-Batista…have been freed for lack of evidence.” Fidel Castro 
was paraphrased as estimating that “no more than 450 Cubans will be executed for ‘war crimes’ 
committed during the regime of Fulgencio Batista.” The article pointed out that this number was 
less than the 450 bodies “found in the bottom of an abandoned mine shaft” killed in a single 
town by agents of Batista, with many bearing “evidence of torture.”714 Some articles revisited the 
horrors of life in prison during the Batista presidency. One opened, “Life in Batista’s prisons had 
its gentler aspects, such as indirect music. But when the music stopped, the screams began.”715 
Other works detailed the atrocities committed by the very men being put to death before the 
revolutionary firing squads.716 The executions were represented in the coverage of periodicals 
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produced by Anglo-American residents in ways that were primarily sympathetic in early 1959 
with the difficult position of the revolutionary government. On January 22, the Times of Havana 
headline read, “War Trials Begin Today After Roar of Approval Heard Round the World.”717 On 
the same day, a columnist for the same paper explained, “The people carried signs, thousands of 
signs, banners and posters all demanding the trial and execution of ‘war criminals’ of the Batista 
regime.”718 Many Anglo-American residents understood these executions were enacted by a 
revolutionary government acting in response to the demands of the people. 
 With men like López-Fresquet in the revolutionary cabinet, Cuban and Anglo-American 
businesses found ways to frame their economic participation before and after 1959 as patriotic. 
López-Fresquet created legal structures that excused businesses which withheld taxes before 
1959, casting their actions as withholding funds against the tyrannical Batista dictatorship, as 
opposed to being self-serving corporations who financially benefited from Batista’s priorities. 
Law 40 went into effect in February 1959, allowing taxpayers to back-pay taxes unpaid during 
the Batista administration. López-Fresquet successfully created capital for the Cuban 
government, while representing the business networks frequented by Anglo-American executives 
as invested in, and supporting popular revolution. Under Law 40 the revolutionary government 
required businesses to pay all of what they owed from 1958, half from 1957, and one-quarter for 
1956. This brought the revolutionary government 108 million pesos and paid for 60,000 to be 
employed in public works.719  Along with Fidel Castro’s poco a poco speech, which stressed that 
                                                 
717 “War Trials Begin Today After Roar of Approval Heard Round the World,” Times of Havana, January 22, 1959, 
1. 
718 An Old Habanero, “Thunderous Approval of Executions Echoes Throughout Republic,” Times of Havana, 
January 22, 1959, 16. 
719 López-Fresquest, My Fourteen Months with Castro, 86. 
274 
slow-pace revolutionary reforms would be implemented “little by little,” the early policies and 
rhetoric of the revolution comforted many within the Anglo-American business community.720  
 On February 7, 1959, the Times of Havana published an article that enthusiastically 
endorsed Castro. Delineating the qualities essential to a Cuban leader, the editorial called for 
someone who “fought and lived for his country…he must be intelligent, imaginative, 
creative…he should be of a good family…a young lawyer with vision…there is only one 
candidate: Fidel Castro.”721 Referencing the upcoming trip to the United States by Castro, 
another editorial read, “He will get a huge welcome as a liberator which he deserves, and he will 
see for himself how much the United States appreciates freedom and those who win it.”722 There 
was no lack of patriotism for the United States among those privileged outsiders espousing this 
perspective, but they understood well, in the winter of 1959, that to preserve their status as 
foreign citizens living in Cuba, the U.S. government would have to accept this new revolutionary 
Cuba.  
 Clarence Moore, a former CIA agent and the founder and editor of the Times of Havana, 
hoped to use his journalist platform and professional connections to help ameliorate tensions and 
perhaps preserve the relationship between the United States and Cuba in early 1959. Moore set 
off for Washington seeking an audience with Congress to address the “confusion and 
misunderstanding on both sides.” He envisioned himself as improving what appeared “to be 
strained relations between the two nations.”723 While unsuccessful at altering the eventual break 
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in relations between Washington and Havana, efforts by influential members of the Anglo-
American colony, including Moore, offered human connections to policy makers in Washington. 
They expressed the hope that their defense of the new government would make it harder for U.S. 
politicians and diplomats to identify the revolution as a dangerous, communist threat that must 
be confronted. 
 In April 1959, the Anglo-American press on the island expressed high hopes for Castro’s 
visit to Washington. The trip by Castro to the United States seemed like a viable opportunity to 
soothe a straining relationship. On April 23, the Times of Havana wished Castro,  “success on his 
tour, which has already won him numerous new friends for Cuba and the revolutionary 
government.”724 The Havana Post, the other newspaper published for and by Anglo-American 
colony, “share[d] with Ambassador Bonsal the hope that [improved relations and increased 
understanding] will be one of the benefits of the visit of Prime Minister Castro to the United 
States.”725 Headlines reflected the Anglo-American colony’s enthusiasm and optimism for 
continued bi-national relations. “Wild Welcome for Fidel On Arrival in New York: 20,000 Turn 
Out at Station Hotel,”726 and “U.S. Understands Justice of Cuban Cause”727 made the front page 
of the Havana Post. On April 18, the Havana Post commented upon the determination by Castro 
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to create a commercial treaty with the United States.728 The Cuban-based Anglo-American 
newspapers emphasized Cuban opposition to communism and all dictatorships.729  
 Many Anglo-American residents feared that U.S. power brokers who viewed Castro as 
ideologically averse to their interests were provoking strife between the two nations. The papers 
of the Anglo-American colony sought to set the record straight. Continuing to pursue his role as 
mediator during Castro’s tour of the United States, Clarence Moore made public his support for 
the new government, “In Cuba we have an honest regime that is sincerely devoted to making this 
island a better place to live for all Cubans…. There are many persons in high positions who are 
capable, intelligent and dedicated.” Trying to ease anxieties of influential Anglo-American 
executives living in Cuba and policymakers in Washington, Moore was translating again: “Cuba 
is determined to honor its international obligations…. Cuba wants foreign capital.” Moore 
reminded his readers that Castro was still widely celebrated by their Cuban neighbors and 
friends: “The morale and spirit of the people throughout the island has jumped tremendously in 
the last four months—mounting criticism from certain business groups notwithstanding.” 
Finally, turning to the greatest threat of all, Moore concluded, “Prime Minister Castro recently 
stated that communism feeds on empty stomachs and misery, and that the purpose of his 
government is to eliminate so far as is possible these sources of unrest and conspiracy.”730 
According to Moore and many others within the Anglo-American colony, in spring 1959 the 
revolution was set to achieve a restructuring of Cuban society to benefit the Cuban population. 
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Those Cubans and Anglo-Americans who were initially pro-revolution and enjoyed good 
relations with the U.S. Embassy and power brokers in the United States worked to deter 
confrontational action from Washington.  
Unsteady Bridges: Fractured Relations Between Colonized and Colonizer 
 On January 21, 1959, Philip Bonsal became the new U.S. Ambassador to Cuba. Bonsal 
was a career diplomat from a family of diplomats. His father served the United States abroad in-
between stints as a Pulitzer-Prize-winning newsman who covered the Cuban War of 
Independence for the New York Herald Tribune. The Eisenhower administration chose Bonsal 
because he successfully promoted U.S. interests when navigating a revolutionary movement in 
Bolivia a few years earlier. Unlike his predecessor Earl T. Smith, Philip Bonsal was not a 
political appointee. Smith had been a businessman before receiving the post of Cuban 
Ambassador and did not speak Spanish. President Eisenhower made clear, through his 
appointment of Bonsal, that the new Cuban government required a career diplomat; plush 
appointments designed to reward political allies would no longer suffice. Anglo-American 
colony member Ruby Hart Phillips agreed that “both Cubans and Americans approved the 
appointment.”731 To the Anglo-American colony, Bonsal’s appointment signified that 
Washington’s policy toward Cuba would be handled diplomatically and not guided exclusively 
by U.S. business interests. Yet in Cuba’s quest for national autonomy over the first few months 
of the 1959, it became clear that the ambition of the Cuban Revolution stood in contradiction to 
the geopolitical and socio-economic interests Bonsal had been sent to defend.  
 The ground under the Anglo-American colony in Cuba quickly shifted following 
Batista’s flight. Anglo-Americans found their influence and capital no longer prioritized by the 
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Cuban government. The Agrarian Reform law, which limited the size of farms on the island to 
3,333 acres, was signed into law in May and put into effect at the start of June 1959. Within six 
weeks, on July 16, Cuban president Manuel Urrutia, who enjoyed substantial popularity among 
Anglo-American residents for his stance against communism, resigned.732 The Cuban summer of 
1959 was opening with a radical turn of affairs, as Anglo-Americans found their privileged status 
uprooted by a new Cuban nationalism.  
 Panic grew in the Anglo-American colony as the Cuban government moved forward with 
the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law. The new policy challenged Anglo-American 
sugar and ranching corporations in Cuba and would cause concern in Washington. Many within 
the Anglo-American colony became disillusioned with the prospects of harmony between the 
two nations and they prepared to relocate outside of Cuba. Yet still, a large group of Havana’s 
Anglo-American residents continued to work toward maintaining their place in Cuban society, 
seeking to build bridges upon trembling ground. Some Anglo-Americans defended the actions by 
the revolution as attempts to ameliorate the suffering of a populace that had been ignored for the 
entirety of Cuban history. While condemning the verbal and written attacks against the United 
States by Cuban officials, these Anglo-American colony members were also quick to denounce 
U.S. antagonism.  
 At the end of May 1959, Ambassador Philip Bonsal met with the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs and its Chairman, Democratic Representative from Alabama, Armistead I. 
Selden, Jr. The Ambassador knew Selden to be one of the most important men involved in the 
precarious relations between the United States and Latin America. Bonsal sat before the 
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Congressional Committee being questioned by Representative Selden about the soon-to-be-
signed Cuban Agrarian Reform bill:  
Mr. Ambassador, in connection with this there has been some discussion in the 
committee on the possibility of including in the Mutual Assistance bill a section, which 
would make some reference to expropriation or confiscation of property. Do you think 
the inclusion of such an amendment in the bill would be helpful as far as the Cuban 
situation is concerned? That it might possibly ward off expropriation or confiscation of 
American property in that area?733 
 
 The ambassador did not quite know how to respond. The Representative from Alabama 
seemed to be asking for advice on whether it was appropriate to pressure the Cuban government 
to exempt U.S. interests as the Cuban economy was being adjusted. Having lived in Cuba for 
nearly half a year and engaged with the Cuban pleas for autonomy, Bonsal emphasized the need 
to respect Cuban sovereignty. 734 Bonsal responded to Representative Selden: “We do not, as I 
understand it, question the right of sovereign governments to expropriate private property…. It 
would be most unfortunate to involve the purposes and objectives of our Mutual Assistance 
policy in the settlement of these claims. We would lose far more than we would gain.”735 The 
gulf between Washington and the Cuban government was clearly growing. Cuba was struggling 
for an independence denied since it became a nation in 1902. Washington was awash with 
political anxieties that the United States had completely lost control of the situation and that a 
communist takeover could be on the horizon.  
 Coverage of the events in the Anglo-American colony press in the summer of 1959 
signaled and circulated evidence of the growing disenchantment with the revolution in 
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Washington.736 The Times of Havana sadly reflected, “We would be failing in our duties if we 
did not adequately reflect the fact that relations between Cuba and the U.S. have grown steadily 
worse in recent weeks.”737 The Havana Post and the Times of Havana commented upon the 
growing separation between the two governments. Times reporter Henry Goethals wrote on the 
day of President Urrutia’s resignation, “Worsening Cuban-American relations hit possibly their 
lowest point in more than half a century in the wake of the Díaz Lanz testimony before a Senate 
subcommittee in Washington D.C. in which the former Cuban Air Force commander charged 
that Fidel Castro and members of his government are Communists.” Díaz Lanz served in, and 
then fled, the new government in 1959. Goethals continued, “The newspaper Revolución, official 
organ of the 26th-of-July Movement said in a scathing front page editorial yesterday that Cuba is 
being ‘concretely threatened’ by the United States.”738 Another article reported on the outrage 
that Castro directed at Secretary of State Christian Herter. Speaking to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in August, Fidel Castro challenged Herter, who was reflecting on a 
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failed expedition of private Cuban citizens attempting to ignite Revolution in the Dominican 
Republic. The Cuban Prime Minister lambasted Secretary Herter for making “no mention of the 
horror that the tyranny of Dominican strong man Rafael Trujillo signifies.”739 Cuba’s Anglo-
American editorials criticized U.S. policy makers for undermining peaceful diplomatic 
coexistence. One article accused the United States Senate of turning the Díaz Lanz hearing into a 
“three-ring circus,” thus increasing the recent “venomous criticism” by Cubans against the 
United States government. 740  
 In a fledgling attempt at reconciliation, the Times of Havana sought to steer Cuban 
journalists away from attacks against the United States. In July, 1959 one editorial read, “The 
Times of Havana is distressed to read frankly anti-American editorials in the usually friendly 
Cuban press.” Eager to affirm a sturdy relationship between Cubans and people of the United 
States, the editorial sought to reassure readers “that the friendship that exists between the peoples 
of Cuba and the U.S. is too deep to be jeopardized by any such attacks in the press.”741 Despite 
their growing ambivalence toward the revolutionary government, the Anglo-American press 
continued to emphasize instances of solidarity between the Anglo-American colony, the Cuban 
government and the Cuban people. Optimism could be found in the periodicals of the Anglo-
American colony as a Times of Havana piece read, “Nevertheless, it is our firm conviction that 
the traditional friendship between Cubans and Americans will overcome these obstacles.” The 
piece ended with a plea for “officials on both sides of the Florida straits [to] refrain from rocking 
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the boat.”742 References to the historical friendship of the United States and Cuba reflected 
strong concern among privileged outsiders of the fragile space Anglo-American residents 
occupied in the contemporary political moment. A last push to salvage a tenuous relationship 
would be undertaken by elements of Havana’s Anglo-American colony in fall of 1959. It would 
end in disaster and lend momentum to cross-cultural organizing of a different kind, against the 
revolution. 
The Fall of Hope 
 The fall of 1959 began with lingering, but dissipating optimism from some sectors of 
Havana’s Anglo-American colony. In early September, Ambassador Bonsal and Fidel Castro sat 
down for five to six hours for a much-anticipated conversation on U.S.-Cuban relations.743 In 
October, the Times of Havana reported that the U.S. Ambassador met with Cuban Foreign 
Minister Raúl Roa Garcia for close to an hour.744 Some Anglo-American residents expressed 
optimism that the storms of summer had been weathered. The news improved further when it 
was confirmed that the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) would be holding a major 
convention in Cuba. 
 Anglo-American residents knew the ASTA convention was an opportunity to impress a 
group vital to bolstering tourism on the island. Arm-in-arm with friendly elements of the Cuban 
government, the Anglo-American colony set to work. They organized volunteers from the 
Anglo-American colony to “offer their cars and their time to aid with chauffeuring the wives of 
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the ASTA convention members.”745 Delegates from the Canadian Embassy courted the group of 
tourist experts while Ambassador Bonsal prepared to host a reception for the visitors.746 The 
travel agents were invited to Catholic mass in English; the women among them were encouraged 
to attend musical performances at the Women’s Club.747 Representatives of the Mothers’ Club, 
the Lyceum and Lawn Tennis Club, and the Menorah Sisterhood attended planning meetings to 
determine how best to entertain the spouses of ASTA members.748 On October 17, an editorial in 
the Times of Havana expressed the excitement that could be felt throughout the capital city: “the 
big day has arrived, and delegates to the 29th Annual Convention of the American Society of 
Travel Agents began registering in Havana today for a week of festivities and a careful look at 
the new Cuba.” Appealing directly to the new visitors, the piece continued, “Enjoy yourselves 
and come back often. You will always receive a typically warm Cuban welcome.”749 On the 
cover of the paper that same day an advertisement read “ASTA, We Love You.”750 Airline 
companies, beer and cigarettes corporations, hotels, as well as Reader’s Digest South America, 
realtors, and producers of condensed milk all made sure to place advertisements welcoming the 
travel agents.751  
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 Elements within the Cuban government also dedicated themselves to ensuring the success 
of the ASTA convention. The Times of Havana reported that the Cuban “revolutionary 
government, its people, its hotels and tourist promoters today have one sole thought and one 
purpose: ‘Welcome, ASTA, to Cuba.’”752 The agents stayed at some of the most luxurious hotels 
in the city, including the Hotel Nacional, Havana Riviera, the Havana Hilton, and the Capri.753 A 
$1.5-million renovation of the airport terminal was rushed to completion in time for the group’s 
arrival. The police coordinated with translators, office personnel and the Boy Scouts, all of 
whom sported ASTA badges. Cash registers were filled with “tourist dollars,” and an award was 
given to a local bartender who won a competition to create the official “ASTA Cocktail.”754  
 The Cuban Tourist Commission bought full-length advertisements in the expatriate 
newspapers that read, “Welcome, Amigos.”755 As one headline so aptly noted, “Things Are 
Looking Up.”756 And they were. The Cuban government and the Cuban people were working in 
conjunction with the Anglo-American colony to convince this vital group of the island’s viability 
as a future travel destination. Many seemed to imagine these travel agents could ensure the 
success of tourism in Cuba and thus the continued friendship of the U.S. and Cuban 
governments. When Anglo-American colony members took to their beds on the night of October 
20, with four days of the convention remaining, Havana’s Anglo-American residents had reason 
                                                 
752 “Visiting Travel Agents Get Taste of Havana Hospitality,” Times of Havana, October 17, 1959, 1. 
753 Phillips, The Cuban Dilemma, 114. 
754 Henry Goethals, “Visiting Travel Agents Get Taste of Havana Hospitality,” Times of Havana, October 17, 1959, 
1. 
“Cuba Goes All Out,” Times of Havana, October 22, 1959, 1. 
755 Times of Havana, October 17, 1959. 
756 “Things are Looking Up,” Times of Havana, October 17, 1959, 1. 
285 
to be optimistic. It seemed as if the Cuban government was truly committed to improving 
relations with the United States, bolstering the tourist industry and securing the standing of the 
Anglo-American colony within revolutionary Cuba. The situation was looking up; until things 
began falling from the sky. 
 On October 21, 1959, former Cuban Air Force Chief Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz took off in his 
plane from the United States and flew over Havana. This was the same Díaz Lanz who had 
accused the Cuban government of being run by communists in front of the United States 
Congress just a few months earlier. What was dropped from his plane is contested. Reports 
claimed that forty-five people were injured and two were killed.757 In the next few days, the work 
undertaken by the Anglo-American colony and the Cuban government would be near completely 
undone. Immediately following the incident Revolución, the official voice of the 26th-of-July 
Movement, led with a story entitled “The Airplane Left from the United States.”758 Prime 
Minister Castro called for a massive rally to show strength against “‘bombings of Cuban soil 
from U.S. bases.’”759 In the lead article from the Times of Havana Henry Goethals reported, 
“‘Bombardments [verbal from Castro] of recent days have made members of Havana’s 
substantial American Colony a bit jumpy. They’re not used to shots, shells and hot words flying 
across the Straits of Florida.”760 Some within the Anglo-American colony tried to reassure their 
fellow community members that this was “a moment of extreme emotion” which would pass.761 
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Others were not so confident. One American resident who had observed the massive rally staged 
in protest of the U.S.-based attack, expressed a more general unease, “For yanks who have called 
Cuba home for many decades and have always considered Cubans as virtual half-brothers, the 
week’s events were deeply puzzling and touched with disbelief.”762 Alongside their Cuban 
neighbors, large segments of the Anglo-American colony had spent weeks preparing for what 
many considered the last best hope for improved relations between Washington and Havana, 
only to watch it slip away through weak or unenforced airplane regulations on the part of the 
United States government and extremely bitter rhetoric in response by the Cuban Prime Minister. 
 For many members of the Anglo-American colony in Havana, the foundational October 
Crisis was not in 1962, better known in U.S. textbooks as the Cuban Missile Crisis, but in 1959. 
October 1962 marked a significant moment of political crisis at a time when almost all members 
of the Anglo-American colony had left the island. October 1959 launched a crisis of identity, 
place, community and belonging. After struggling to salvage for what many of them had been 
their only home for decades, the members of the colony suddenly found themselves subject to 
attacks. Many, perhaps naively, had hoped for a rapprochement between Cuba and the United 
States for ten months so that they could remain in Cuba. Yet in October 1959, the tenor and 
landscape of the challenge before them had become far more daunting. With pro-U.S. voices 
leaving the Cuban government, hostility on both sides was more aggressive, and Anglo-
American residents found themselves in a rapidly disappearing middle ground as two nations 
charged towards one another, set to unleash a political conflagration. 
 The purge of moderates from positions of influence accelerated between the summer and 
fall of 1959, yet missionaries, educators and others with deep ties to revolutionary Cubans in 
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Havana’s Anglo-American colony held out hope for reconciliation and supported the revolution 
far longer than most of their resident compatriots. Over the course of 1959 they became 
increasingly aware of the overreach by Anglo-American businesses. Their friends, including 
Minister of the Treasury (until March 1960) López-Fresquet, hoped for an end to Anglo-
American exploitation, not an end to foreign investment. He had worked toward a future where 
Cuba would partner with foreign capital in developing the island for the betterment of Cubans, as 
well as foreign corporations. In 1959 López-Fresquet explained, “I am a proven supporter of free 
enterprise, so I welcome American investors to Cuba. I want them to bring their capital and their 
know-how, but also their democratic ideals. I don’t want those who think that democracy is only 
good back home and who, when here, prefer the lucrative type of business that is done with 
dictators.”763  
 Understanding the position he held as a respected Cuban voice to foreign capital, López-
Fresquet further pushed for recognition of other Cuban voices. He lamented that many Anglo-
Americans were unable to understand the revolution from the perspective of the Cuban masses. 
López-Fresquet tried to deconstruct the revolutionary demands to his Anglo-American friends 
and allies: “In the American companies, the top positions were occupied by Americans, who 
enjoyed salaries at U.S. levels. It was extremely difficult for them to establish a relationship with 
the native personnel because of the difference in income. These Americans associated only with 
the rich elite of Cuban society, who constituted the most conservative class of the island. This 
association could not give the Americans an objective view of Cuban affairs.”764  
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 Pazos, both a friend of the Anglo-American colony and head of Banco Nacional de Cuba, 
resigned from his post in October 1959, protesting the arrest of Huber Matos for his statements 
against communism and Castro’s “overreaction” to the Díaz raid. His departure concerned 
Anglo-American residents, rapidly losing confidence in the revolution. Jay Mallin wrote, 
“[Felipe] Pazos was one of [the] best and most respected financial brains in government, and it 
was not uncommon to hear criticism of the govt. answered with, ‘as long as Pazos is in Govt., 
things can’t be too wrong.’ But now Pazos is out and, to boot, replaced by onetime Argentine 
medic Major Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, who once said on a TV program, ‘if it appears to you that 
what we are doing in favor of the people is communistic, then we are communists.’ Citizens 
displayed their confidence in govt. and Guevara by forming lines to start runs on banks.”765 With 
their moderate friends and allies quickly disappearing from the ranks of the Cuban cabinet, many 
within the Anglo-American colony feared that they too would be forced from their positions of 
influence in Cuba. 
 Increasing numbers of Anglo-American residents moved back to the United States, as 
well as Canada and Britain. Coverage on the exodus of U.S. citizens back to the United States 
began to consume the society pages of the colony newspapers. Some Anglo-American residents 
explained their departures as occupational transfers, while others offered no explanation. A rapid 
increase in departures announced in the Times of Havana during July and August 1959 reflected 
both a mounting frustration with the tension between Washington and Havana and a fear of the 
unknown that was embodied in the new Cuban government. Doris Frank, who had first come to 
Cuba from Brooklyn in 1935 at the age of eight with her family, left in June of 1959 with her 
husband and newborn son. As a Jew, she explained that just fifteen years removed from the 
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Holocaust, many Jews within the Anglo-American colony feared the rise of totalitarianism under 
the new Cuban government.766  
 By January 1960, the revolutionary government increased its control over local press 
agencies, provoking reaction from the Anglo-American colony. An editorial in the Times of 
Havana challenged the ethics and integrity of the Cuban Revolution with charges of censorship 
in a piece entitled “Press Submits to an Indignity.” The revolutionary government had begun 
forcing Cuban newspapers to print coletillas, a state-written paragraph undermining the validity 
of disagreeable stories. Anglo-Americans decried the practice as a violation of journalistic ethics. 
The Times of Havana lamented, “Freedom of the press protects a newspaper’s right to publish 
and its right NOT to publish material…. We respectfully urge the Cuban government to take the 
necessary steps to correct this situation.”767 Feeling forced to choose between two nations they 
viewed as home, U.S. nationals were beginning to choose the United States.768  
Ernest Hemingway and the Privilege of Celebrity  
 Unlike other Anglo-Americans in Cuba, Ernest Hemingway, who never fully integrated 
into the Anglo-American colony, remained privileged in revolutionary Cuba due to his celebrity. 
Likely the most famous U.S. expatriate in Cuba, Hemingway returned to Cuba, his home of 
twenty years, in March 1960. Throngs of fans and reporters met him at José Martí International 
Airport.  Asked what he thought of increasing U.S. hostility toward the island, he kissed the 
Cuban flag and spoke with raw criticism of U.S. policy. New York Times reporter Herbert 
Matthews, a friend of Hemingway, wrote his colleagues at the paper, “Ernest Hemingway is still 
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the great hero of the Cuban people. He is staying at his home [in Cuba] working as a deliberate 
gesture to show his sympathy and support for the Castro revolution. He knows Cuba and the 
Cuban people as well as any American citizen. I was glad to find that his ideas on Fidel Castro 
and the Cuban Revolution are the same as mine.”769  
 A loyal U.S. citizen, Hemingway and so many others watched with frustration as 
relations between the United States and Cuba began to deteriorate. From Cuba, in the past, 
Hemingway had aggressively thrown his reputational weight behind the interests of the United 
States government. During the rise of fascism in Europe he organized a pro-U.S. private 
intelligence network in Cuba to counter one formed by the pro-axis groups on the island. He did 
this with the permission and eventual support of the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba during WWII 
Spruille Braden. Now, however, he was compelled to voice his support of the Cuban 
revolutionary government. In a letter to United States’ General Charles T. Lanham, Hemingway 
insisted, “I am a good American and have been to bat for my country as often as most—without 
pay and without ambition. But I believe completely in the historical necessity of the Cuban 
revolution.”770 Hemingway had been married in Cuba, had many Cuban friends and supported 
the ousting of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Hemingway even played baseball on a local 
team with Dr. José Luis Herrera who would join the new Cuban government. After the 
assumption of power by the revolution, Hemingway announced, “the Cuban people now have a 
                                                 
769 Herbert L. Matthews to Dryfoos, Merz, Gatledge, Markel, Freedman, memorandum, 15 March 1960, Columbia 
University, Butler Library, New York, NY, Matthews Papers, Series II: Cuba, 1909-2002 (1937-1976), 1948-1978, 
Box 12, 2. 
770 Ernest Hemingway to General Charles T. Lanham, January 12, 1960, in Ernest Hemingway: Selected Letters, 
1917-1961, Ed. Carlos Baker (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1981), 899. 
291 
decent chance for the first time ever.”771 Hemingway would commit suicide on July 2, 1961, just 
a few months after the Bay of Pigs invasion.  
Conclusions 
Between 1956 and 1958, members of the Anglo-American colony had little sense that 
their place in Cuba would be challenged by political events. They knew well, and held 
confidence in, the leaders of the early revolutionary government. They heard their words and 
values being echoed by revolutionary authorities in the first days of 1959. They became aware of 
the brutality revolutionary leaders fought so hard to overcome. Yet in March 1960, Rufo López-
Fresquet joined Felipe Pazos as a civilian, becoming the last moderate from the initial cabinet to 
resign. Cuban officials who were considered allies and members of the Anglo-American colony 
were being replaced by officials either unknown or unfriendly to Anglo-American interests.772 
With Cuban journalists and government officials attacking the United States government and the 
removal of Cuban officials who were seen as allies by Anglo-American residents, the devastating 
reality of tensions between home and homeland was becoming undeniable to colony members. 
 Those working in cultural institutions, with close ties to Cubans, took longer to become 
disillusioned, but soon, along with their Cuban friends and allies, they too began to leave the 
island. An overwhelming majority of those Cubans who graduated from the “High School” 
tracks of schools like Ruston, Lafayette, Candler and Merici would leave as well. Certainly, 
much of this has to do with class and race, as the Cubans who attended elite Anglo-American 
schools in Havana were mostly white and wealthier Cubans who would be valued in the United 
States and were being devalued in revolutionary Cuba. Overall those Cubans and Anglo-
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American residents who built cross-cultural communities in the contact zones of the Anglo-
American colony, wanted to maintain a capitalist system and relations with the United States, in 
a democracy. This is why most expressed great excitement in the first days of 1959 and 
disillusionment in the months and years that followed. These privileged outsiders and privileged 
insiders had been stripped of their status as the revolution upended Cuban hierarchies.  
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CHAPTER TEN: BECOMING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY 
Disillusionment 
 On January 1, 1959, the Cuban people overthrew a Cuban dictatorship, not a colonial 
government. Many Anglo-Americans who considered themselves “apolitical” prior to the 
revolution, celebrated the transition. They imagined the dawn of stability, democracy and peace, 
envisioning their future as secure on the island. Many, though not all Anglo-American residents, 
advocated for a quick recognition of the new revolutionary government.773 Yet within days, the 
revolution stoked the anxieties of the most conservative elements of the Anglo-American colony. 
Adele Fuchsberg remembers how an experience with Fidel Castro transitioned the revolution 
from hopeful to troublesome in her family in early 1959: “I was playing squash outside with one 
of my boy cousins, and Castro came up and said, ‘Does Max Pincus live here?’ And my 
grandfather [Pincus] came out.” Fuchsberg listened as Fidel Castro asked Pincus, “Max, why do 
you need more than one home and why do you need more than one refrigerator?” As the product 
of a marriage between a wealthy Cuban mother and father with U.S. citizenship, Fuchsberg and 
her family realized their privileged position in Cuban society was being challenged by a 
government that sought to reconstruct socio-economic and national hierarchies on the island. She 
narrates this as the pivotal moment in her rejection of the revolution.774  
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 While most Anglo-American residents were more delayed in their turn against the 
revolution than the Pincus and Fuchsberg family, the Anglo-American colony’s sense of political 
“neutrality” grew precarious and untenable during 1959. Unlike more traditional colonial 
outposts, North Americans and British nationals in Cuba could conceive of themselves as outside 
politics during the Batista government (1952-1958). Batista was a Cuban, who like nearly every 
Cuban president before him, prioritized foreign interests. However, between 1959 and 1960, the 
ability of colony members to remain neutral shattered, along with their privileged status on the 
island. Cuban professionals and Anglo-American residents in Havana who advocated for 
political changes during the Batista government had envisioned traditional democratic structures 
and a return to the progressive 1940 Constitution. These visions were the explicitly stated 
political aim of the revolution in the Sierra Pact of 1957, affirmed at a meeting of rebel leaders 
who in 1959 occupied important positions in the new government. Along with most Cubans, 
Anglo-American residents generally held no expectation that a revolution with these stated goals 
would dismantle existing socio-economic hierarchies. Yet by the end of 1959, privileged 
outsiders found their place of influence and luxury challenged, as John Parker contends, 
“[American] club members, for the first time in his middle-class American life…were subject to 
arrest on mere suspicion of disloyalty to the regime.”775 As chants of “Yankee go home!” 
increasingly rang from the Cuban population, members of the Anglo-American colony realized 
something unexpected was in the air; a change more radical than anticipated was enveloping 
Cuba.776  
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 Colony members reacted to their devalued status in a number of ways, depending on the 
economic, geographic, political, cultural and relational space they occupied. Proximity to Cuban 
suffering, goals in Cuba, contacts on the island and the significance of their personal loss all 
shaped their response to events. Those without deep roots in Cuba often sought a quick exile. 
International employers transferred these foreign executives home or to another site of operation. 
Some with Cuban friends and family seeking to flee, established escape routes for their Cuban 
contacts. Many long-term Anglo-American corporate heads who became aggrieved when the 
revolution stripped them of their influence and respective enterprises, dedicated their efforts 
toward sabotaging the new government. A few colony members who witnessed their life’s work 
being undone by an increasingly undemocratic revolution, collaborated with the U.S. 
government to undermine Cuban authorities, often with violence, in order to restore what had 
been taken. Those Cubans and Anglo-Americans who resisted the Castro government organized 
and argued in the very discourses of Western democracy and freedom they had mastered in 
Anglo-American cultural and educational institutions.  
 In attempting to undermine the new Cuban government, the Anglo-American colony, 
cooperating with their Cuban contacts, helped develop major initiatives that often backfired by 
working to consolidate the revolution. Initially, Anglo-American businessmen felt comfortable 
promoting the revolution’s virtue, filling its treasury with back taxes, which helped provide the 
time, as well as the resources for more radical elements of the revolution to strengthen their 
influence. Later, the Anglo-American colony’s Cuban friends and contacts in the revolutionary 
government felt obliged to abandon the revolution, in large part due to their respective ties to 
Anglo-Americans, their individual experiences in the United States and their general acceptance 
of Western-democratic, as well as economic, values. As the revolution devalued the relevance of 
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links to the United States, knowledge of English, and the size of one’s bank account, many 
wealthy and professional Cubans saw the roots of their influence withering with the hierarchies 
of old. They began building a counter-revolutionary community, both in Cuba and in the United 
States, which would become home eventually to two million exiled Cuban-Americans.777 This 
chapter documents the intimate relations and lingering impact of privileged outsiders within 
Cuba’s counter-revolutionary opposition. Anglo-American residents, organizing with 
disenchanted Cubans who had been educated in Anglo-American institutions, collaborated, 
hoping to influence the political and economic responses of the United States government and 
fuel Cuban, as well as international resistance, against the Cuban revolution. The very public 
failures of Anglo-Americans and Cubans in enacting regime change in Cuba aided in 
transforming of the demographics of the United States, in altering the geopolitical landscape 
globally, and in allowing a new generation of Latin Americans to imagine a successful 
contestation of informal empire. 
Anglo-American Introductions to State Violence and National Ambition 
 There is little doubt that most Anglo-American colony members endorsed Cuban 
ambitions for democratic rule in 1959; however, a few were agnostic and some even hostile, as 
they understood early that replacing Batista with a nationalist revolution would be bad for 
business. The ability of foreign executives to stand with the dictator despite calls for democracy 
emanated from their financial interests and personal relationships with Cubans, who also 
benefited from the policies of the Batista government. Despite widespread boycotts by 
politicians and voters during the elections held under the Batista dictatorship, the pretense of 
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democracy satisfied some Anglo-Americans who argued political change was unnecessary. 
Those who benefited economically from Batista’s treatment of foreign capital, and who enjoyed 
few friendships with Cubans seeking reform, could remain aloof and unsympathetic to the 
political, as well as the socio-economic demands of those who remained other. Many within this 
isolated subset of the Anglo-American colony coveted relationships with wealthy Cubans at 
work and with Cuban politicians in boardrooms. They held shared interest in maintaining 
existing Cuban hierarchies.  
 A number of Anglo-American executives recognized the existential crisis the 26th-of-
July Movement presented before it even took power. Kay Torpey remembers her father, an 
executive for the United Fruit and Sugar Company “never believed that things would go back to 
the way they were because he believed that Fidel was not someone who could be bought off and 
that he was very serious and that he wanted to bring justice and equality to the people.”778 As the 
Batista government seemed to be collapsing, a group of Anglo-American business leaders in 
Havana wanted to avoid handing over power to a popular movement and sought instead to 
manage the transition to a “new” Cuba. A group of U.S. businessmen led by G.W. Potts, the 
General Manager of Esso in Cuba, counseled U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Earl T. Smith on 
December 1, 1958, that the revolution seemed similar to the “communist” Árbenz government in 
Guatemala. Potts did not have a long history in Cuba. He arrived in 1954, after Batista had 
broken twelve years of uninterrupted Cuban democracy, and thus did not experience Cuba’s 
democratic period from 1940-1952. With Batista’s increasingly untenable position threatening 
Anglo-American capital on the island, Potts advised Ambassador Smith that the United States 
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should support a military coup. Potts hoped this would transition into a military-civilian junta 
and allow the United States to manage the transfer of power.779  
 A few days following the meeting between Potts, other U.S. businessmen living in Cuba 
and Ambassador Smith, forces working against the 26th-of-July Movement within U.S. 
diplomatic circles began seeking strategies to best manage the inevitable fall of Batista in 1958. 
With the blessing of President Eisenhower, Allen Dulles and Williams D. Pawley--who was a 
friend of Batista--met with the Cuban President in early December 1958. They offered him a 
retirement in his Daytona Beach home if he would resign so that the U.S. government could 
better influence the transition of power and avoid a Castro takeover. Batista refused 
Washington’s offer, paving the way for Fidel Castro to become the unchallenged head of the 
revolutionary movement which would triumph within a month. Until the end of 1958, these 
Anglo-American businessmen and political leaders determined that the situation in Cuba 
required the diplomatic intervention of the United States. Yet in the first week of January 1959, 
swept up by the popular enthusiasm for revolution and with few other options, this same 
community of U.S. businessmen recommended a quick recognition of the revolutionary 
government. On January 7, the United States formally recognized the new Cuban authorities who 
Pawley, Eisenhower and Dulles had tried to undermine by convincing Batista to resign a few 
weeks earlier.780   
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Identifying the First Crimes of the Revolution 
 Many Anglo-American residents were ignorant of the brutality of Batista-government 
personnel; these members of the community expressed anger at the firing squads that followed 
Batista’s flight. Most Anglo-Americans lived relatively sheltered lives on the island as Batista 
shielded them from the conflict as best he could before 1959. In cosmopolitan Havana many 
Anglo-American residents remained unaware of, or unmoved by the desperation of poor, and 
especially rural Cuban campesinos. From their offices and homes in the wealthy areas of 
Havana, the rumors of murder and torture conducted by Batista’s henchmen across the Cuban 
countryside seemed unrealistic. As a result, exclamations of shock and horror could be heard 
throughout the varied sectors of the Anglo-American colony with the commencement of 
executions by the revolution. 
 The widespread lack of knowledge concerning the experiences of poor and rural Cubans 
before 1959, within the more secular and business oriented elements of the Anglo-American 
colony, made the executions of Batista’s henchmen seem unlawful, unjust and cruel to many. In 
early 1959, as they watched on their televisions and saw images in popular magazines of quick 
revolutionary justice meted out by military tribunals, many Anglo-American colony members 
grew uncomfortable with the direction of events. Former colony resident Cathy Brown Crescioni 
remembers, “The executions were terrible.”781 Cuban-American resident Mary Casas Knapp 
agrees, explaining Castro, “incited the people to be screaming, ‘paredón,’” referencing “the 
firing wall. And the evil was palpable.”782 Through censorship and disinformation, Batista 
attempted to hide the death and misery consuming the island between 1956 and 1958 from 
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Anglo-Americans. By contrast, the public trials and executions after 1959 were often broadcast 
into the living rooms of the Anglo-American colony.  
 Anglo-American residents who enjoyed personal relationships with Batista often argued 
that there was no reason for Batista to lose power. General Manager of Sterling Products 
International, Edward Landreth, was among the Anglo-American colony members who proved 
most disenchanted with the revolutionary changes brewing in January 1959. Socializing with the 
Batista family at the Biltmore Yacht and Country Club, his daughter Ann Landreth Gund 
remembers, “My parents from the outset thought Castro was terrible and they’d have arguments 
with their friends. And they lost a lot of friends because most people thought Castro was fine at 
the time.” Gund continues, “My parents certainly didn’t think Batista had to go because, even 
though he was a dictator, he was a benign dictator.”783 The Landreths were not alone in this 
sentiment. The daughter of Anglo-American industrialist Burke Hedges went further, claiming in 
1959 her family wanted, “A democracy that would be good for everybody. Which actually, with 
Batista, we had.”784  
 Perhaps no Anglo-American resident was closer to President Batista than Burke Hedges; 
this relationship clearly influenced how the Hedges family experienced the revolution. Burke 
Hedges held business, political and social relationships with Batista who served as a witness for 
the wedding of his daughter, Avis Hedges Navarro, in Havana.785 Hedges served as the Cuban 
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ambassador to Brazil due to his friendship with the Batista, after being made a naturalized Cuban 
citizen. Informed by this relationship, as well as six decades of animosity following the loss of 
their possessions and home, Navarro explained, “Compared to Castro, [Batista] was a sweetie 
pie.”786 In March 1959, when the Castro government overturned the acquittals of Cuban pilots 
Avis became convinced that, “this is a dictatorship. It is a vindictive and personal dictatorship…. 
I will not live under it and my children will not be brought up under it, and that is final.” Avis 
would immigrate shortly thereafter to Miami.787 While Burke Hedges never returned to Cuba 
after 1958, Avis’ Cuban husband Tony Navarro would join the counter-revolutionary urban 
resistance helping to unleash a campaign of terror against the new government before fleeing to 
the Brazilian Embassy on January 1, 1961.788 After 1959, Anglo-Americans and their Cuban 
friends and family became vulnerable in a way they had never experienced before.  
Falling from Grace: Americanos Aplatanados Lose Place in “New” Cuba 
 Michael Sanjenis offered a critical perspective of the Anglo-American colony members 
when asked why an anti-U.S. rhetoric evolved with the revolution. Sanjenis explained that the 
revolution “Took on an anti-American tenor when [revolutionaries] found out the United States 
was not…going to respect them, was not going to grant them their sovereignty and treat them 
like an equal. In other words, they wanted to treat them the way they’d always treated them, like 
they owned them.”789 Michael was a member of the Anglo-American colony through his mother; 
his Cuban father served under Rufo López-Fresquet in the Ministry of Treasury in 1959 and 
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early 1960. He understood well, living in an ethnically mixed household, that Washington’s 
rejection of Cuban demands for independence unleashed resentment on the island.  After 1959, 
Cubans increasingly contested the narrative of Anglo-American benevolence, and began 
describing Anglo-Americans as self-interested colonizers.  
 As their angst grew more apparent over the course of 1959, members of the Cuban 
government attempted to assuage Anglo-American residents that their place in Cuba would not 
disappear. In a note to Ambassador Bonsal, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Raúl Roa 
García tried to clarify that the frustration with the United States was not directed at its people, 
but at its government and corporations. Roa explained, the Cuban government “never did 
confuse, nor do they now confuse, the American people with the power structure…”790  
 Nevertheless, colony members and their Cuban contacts were growing anxious, hearing 
the rhetoric of the Cuban government and populace, which critiqued the United States with 
increasing ferocity throughout 1959. John Parker remembered, “first seeing ‘Yankee Go home’ 
crudely painted on a house wall in old Havana.” As the son of a soldier during the Spanish-
American War and with his siblings buried in Havana’s Colón Cemetery, to Parker, as well as 
many other Anglo-American colony members, Cuba was the only home they knew. Parker 
remembers, “Cuba was the best friend the United States had and the record proves it.”791 The 
intercultural community that developed between Cuban professionals and Anglo-American 
residents watched, with a blend of pain, fear, sadness, and rage, as their lives and identities were 
disrupted, often threatened, by Cuba’s new economic, political and cultural priorities.  
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 Chris Baker, spoke of the shock experienced by Anglo-Americans as they lost their 
privilege in Cuban society, explaining that before the revolution, “the majority of Americans or 
Brits or Canadians didn’t really have an understanding of what was going on…they chose to 
ignore the big chasms that existed.” He explained, “You had thought of yourself as being one of 
the good guys; all of a sudden somebody is saying, ‘Well according to the old rules that might be 
true. According to the rules that we have now, that is no longer going to be true.’”792 Foreign 
residents across the island were devastated as descriptions of exploiters replaced the narrative of 
Anglo-American benevolence cultivated in Cuba’s foreign-run contact zones and through 
propaganda disseminated by the United States government since 1898. 
 By the end of 1959, members of the Anglo-American colony retained little faith that their 
place in Cuban society could be preserved. As tensions rose between home country and nation of 
residence, colony members watched as Ernesto “Che” Guevara replaced Felipe Pazos as 
President of the National Bank. Che then sold the gold Cuba held at Fort Knox and by November 
1959, transferred the funds to Swiss and Canadian banks. Economic shifts, and new alliances, 
were rapidly materializing. By the end of January 1960, President Eisenhower sought the 
authority to cut the Cuban sugar quota. In February, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas 
Mikoyan signed a major trade agreement with Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Counter-
revolutionaries in Cuba and in exile began a campaign of sabotage and violence. Air raids by 
Cuban exiles flew over the island, attacking and destroying Cuban sugarcane fields.793 On March 
4, 1960, the Belgium ship La Coubre exploded, carrying to Cuba “forty-six tons of grenades and 
ammunition.” Depending on the source, somewhere between forty-four and seventy-three were 
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left dead, with 206 to 345 wounded.794 This newly forming Cuba was quite distinct from the 
“paradise” the Anglo-American colony enjoyed before 1959.  
 Internal changes were rapid, and radical. In April 1960, the Cuban government began the 
process of expropriating the remaining lands owned by the United Fruit and Sugar Company. In 
May, Cuba and the U.S.S.R. re-established relations for the first time in eight years. By the end 
of that month the government called upon the U.S. petroleum companies operating on the island 
to refine Soviet oil. When the U.S. companies refused, in June 1960, Cuban officials ordered the 
nationalization of those refineries. In response, the United States Congress enacted a measure to 
authorize the President to terminate the Cuban sugar quota. In August, the Cuban government 
nationalized all U.S. businesses and commercial properties.795 Political, economic and social 
hierarchies were upended; the end was clearly approaching for the Anglo-American colony. 
 By the summer of 1960, the community was growing smaller, and held less influence 
than it ever had in Cuba. On July 11, the Vice President of the American Club Gottfried K. “Go” 
Smith pled with remaining colonists to dine at the Club’s restaurant: “It is only by patronizing 
the dining room that we can hope to cut down the substantial loss that we sustain every month…. 
Our overhead and food costs have gone up during the past year and, you must know, our 
membership has dropped off.”796 Despite the dwindling size of the Anglo-American colony and 
its more desperate attitude, some spoke of hope for salvaging the relationship between the two 
nations, and by extension, for the Anglo-American colony itself. Speaking directly and bluntly to 
                                                 
794 “Irresponsible Attitude Damaging Relations, Cuban Diplomat Told,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1960, 1; 
“Implications of Sabotage,” Times of Havana, March 7, 1960, 16. 
795 Franklin, Cuba and The United States, 26-27. 
796 “Urges Greater Use of American Club Facilities,” Times of Havana, July 11, 1960, 5. 
305 
members of the colony, an editorial in the Times of Havana, published on July 18, 1960, 
expressed this tenor.  
Although it seems awfully late in the day, the Times continues to plead for the ultimate 
understanding between two friendly peoples. We simply refuse to believe that a historical 
friendship cannot survive a bad year, and we go ahead on that thesis. The situation 
between the United States and Cuba requires the patience and attention of our best minds. 
If democracy is a good product, then it is up to all of us to make it work.797 
 
By October, desperation had set in and many recognized it was only a matter of time before 
relations would be permanently severed. The Havana Post ended Cuban operations in September 
1960, leaving the Times of Havana as the sole multi-weekly voice for the Anglo-American 
colony. The Times was shuttered in November. 
 At the end of 1959, Ruston headmaster Baker began to entertain his own doubts about the 
direction of the new government. He dedicated his life’s work to the “promotion of democracy” 
in Cuba, and yet the revolutionary government seemed to continually delay its pursuit of 
democracy. By this time, most of his contacts in the early government had been purged or 
resigned. The last moderate cabinet member, Rufo López-Fresquet, left in March 1960. Baker 
remembers, “The year 1959-1960, the last one the school operated its regular schedule, began 
well…. But as Castro extended his dictatorship, Ruston families, Cuban as well as American, 
began to move to the United States. At the opening of classes in September 1960, there were 
only 150 students left.”798 James Baker remained in Cuba until January 4, 1961 with his wife 
Sibyl. That day they carried “Five suitcases of clothes and left behind the school, our home and 
all our 22 years’ work…. We too were refugees. Refugees driven from our home by Castro’s 
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tyrannical dictatorship. Refugees concerned about the future of the country and people we 
loved.”799  
Professional Class Cubans and the Counter-Revolution   
 Many Cubans who had cultivated skills, cultural norms and Anglo-American friendships 
due to contact with privileged outsiders, grew frustrated with the rise of anti-U.S. rhetoric and 
the diminishing influence of Anglo-American values on the island. Fluency in English and an 
electoral democracy, that many Cuban professionals worked hard to attain, seemed to matter less 
than ever. Anglo-American ways of dressing, celebrating, speaking and thinking became 
symbols of the counter-revolution, as Cubans abandoned their business suits, stopped celebrating 
Christmas, no longer chewed gum and altered their own understandings of history and visions of 
the future. Cuban and Russian alternatives replaced U.S. material goods and cultural norms 
cultivated by wealthy Cubans looking to advance socially and financially in an economy 
dominated by Anglo-American interests.800 For many Cubans who had assimilated and aspired 
toward Anglo-American values and forms of knowledge, this rupture in U.S.–Cuban relations 
felt like a betrayal.  
 Notions of democracy, as well as North American and British definitions of modernity, 
shaped the developing subjectivities and hybrid identities of many young Cuban students 
attending Anglo-American schools.801 In a 2016 interview, Ricky Sánchez reflected on his 
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commitment to Western-styled democracy in Cuba. A former Cuban student at Havana’s top 
U.S.-run private school in 1950s Cuba, Sánchez attributed his democratic principles to his U.S. 
education. He explained, Ruston Academy “stressed democratic values as much or more than 
any school that I’ve heard of…ambassadors from the United States…would come to talk to us 
about democracy.” Excited about the early direction of the revolution, and his ability to witness 
and participate in the transformation of his society, in a patriotic gesture Sánchez turned down 
U.S. universities to attend the University of Havana in 1959. Yet after Castro denounced and 
distanced the government from the democratic values Sánchez had been schooled in, he grew 
disillusioned. Sánchez explains, “One defining moment and I’ve always said it… [Castro] gave a 
speech in which his theme was…. ‘Eleciones para qué?’ Why should we have elections?…. And 
in my background of Ruston, that was what I had been taught that was bad about the other 
government, that it was a “dictatorship” without elections. And here the guy bringing hope…. It 
blew my mind. It completely blew my mind.” He continues, “From then on, progressively I 
decided to get a little more involved in things, and then I decided to leave and come here and join 
the invasion.” Seduced by the promise of democracy, Sánchez “could not fathom supporting 
either the previous government before Castro, nor Castro later on.”802 So thoroughly identified 
with the ideologies cultivated at Ruston, as a young man he was willing to sacrifice his life for 
his vision of a democratic Cuba, and so he chose to participate in the CIA-organized Bay of Pigs 
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Invasion of April 1961.803 Eighteen months after his capture, at the end of December 1962, 
Sánchez was welcomed to Miami by James Baker’s sons, Dennis and Chris, awaiting him at the 
Dinner Key Auditorium.804  
 Fidel Castro’s refusal to purchase arms from the United States ultimately convinced the 
Minister of Treasury Rufo López-Fresquet to leave the Cuban government.  López-Fresquet had 
hoped to coordinate the weapons deal with Mario Lazo, who represented Anglo-American 
corporations and governments on the island. The Minister of the Treasury was the last “pro-U.S. 
moderate” to serve in the revolutionary cabinet.805 López-Fresquet recalls, “Up to my last minute 
in the government I preserved the hope that Castro would somehow abandon the Communist 
road. I felt that, owing to my contacts with American officials, I could serve as a bridge to renew 
the traditional good relations that geography, history, culture, and economy direct Cuba to 
maintain with the U.S.”806 This was not to be, as Anglo-American colony members saw the last 
friendly face leave office in a revolutionary government once filled with friends and allies whom 
many colony members celebrated with fourteen-months earlier. 
 For Minister López-Fresquet, Castro’s refusal to buy arms from Washington seems to 
have signaled a decisive break with the United States. His deep and intimate ties to the United 
States finally forced López-Fresquet to leave his post in the revolutionary government. Still, 
López-Fresquet argued: “Those who combat Castro only because he confiscated their ill-
acquired properties, or made them leave Cuba for fear of being tried for their crimes, or took 
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away their privileges, or did not appoint them to public office…. These counter-revolutionaries 
do not believe in democracy; to them the Cuba of yesterday was perfect.”807 López-Fresquet 
served in a government that approved a number of radical economic reforms and demanded 
national sovereignty, however, it seems, the Minister of the Treasury could not imagine serving a 
Cuba completely severed from the United States. 
 In López-Fresquet’s memoirs, he commended many within the Anglo-American colony, 
including the professional staff at the U.S. Embassy who worked in solidarity with Cubans 
seeking democratic and sovereign institutions. Still, from exile, López-Fresquet concluded that 
U.S. businesses and U.S. ambassadors Gardner and Smith “provided Castro with all the 
examples he needed to convince the Cuban people of the evil intentions of U.S. policy in 
Cuba.”808 For López-Fresquet and others like him, who had been educated in the United States, 
who worked with Anglo-American corporations or who married a U.S. national, deep attachment 
to the United States and Anglo-American democratic values obstructed their ability to continue 
aiding the process of reordering Cuban society. After resigning on March 17, 1960, López-
Fresquet walked from the Presidential Palace to the American Club, wearing a green tie, and 
preparing to celebrate St. Patrick’s Day. He recalls, “I never enjoyed as I did then the party given 
each year on that date at the American Club.”809 
 Most Cubans educated at Anglo-American schools, many Cubans who worked in 
Protestant institutions, especially in Havana, and those who socialized with Anglo-Americans in 
clubs would leave the island by the end of the 1960s, with a substantial portion leaving much 
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earlier. Much of this has to do with class; most of the Cubans who closely and intimately 
interacted with Anglo-Americans were relatively wealthy before being stripped of property, 
capital and influence by the revolution. These Cubans and their allies in the Anglo-American 
colony built intercultural communities in the contact zones of the Anglo-American colony. 
Within these contact zones many developed shared visions for what Cuba should look like after 
1959. They generally hoped the nation would become a Western-styled democracy with a 
capitalist system that strove for more equal relations with the United States. This vision was 
saturated in Anglo-American conceptions of individual and economic freedom. It is no surprise 
that most of these relatively wealthy Cuban professionals with close ties to Anglo-American 
residents expressed great excitement in the first days of 1959, and profound disillusionment in 
the months and years that followed. 
Education Provides Paths to Neverland in Times of Revolution 
 In transnational circles of resistance, Cubans and Americanos aplatanados organized 
against the revolution by applying financial and political pressure on the Cuban government, 
while often taking personal and political risks. After “Castro showed his true colors” Bessie 
Sams Casas “hid anti-Castro students.” Her daughter Mary recalls, “This is in the fall of 1960. 
My mother hid [members of the] anti-Castro resistance in the home.”810 As principal of the 
Episcopalian Cathedral School, and with a Cuban husband, Bessie Casas held a close attachment 
to the island. Friends, students, family and acquaintances leaned on her for support as they 
fought to defend the Cuba they knew from collapsing. Educators who mobilized support for the 
revolution between 1956-1959 joined their Cuban contacts to resist government moves towards 
communism and totalitarianism. 
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 Before leaving Cuba, James Baker and Ruston Academy mobilized financial and social 
networks to resist the revolutionary government. While it is well known that operation Pedro 
Pan developed as a collaboration between the U.S. State Department and the Catholic Church, 
the program originated in cultural institutions of the Anglo-American colony.811 Spurred by 
propaganda disseminated by counter-revolutionary forces, a very real fear among Cuban parents 
surrounding the forced separation of families and the reeducation of Cuban children took hold on 
the island in the early 1960s.812 The varied contact zones across the island, including Ruston 
Academy, provided safe spaces for Cubans, North Americans and British nationals to organize 
themselves in response.  
 In November 1960, a member of the counter-revolutionary underground approached 
James Baker seeking an educational scholarship to the United States for his seventeen-year-old 
son. Baker knew this man as a Cuban parent of a child who attended his school. Baker explained 
that “[This man] and the other parents opposing Castro were willing to face personal 
imprisonment, even death, as they struggled for their country’s freedom. But they were 
concerned about their children. They feared that if they were imprisoned or killed their children 
might suffer the fate of the Spanish children who during the Spanish revolution were sent to 
Russia when their parents were imprisoned for their opposition to the government.” 813 In early 
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December 1960, Baker flew to Miami to garner the support of business leaders from the Anglo-
American colony in exile to help finance the students “whose parents sought a way to send their 
children alone to the States.”814 Working with the Catholic Church in Miami, “I would send 
these names to Father Walsh. He in turn would obtain for them the student visas required by the 
Immigration Department.”815 Baker and other members of the Anglo-American colony utilized 
networks developed through intercultural institutions to organize individuals and agencies so that 
Cuban youths could be sent abroad as part of operation Pedro Pan. Baker did not anticipate that 
the U.S. would sever diplomatic ties, disrupting the Pedro Pan project. 
 In January 1961, the Eisenhower administration ended relations with the Cuban 
government after it demanded the staff at the U.S. Embassy be reduced from 150 to 11.816 Walsh 
and Baker lost the ability to attain legal visas, and so they improvised. British authorities in 
colonial Jamaica would grant student visas to Cuban youths with the understanding that they 
would simply pass through en route to Miami. With the breaking of relations on the horizon, 
Baker organized a committee in Cuba to gather the names of children whose parents wished to 
send them off island before his departure on January 4, 1961.  
 Baker worked to organize a transcultural network of mostly educators to transport Cuban 
children from Cuba to the United States. He was aided by fellow educator Penny Powers, a 
British national and former teacher at the Anglo-American-run Phillips School in Havana and 
their Cuban contacts including Berta Finlay, a former Ruston teacher and Frank Finlay, head of 
KLM Airlines in Havana. From exile, James Baker recalls his “most important assignment was 
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to receive unaccompanied children when they arrived at the Miami airport…. Because of 
Castro’s policy of delaying flights to Miami…it was [often] necessary…to be in the airport 12 to 
16 hours a day.” 817 Margarita Oteiza, formerly a Cuban teacher working at Ruston, now in exile, 
helped relieve Baker by organizing a group of North American and Cuban mothers from the 
school to provide round-the-clock service as volunteers.818 The networks of Anglo-Americans 
and Cubans in Miami and Havana proved pivotal to the transnational transport of more than 
14,000 unaccompanied minors between Cuba and the United States in the twenty months 
between December 1960 and the October Crisis of 1962.819 This operation transformed the 
demographics and politics of both Cuba and South Florida.  
Anglo-American Colony Residents and the U.S. Government  
 With the implementation of revolutionary policies and the unwillingness of Anglo-
American residents to accept their new status on the island, it was clear that the Anglo-American 
colony in Cuba could not be salvaged. A literal and existential loss of place provoked a profound 
sense of anger and betrayal. Many Anglo-American residents organized to avenge the new 
Cuban government through fiscal sabotage, promotion of anti-Castro policy solutions in 
Washington or by mobilizing for counter-revolutionary actions. Before leaving Cuba, some 
Anglo-American residents worked to injure the Cuban economy. As was the case with many 
Cubans, Anglo-American colony members attempted to, and often succeeded in illegally 
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removing their capital and property from the island as they fled. Some well positioned executives 
actively worked to destabilize production and ensure shortages in Cuba. These Anglo-American 
residents sought to preserve the wealth they had earned on the island, to keep their capital from 
the revolution’s coffers, as well as to avenge their loss of status and home. 
 While many lost everything to the revolution, some Anglo-Americans successfully 
smuggled their money and personal possessions out of Cuba and out of the hands of Cuban 
authorities. To prevent the flight of capital, the revolutionary government enacted strict 
guidelines that severely limited what could be taken out of the country. To get around these 
restrictions, Adele Fuchsberg remembers her father and uncle rolling up U.S. bills and placing 
them into emptied cigarettes so the currency would not be seized as they left the country. 
Fuchsberg recalls, “They were doing this meticulously. Taking out the tobacco, putting in 
money, putting it back in packs and sealing it up. And I was told never to tell anybody.”820 Ann 
Landreth Gund’s mother similarly hid $100 bills in her cigarette boxes before exiting the 
island.821 Stephanie Braxton’s mother convinced the dock master to allow her property to be 
shipped out without being searched in the summer of 1960.822 Albert Goltz’ mother relied upon 
contacts at the British Embassy to smuggle linen, silver, pictures and other personal items to 
New York.823 Before leaving in September 1960, Comida Arensberg gave the family silver to the 
West German ambassador who got it off the island for her.824 Allyan Watson-Rivera remembers 
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her Scottish father and U.S.-born mother decided to donate their valuable tableware to the British 
Embassy, rather than have it claimed by revolutionary authorities.825 Anglo-Americans took 
great risk to keep their money and property as they carved a new life in the United States, while 
others were simply determined to prevent the revolution from profiting off their family’s loss. 
 Consequences imposed by the Cuban government for foreign nationals caught in 
smuggling activities proved substantial. In the summer of 1959, Fuchsberg set off to summer 
camp in North Carolina as she did every year with cousins from New York. To her surprise when 
unpacking her suitcase, she discovered silver trays, silver candlesticks and cutlery.826 Adele 
Fuchsberg’s father Meyer spent a few weeks in a Cuban jail for his smuggling activities after 
being discovered with a suitcase of cash by the family cook Dominga, who reported Meyer 
Fuchsberg to revolutionary authorities. Adele explains that with the influence of President 
Eisenhower, her father secured a temporary release from prison to attend his mother’s funeral in 
New York. He never returned to Cuba.827   
 Motivated by a sense of betrayal, many Anglo-American executives hoped to stymie the 
Cuban economy over which they no longer held influence. General Manager for Sterling 
Products International, Edward Landreth, burnt company recipes for pharmaceutical drugs before 
leaving so that the revolution could not profit from the corporation’s intellectual property. Ann 
Landreth Gund recalls Secretary of State Christian Herter, a friend of her maternal grandfather, 
called to warn Edward that he was on a “some sort of blacklist” and the family should “get out 
immediately…” Ann explains, “My father came home from work on whatever day it was in May 
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and he was followed by three or four very large crates that were about 4 x 6 feet in which were 
all the prescriptions, all the recipes for all the drugs. And we spent the entire night burning the 
recipes in our fireplace.” A young girl at the time, Ann remembers behind the fireplace “the 
entire wall was mirror…the heat got such that the mirror cracked all the way. The next morning 
our gardener saw all these ashes and got very suspicious and we were really afraid that he was 
going to…I don’t know what we were afraid of. But my father had already made the decision 
that we were going to leave that day…. We left within 12 hours of the time that my father got the 
word.”828  
 Once it became clear that the Agrarian Reform Act of May 1959 would destabilize their 
position in the Cuban economy, Anglo-American sugar companies worked to undermine the 
Cuban government. Foreign executives would prove to be pivotal translators and predictors of 
doom and danger to U.S. policy makers in the months to come. Lawrence A. Crosby, President 
of Vertientes-Camagüey Sugar Company, Phillip Rosenberg, and other sugar executives in Cuba 
worked to undercut the new government through internal and external pressure.  In May 1959, 
Lawrence A. Crosby told State Department officials that his mill would perhaps refrain from 
financing the clearing of cane fields and the development of new irrigation systems, due to the 
political situation in Cuba. Longtime colony member Phillip Rosenberg participated in an 
economic slowdown conducted by sugar executives in 1959 who sought concessions from the 
revolutionary government. Rosenberg refused to fertilize and plant new crops, working to ensure 
a “sugar shortfall” on the island that could damage the Cuban treasury, as well as the 
revolution’s reputation for strengthening the Cuban economy.829 
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 Throughout 1959, U.S. sugar executives and the U.S. State Department seemed to 
develop a coordinated response to the evolving situation in Cuba, creating shortages on its main 
export. The passage of the Agrarian Reform Law in May 1959 nurtured seeds of conspiracy 
developing between interested U.S. business and political actors dedicated to bringing down the 
revolutionary government. Upon the law’s publication, Lawrence A. Crosby called Assistant 
Secretary of State Mann to declare the Agrarian Reform measures “will be disastrous to [the] 
sugar industry of Cuba.” A meeting for May 25 was hastily arranged between high-ranking State 
Department officials and representatives of U.S. business interests in Cuba.830 A report from the 
U.S. Embassy in Havana to the Secretary of State explained that Anglo-American sugar 
executives, who gathered at an embassy meeting where 30 of 34 U.S. sugar mills were 
represented, were “deeply concerned…that in addition to provisions [in the] present law, future 
regulations and interpretations thereof by present Leftist Directorate may become so onerous as 
to be real confiscation rather than just expropriation.” The sugar executives wanted U.S. officials 
to explain “what effects drastic application of [the] law here [in Cuba] will have on U.S. sugar 
legislation.”831 Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom telephoned with Crosby and Sam 
Baggett of United Fruit to help find a path forward that would be more amenable to U.S. 
corporate interests.  
 Winning the public-relations battle against the revolution in the United States proved 
significant to U.S. diplomats and sugar executives. Rubottom encouraged Baggett to try to 
influence coverage of the revolution by the New York Times. In particular, he was concerned 
about the sympathetic stories of the revolution in Times articles by Herbert Matthews. Rubottom 
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suggested to Baggett that “if United Fruit had any contact with the New York Times through 
which they could try to get Matthew’s superiors to realize what he is doing[,] it might be 
helpful.”832  
 Aggrieved Anglo-American executives in Cuba pressured a hesitant U.S. State 
Department to take a tougher stand against the revolutionary government. In September 1959, 
President of the American Sugar Refining Company William F. Oliver told State Department 
officials he felt the United States could procure its sugar from other nations, in case the U.S. 
decided to “punish” the Cuban government. Despite shared interests, U.S. diplomats proved 
unprepared for that step and recoiled at the use of the word “punish” in late 1959.833 By 1960, 
however, things had changed as Washington adopted the hardline stance of these businessmen 
against the revolutionary government. In June 1960, the Vice President of United Fruit, Sam 
Baggett authored a report with other leading U.S. executives who held economic interests in 
Cuba. Collectively recognized by the Eisenhower Administration as “The Consultants on Latin 
America for 1960,” these businessmen produced a document enumerating eight central 
recommendations: 
1. Join with other American nations in an effort to expose to the world the Communist 
regime in Cuba and help the Cuban people regain their freedom. 
2. Send strong note on expropriations to Cuban government with the warning that U.S. 
expects Cuba to compensate American property owners, as required by international law. 
3. Start campaign of “truth” propaganda to Cuban people, via radio and news media, 
exposing Castro as a Dictator and listing freedoms which have been taken away from 
them. 
4. Consult with other American countries to bring Cuban situation before OAS, 
condemning Cuba for its aggressions and seeking to impose sanctions under treaties. 
5. Impose exchange and trade controls on Cuba, thereby cutting off her dollar build-up, 
which is being used to purchase armaments. 
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6. Start action through Department of State for elimination of premiums on Cuban sugar, 
either by taxes or authority for CCC to be sole purchaser. 
7. Aid and encourage opposition elements within Cuba to overthrow the present 
Communist regime and regain internal control. 
8. Seek State Department issuance of a White Paper on Cuba indicting the present regime 
for the suppression of freedoms in the country, and its various aggressions outside the 
country, which threaten the peace, and security of the hemisphere.834 
 
All eight initiatives would eventually be pursued by Washington against the Cuban government 
in one way or another. After 1959, the United States government quickly embraced business 
leaders’ desire to help design U.S. foreign policy.   
Waging Counter-Revolution   
 Close to two dozen American Club members were arrested by Cuban authorities between 
the cessation of diplomatic relations in January 1961 and the Bay of Pigs invasion, April 1961, 
including U.S. nationals Howard F. Anderson and Angus K. McNair. John Parker estimates that 
close to 2,000 Americans remained on the island in April 1961. Parker writes after the start of 
the invasion, “Many of them sought refuge at European embassies as the mass-arrests began in 
earnest.”835 Though Howard F. Anderson was not involved in the invasion itself, according to his 
daughter Bonnie Anderson, “He did favors for the CIA. He carried messages back and forth. He 
brought in radios. Many people in the American Colony down there were active in helping 
American intelligence gather information and also providing assistance to the underground.”836 
The CIA sought out Anderson for his Cuban connections that they hoped could be useful. After 
meeting with intelligence officials in the United States, Anderson returned home to Cuba in 
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February 1961. The revolutionary government had given two-weeks notice to one of his gas 
stations before its nationalization. Turned in by a maid who became aware of his counter-
revolutionary activities, Anderson was picked up by Cuban police on his birthday, March 13, and 
charged with gun-running. The trial was set to begin on April 18, 1961.837  
 When his Cuban and Anglo-American friends learned that Howard F. Anderson was 
executed during the Bay of Pigs invasion, they were devastated. Anderson’s mother was born in 
Cuba in 1922, and she attended Ruston Academy. James Baker was her teacher. The Anderson 
family income derived, in large part, from a rust-resistant formula they developed and sold at 
their gas stations. The solution prevented salt-water from corroding the metal on automobiles for 
Cubans and Anglo-Americans alike. Anderson was a regular at the Hemingway Fishing 
Tournament with his famed sailboat, known as one of the finest docked at the Biltmore Yacht 
Club. His son Gary swam the 100-meter butterfly for the Biltmore’s club team.838 Howard served 
as Commander of American Legion and former director of the American Chamber of 
Commerce. Mario Lazo, who himself was detained following the invasion, attempted to provide 
legal representation for Anderson hoping to save his life. When he failed to do so he asked his 
longtime partner: “How did they get away with [executing him] under the law?” His partner 
responded, “Mario, the law had nothing to do with it.” 839 The rules were in flux as Cuban 
hierarchies shifted. Privileged outsiders no more, Anglo-Americans were significantly more 
vulnerable to the Cuban justice system after 1959. 
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 Exile did not end attempts by Anglo-American colony members to dismantle 
revolutionary authorities in Havana. John Parker worked with a Cuban exile group called 
Comandos L in 1962 and 1963, raiding the island in an effort to “do as much damage as 
possible” and “keep the Castro forces insecure and get as much publicity as possible to give lie 
to the impregnability of the Cuban communist government.”840 According to Parker, Comandos 
L depended on funding from Cubans as well as “Americans who had lived in Cuba.”841 Exile 
groups like these lit Cuban cane fields ablaze and targeted Cuban infrastructure to undermine the 
Cuban economy. In the early 1960s many Cubans and some U.S. nationals landed in Cuba 
hoping to foment an uprising; most were captured by Cuban authorities.842 For the Anglo-
American residents that participated in counter-revolutionary activities, transnational solidarities 
with Cubans solidified in their shared experience of exile. 
Patriotic Cold Warriors 
 Upon hearing the news of Batista’s flight in the early hours of January 1, 1959, Meyer 
Lansky traveled from the Plaza Hotel to the Sans Souci, managed by fellow mafioso Santos 
Trafficante, to remove money from the Casinos and secure the cash at Joe Stassi’s home. Lansky 
then went to the Hotel Nacional and his Riviera Hotel to do the same. Upon hearing about the 
revolutionary victory, Cubans took to the streets and targeted their anger at the financiers of the 
Batista regime--the mafia-controlled casinos. On January 1, 1959, Cuban mobs destroyed the 
gambling machines and tables of the Plaza casino in a bonfire. At the Sans Souci, angry Cubans 
damaged the gaming equipment and ignited fires. The crowds shattered the front windows at the 
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Deauville, as they attempted to enter the casino and wreak havoc. A similar scene unfolded at the 
Sevilla Biltmore, where according to historian T.J. English, “the casino was destroyed.” English 
continues,  
The greatest indignity of all was saved for the Riviera. In an act of revolutionary 
audacity, campesinos brought into the city a truckload of pigs and set them loose in the 
lobby of the hotel and casino, squealing, tracking mud across the floors, shitting and 
peeing all over Lansky’s pride and joy, one of the most famous mobster gambling 
emporiums in all the world…. Emotionally, the revolutionaries and ultimately the Cuban 
people had come to identify the Havana Mob with everything they despised about the 
Batista regime. And so they attacked the fruits of their rule in Cuba with a kind of 
savagery usually reserved for bullies, wife-beaters and child molesters. Death to Batista! 
Death to the collaborators! Death to the American gangsters!843  
 
 Many U.S. mob bosses found a home in Cuba after World War II, and became valuable 
partners to President Batista. Meyer Lansky rose to a position of legitimacy through his 
relationship with the Cuban government that empowered him to regulate Cuba’s casinos. While 
some of the children of men associated with the U.S. mafia in Cuba attended Anglo-American 
schools like Ruston, and Meyer Lansky joined Havana’s North American Jewish congregation 
for Yom Kippur services, the foreign mobsters remained relatively isolated from the 
businessmen, educators and diplomats who worked to build a cohesive Anglo-American 
colony.844 Yet unlike other elements of the Anglo-American colony, the U.S. government seized 
the opportunity to collaborate with the mafia in executing U.S. foreign policy in Cuba. 
 Despite the destruction of their casinos, U.S. mob bosses refused to leave, initially 
optimistic a place for them could be preserved in this “new” Cuba. The mafia bosses would find 
great hostility directed at them by revolutionary authorities. Though he sent his family home, 
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Meyer Lansky remained on the island in early 1959, as did Santos Trafficante. In June 1959 
Cuban authorities arrested Trafficante and placed him under house arrest. Raúl Castro secured 
Trafficante’s release after meeting with the mob boss. Jake Lansky–Meyer’s brother–along with 
others, were detained as well. After suffering these humiliations and being forced into exile, 
Meyer Lansky would put a one-million-dollar bounty on Fidel Castro’s head. 845  In December 
1959, CIA officer J.C. King sent a memorandum to director Allen Dulles proposing the agency 
analyze the elimination of Fidel Castro. The first of many operations approved by the U.S. 
government to kill the Cuban leader would be initiated on August 16, 1960.846  
 In November 1961, a half-year after the failure of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy 
formally, though secretly, initiated Operation Mongoose to assassinate Castro and overthrow the 
Cuban government.847 Seeing their interests as aligned, the Central Intelligence Agency soon 
contacted U.S. mob officials connected to mafia operations in Havana to collaborate in the 
assassination of the Cuban leader.848 In early September 1960, Italian-American mob boss John 
Rosselli came to an agreement with the CIA to liquidate Castro for $150,000. In October 
Rosselli contacted Tampa crime boss Santos Trafficante who returned to Cuba and made 
preparations for Castro’s murder.849 Of course, like all attempts to assassinate Castro, Rosselli 
failed. Revelations of this partnership between the U.S. government and the U.S. mafia, as well 
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as the CIA assassination program more generally, were made public by the Church Committee in 
1975.   
Conclusions 
 By the end of 1960 the revolution united almost the entire Anglo-American colony in 
shared frustration and resistance. Cuban events impacted North American and British nationals 
as they never had before. For the first time, Anglo-American residents found their privilege 
challenged by Cuban authorities, and many began engaging in Cuban political movements for 
the first time in their lives. Anglo-American residents employed an array of resistance strategies 
in conjunction with Cuban counter-revolutionary forces, many of whom grew disillusioned as 
the Anglo-American skills and values they had acquired became less valuable in a revolutionary 
context. Foreign nationals organized with Cuban allies to help forge a path for those seeking 
refuge in the United States. With the aid of the U.S. government, Anglo-American residents 
attempted to undermine the Cuban economy on both a personal and corporate scale. They pushed 
for hardline policies that would be adopted by the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. 
Some risked their lives to overthrow the revolutionary government, while U.S. mafia figures who 
once resided in Cuba, plotted Castro’s assassination. Through these acts of solidarity with their 
Cuban friends and allies, Anglo-American residents altered both U.S. and Cuban history in their 
counter-revolutionary campaigns. 
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CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL GAZE 
“If you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because 
your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together.”850 
 On December 24, 2015, I found myself sitting in the comfort of a tourist bus, traveling 
between the Cuban cities of Trinidad and Santiago. A German man across the aisle, speaking in 
English seemed to be lecturing a Cuban traveler about Cuba’s underdevelopment. Undaunted by 
his unfamiliarity with the historic context from which the Cuban Revolution emerged, the man 
began to proscribe remedies for what he perceived to be the ailments plaguing present-day Cuba. 
He explained that he and his family of five traveled to Cuba to see “socialism before the Cubans 
in Miami saved” the island’s decaying infrastructure. He went on to share his reflection that 
“Fidel Castro must be sad when he walks the streets of Havana, [as]…the Cubans have let the 
city crumble.” With an air of arrogance, he explained, “life is easy in Cuba’s climate, pick the 
banana, eat the banana and another grows in its place. This is why the Cubans are lazy.” He went 
on about German modernity, developed in the context of Germany’s less hospitable 
environment. The tropical conditions, he continued, are “why in this Cuban paradise the people 
live like hell, and the Germans, despite their hellish climate, live like they are in paradise.”  
 Our tourist bus passed a camión, packed with over fifty Cubans squeezed together on 
four stadium-style benches stretched the long way in the back of the truck. These Cubans were 
probably making the same journey to Santiago. Their lack of luxury likely confirmed Cuban 
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backwardness to the German tourist. Upon our arrival, the man’s family offered to share a taxi 
with me, to travel to the Hotel Casa Granda, Santiago’s premiere lodging. I had not yet booked a 
place to stay. The hotel overlooked Parque Céspedes where Fidel Castro triumphantly declared 
victory on January 1, 1959, stating, “[This Revolution] will not be like 1898 when the Americans 
came and took over...”851 I politely declined as I reflected on the ironies. Today, the island is 
threatened by a return to an imperial gaze that echoes the first six decades of the twentieth 
century.  
 Modern Cuba, similar to so much of the globe, stands at a crossroads. The looted 
economies of nations in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern, as well as Southern Europe, 
whose leadership failed them, often in partnership with foreign capital, spell disaster for the 
world’s poor. The expansive tools of informal empire have become far more precise since than 
they were deployed in Cuba during the 1950s and 1960s. Contact and development have 
materialized through coercion: sanctions, tariffs or austerity, and sometimes war. This leads to 
punishment of the lower classes for economic and political failures of the international system 
and immunity for the domestic and foreign leaders who rose and profited from conditions of 
informal empire. A rise in resentments and radicalisms is emerging, embodied and enacted as 
nationalisms, fundamentalisms and xenophobia, as well as collective resistance and 
mobilizations. Today, stratified contact, in the context of informal empire, streams across the 
globe as inequality gaps grow and antipathies metastasize. 
 In The Danger of a Single Story, Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie argues that 
a single story of an individual or group is never sufficient. The circulation of a single story about 
                                                 
851 “Fidel Speaks to Citizens of Santiago,” January 1, 1959, Accessed February 15, 2015,  
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1959/19590103.html. 
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a people or a nation, defined by generalities, promulgated by corporate or political elites, often 
reflects a narrative “used to dispossess and malign.” Hierarchies and suffering are naturalized, 
attributed to deficiencies of groups or individuals. History, as well as global economic and 
political dynamics are obscured. The people of Africa, Latin America, and parts of Europe and 
Asia are being defined by a single story, as images of their poverty, disorder, and violence 
circulate globally in abundance, through film, music, journalism, social media and literature. 
Adichie contends, “The consequence of the single story is…it robs people of dignity, it makes 
our recognition of our equal humanity difficult, it emphasizes how we are different rather than 
how we are similar.”852 These single stories thrive in the absence of contact. 
 This dissertation presents a multi-voiced history of the Anglo-American colony, 
complicating the many single stories that have been told about Cuba, the revolution, and the 
counter-revolutionary. It goes beyond the story about Anglo-American management of the 
informal empire in Cuba. The stories told in this dissertation, enriched by oral histories, reveal 
relationships and intimacies cultivated between Anglo-Americans and Cubans. Many Anglo-
Americans, especially in the first decades of the twentieth century, viewed Cuban destitution, 
political instability, and “immoral” cultural practices as reflections of Cuban temperament, 
Cuban history or the Cuban climate. However, contact with Anglo-American people and 
institutions provided a plethora of opportunities to complicate, challenge and contest that 
narrative. As we have seen, Anglo-Americans proved more and less willing to bend their views, 
depending on their standpoint, forms of engagement and proximity to suffering.  
                                                 
852 Chimamanda Adichie, “The Danger of a Single Story,” Ted Talks (July 2009), Accessed, August 1, 2018,  
https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story#t-602891.  
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 The Anglo-American colony helped to prevent the revolution, Cubans, and Anglo-
Americans from being defined by a single story. Contact enabled rural missionaries to appreciate 
the dynamics that produced Cuban poverty in the context of informal empire and an exploitative 
sugar economy. Contact garnered opportunities for Cuban professionals to convey their desire 
for republican political structures to Anglo-American knowledge-producers promoting Western 
values, like democracy. Contact encouraged Anglo-American friends, lovers, colleagues and 
allies to form solidarities with Cubans, challenging the narrative of an illegitimate and unpopular 
revolution being promoted by the Batista government in the 1950s. Further, contact provided 
Anglo-Americans exposure to the atrocities committed by Batista’s authorities, provoking many 
to defend the revolution in the first months of 1959. These multiple stories stood as challenges to 
the narrative disseminated relentlessly by the U.S. press, U.S. officials and foreign capital, 
designed to undermine the new government.  
 Many revolutionary leaders emerged from the contact zones established by the Anglo-
American colony.853 These leaders often graduated from Anglo-American schools in Cuba and 
the United States, while others attended Protestant institutions on the island.854 A familiarity with 
Anglo-American ways augmented their ability to be respected and valued by their Anglo-
American colleagues, teachers, friends and neighbors. These Cubans successfully challenged the 
                                                 
853 Homi Bhabha’s notion explains cultural hybridity, or “the ‘third space’” as between fixed cultures, which enables 
the birth of something new, influential and powerful. Rutherford, J. “The Third Space: Interview with Homi 
Bhabha,” Identity, Community, Culture Difference, J. Rutherford, ed., (London, UK: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990): 
207-221, 211. 
854 Revolutionary leaders including Frank País, Mario Llerana, Huber Matos, Faustino Pérez, Daniel Álvarez, Raúl 
Fernández Ceballos, José A. Naranjo, Manuel Ray, Carols Varona, Elena Medernos, Armando Hart and Pepín 
Naranjo belonged to Protestant churches or attended Protestant schools. Others like Regino Boti, Vilma Espín, Rufo 
López-Fresquet, Manuel Piñeiro, Enrique Oltuski, Elena Mederos Cabañas, José Miró Cardona and Felipe Pazos 
either went to Anglo-American schools, worked for Anglo-American businesses or had Anglo-American friends and 
clients.; Vicente Cubillas, “El aporte de la iglesia evangélica a la causa redentora,” Bohemia, February 1, 1959, 108; 
Pérez, On Becoming Cuban, 487-88; Ramos, Protestantism and Revolution in Cuba, 36; “Cuban News Roundup,” 
Times of Havana. July 1, 1957, 4. 
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structures that governed the island, in part by exerting tremendous influence over the Anglo-
American colony and communicating in the language and values of informal empire. In the end, 
contact encouraged a transnational community of professional class Cubans and Anglo-
American residents to contest the revolution that challenged the United States as an obstacle to 
progress. 
 Through archival analyses and personal testimonies, this dissertation explored the 
variegated terms of contact and power negotiated between Anglo-Americans and Cubans in the 
context of revolution. Through this work we see the predictable subjugation that erupts in the 
paradox of stratified contact, creating short-term economic abuse, but also the context for  
revolutionary consciousness to develop. The exploitation of labor and unceasing hierarchies 
conditioned marginalized Cubans, as well as other Caribbean laborers residing in Cuba, to 
embrace challenges to the logic and tactics of informal empire.  
 From within the networks of the same Anglo-American colony, professional Cubans 
were able to acquire Anglo-American tools and language skills through transnational socio-
economic contact. In foreign-run schools, social clubs, churches and businesses, this sector of 
Cuban society proved adept at creating allies among privileged outsiders in support of the 
revolution. As Cuban professionals in Havana narrated their desire to adopt Western-structures, 
including democracy and a free press, Anglo-Americans heard an echo of their own values.  
 On the same island and within the same colony, contact forged in struggle developed 
allies among Cuban parishioners and rural missionaries, dedicated to the political and socio-
economic reorganization of Cuban society. These missionaries taught, prayed, socialized and 
broke bread with revolutionary leaders. They lived in close proximity to poverty and suffering. 
They grieved young rebels tortured and massacred by Batista’s authorities. They observed 
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foreign and domestic corporations that dispassionately left the rural poor destitute. By 1959, they 
had become supporters, at least for a time, of the Cubans demanding a radically better life. 
 The story of the Anglo-American colony is both a dystopic story of greed and a buried set 
of narratives about solidarities forged in privilege and struggle. Single stories of the other were 
abandoned and replaced with cross-cultural alliances hatched in pursuit of complex desires, 
needs and ambitions for revolution and counter-revolution. Transnational contact between 1952-
1961, destabilized the single, self-serving narrative of Cuba promulgated by those seeking 
merely to extract wealth and influence from the island in times of revolution.  
 Ironically, in many sectors of U.S. society, the narrative of the Cuban revolution has 
returned to a single story. Many U.S. nationals only know Cuba as a story of loss, betrayal, 
authoritarianism, as well as its absence of individual freedoms, both economic and of expression. 
An imperial and distant gaze has gained ascendency, eclipsing the counter-narratives that once 
matured in Anglo-American contact zones. This simplified narrative of the Cuban revolution, 
peddled to U.S. audiences and beyond, typically begins after 1959. It focuses on the denial of 
rights, ignoring the prior history of brutality and failing to appreciate the implementation of 
egalitarian reforms. To the German visitor who sat across from me on the tourist bus, Cuba’s 
crumbling architecture, the poverty of its people and an exile community numbering in the 
millions define what it is to be Cuban. Today, without Cuban and Anglo-American social 
bridges, modern Cuba in the popular U.S. and perhaps European imagination, is draped in 
incomplete characterizations molded with the political and economic agenda of those seeking to 
undermine the current Cuban administration. Absent from today’s narrative is the complex story   
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of the Anglo-American colony, that, despite all its contradictions, destabilized efforts by power 
brokers to simplify Cubans, and amplified across national borders the meanings, passions, 
desires and significance of the Cuban Revolution.   
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APPENDIX A: ORIGINAL INTERVIEWS 
This research has been informed by a series of eighty-six original interviews conducted over five 
years, in-person, on the telephone and through email, with Anglo-Americans and Cubans who 
lived on the island and were affiliated with Anglo-American institutions in Cuba.  In the United 
States, in-person interviews were conducted in Florida, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Washington D.C., New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Illinois and Minnesota. In Cuba, oral histories were collected in Havana and 
Chaparra. Telephone and email correspondence took place with men and women throughout the 
United States and Cuba. Depending on the informant, the interview was conducted in English 
and/or Spanish. 
 
The snowball sample was gathered through original contacts with a set of key informants and 
their recommendations. The original contacts included a key informant from Ruston Academy, 
Chris Baker, Protestant missionaries Edgar Nesman and Carroll English, and Virginia Schofield 
who grew up in Oriente on United Fruit and Sugar Company property before attending Colegio 
Buenavista in Havana. The participants are classified below by the Anglo-American networks--
often more than one--they identified with. 
 
This table identifies the associations of participants’ networks while in Cuba. 
 
 
 Students of Havana’s 
Anglo-American 
Educational 
Institutions855 
Anglo-American 
Religious 
Institutions856 
Sugar 
Corporations857 
Politicians/ 
Diplomats858 
Other859 
Anglo-American 42 10 5 2 4 
Cuban 13 2 4 2 3 
Cuban-Anglo-
American 
8 0 3 1  
Total 63 12 12 5 5 
 
                                                 
855 The vast majority attended Ruston Academy. However four attended Merici Academy, three attended--and one 
taught at--Buenavista and Candler, while one attended Lafayette Academy.  
856 This number includes six rural missionaries, the children of missionaries in Oriente and Camagüey, as well as a 
Cuban bishop, a Cuban parishioner and the offspring of urban missionaries.  
857 The children of five Anglo-American sugar executives who worked for Hershey, Centrales Vertientes and United 
Fruit, the son of a Cuban engineer, the out-of-wedlock/estranged son of an Anglo-American Cuban American Sugar 
Company executive, the daughter of a British middle-manager, the son of a Cuban peddler on the property of 
Central Macareño, three Cubans from the mill town of Chaparra. 
858 The grandson of a high-ranking Batista official, the son of a Cuban senator in the 1940s, the son of a high-
ranking revolutionary official, the daughter of a British diplomat, the daughter of the Cuban ambassador to Brazil, 
and the daughter of a U.S. Embassy official. 
859 Three Anglo-Americans came from the families of independent farming communities, one Cuban’s father served 
as Ernest Hemmingway’s butler while two were the Cuban husbands of Ruston students. 
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